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ARTICLES
INTERDEPENDENCE AND CHOICE IN DISTRIBUTIVE
JUSTICE: THE WELFARE CONUNDRUM
LEE ANNE FENNELL*
This Article presents a theoretical model for analyzing welfare policy choices, a
model that seeks both to explain the puzzling persistence of welfare in the face of
widespread dissatisfaction with it, and to provide a reasoned basis for making more
satisfactory policy choices. Drawing on game theory, the author postulates that the poor
and the nonpoor are faced with a strategic dilemma as a result of their shared stake in
the alleviation of poverty. The author's analysis of this dilemma suggests that the
nonpoor react rationally by providing assistance to the poor, but that they are dissatisfied
with this outcome insofar as it imposes costs on them. Indeed, the author contends that
some of the most troubling of these costs result from decisions made by the poor in
reaction to the nonpoor's decision to provide assistance.
Having identified the strategic dilemma or "game" that results in society's
grudging provision of welfare, the author then explores ways in which society can
reduce the costs associated with welfare by changing the way the game is perceived by
the poor, the nonpoor, or both. The impact of rhetoric and program design on these
perceptions is examined in the context of past, present, and proposed policy alternatives.
The author concludes by outlining a possible poverty alleviation strategy which, by
taking the poor and the nonpoor outside the present strategic dilemma, would eliminate
some of the most problematic features of welfare policy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Welfare is a longstanding feature of our social and political
landscape,' yet it remains a uniquely puzzling piece of social policy.
Society grudgingly spends money to transfer holdings from the more well-
off to the less well-off,2 yet it is not clear why, at a philosophical level,
these transfers are made.' Far from embodying any coherent theory of
distributive justice, the welfare system represents an uneasy compromise,
acceptable to almost no one,4 forged between clashing and utterly
incompatible intuitive ideas of justice and rights.5  Nor have
policymakers articulated with clarity what results are expected or desired
1. See, e.g., MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A
SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA, at ix (1986) ("American welfare practice has
been constructed in layers deposited during the last two centuries."); Jacobus tenBroek &
Richard B. Wilson, Public Assistance and Social Insurance-A Normative Evaluation,
1 UCLA L. REV. 237, 297 (1954) ("Public responsibility for disadvantaged persons and
groups may properly be said to have begun with the Elizabethan Poor Laws in the
Sixteenth Century.").
In this Article, I use the term "welfare" to mean programs such as Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC), which are directed at able-bodied, working-age adults
and their dependents. Other programs, such as Social Security, which are consciously
redistributive but are not commonly thought of as "welfare," are not encompassed within
my usage of the term. See, e.g., DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY IN THE
AMERICAN FAMILY 5 (1988) ("Welfare, as the public uses that term . . .means cash,
food, or housing assistance to healthy nonaged persons with low incomes.").
2. In this Article, the terms "more well-off" and "less well-off" are used
interchangeably with the terms "nonpoor" and "poor," respectively. These terms are used
to designate relative levels of material well-being, with "less well-off" or "poor"
individuals falling below the level of material well-being that is generally necessary for
subsistence and meaningful participation in our society.
3. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 232 (1974) ("The
legitimacy of altering social institutions to achieve greater equality of material condition
is, though often assumed, rarely argued for."), quoted in CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING
GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 1950-1980, at 196 (1984).
4. See, e.g., ELLWOOD, supra note 1, at 4 ("Everyone hates welfare.
Conservatives hate it because they see welfare as a narcotic that destroys the energy and
determination of people who already are suffering from a shortage of such qualities
.... Liberals hate it because of the way it treats people."); KATZ, supra note 1, at ix.
5. See, e.g., ELLWOOD, supra note 1, at 19 ("[Pioverty policy must always be
an awkward compromise among competing values and perspectives."); JOEL F. HANDLER
& YEHESKEL HASENELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF POVERTY: WELFARE REFORM
IN AMERICA 30 (1991) (noting the "[clontending ideologies embedded in welfare policy");
Robert P. Bums, Rawls and the Princoles of Welfare Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 184, 237
(1989) (noting that welfare "is a political compromise among conflicting notions of
justice").
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from welfare expenditures. As a result, there is no obvious way of
measuring how well, or even if, a program is working.7
Despite the lack of articulated rationales or goals, the welfare system
has been widely disparaged as a failure, or worse, as actually
counterproductive! The current unpopularity and perceived futility of
the present welfare system have touched off a re-evaluation of welfare
policy and have spawned renewed efforts at welfare reform.'
Meanwhile, both inequality of income and absolute poverty have
continued to climb,"0 with childhood poverty becoming increasingly
prevalent."
6. See, e.g., ELLWOOD, supra note 1, at 44 ("[Wlelfare programs like AFDC
cannot decide what their goals should be."); THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL., AMERICA'S
MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE: PERSISTENT MYTHS, ENDURING REALrrIES 43 (1990)
("Social welfare programs are enormously complex amalgams of goals and techniques
7. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE,
POVERTY, AND THE UNDERCLASS 70-87 (1992). Jencks contests Charles Murray's
assertions in Losing Ground, supra note 3, that the poor have been made worse off by
welfare, but observes that a distinction must be drawn "between the material condition of
the poor and their social, cultural, and moral condition." JENCKS, supra, at 71. See also
MARMOR ET AL., supra note 6, at 222 (criticizing those who label social welfare
programs "failures" based on the "mistaken assumption that social welfare programs are
designed to pursue a single purpose").
8. See, e.g., Nicholas Lemann, In Quest of a Great Society, WASH. POST, May
10, 1992, at C1 ("In policy-making circles in Washington, the word 'failed' has become
permanently grafted onto the War on Poverty and the Great Society. The general mental
picture is one of a stupendous concatenation of wacky liberal ideas that were launched for
years, one after another, with unlimited funding, and that not only didn't work, but
actually made things worse by creating today's inner-city ghetto class.").
9. For example, President Clinton has proposed a two-year limit on welfare
benefits, with the requirement that recipients find a job (or be provided one by the
government) after that period has elapsed. See Ruth Marcus, President Pledges to Reform
Welfare: Jobs Would Be Required After 2 Years, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1993, at Al.
Wisconsin has received approval to begin experimenting with a program that is similarly
based on a two-year welfare benefit limit. Spencer Rich, Clinton Gives Wisconsin Go-
Ahead on Two-Year Welfare Limit, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 1993, at A6. Other states have
also been active in adopting various welfare reform measures. See, e.g., Will Marshall
& Elaine C. Kamarck, Replacing Welfare With Work, in MANDATE FOR CHANGE 217,
226-28 (Will Marshall & Martin Schram eds., 1993) (discussing state programs).
10. See, e.g., MICKEY KAUS, THE END OF EQUALITY 29 (1992) (describing trend
of increasing income inequality); Ranks of Poverty Swell by 2 Million, WASH. POST, Sept.
4, 1992, at Al (reporting Census Bureau figures). The income distribution in the United
States is more unequal "than in most other Western nations, both before and after taxes."
ROBERT KUrrNER, THE ECONOMIC ILLUSION: FALSE CHOICES BETWEEN PROSPERITY
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 261 (1984).
11. According to 1990 U.S. Census Bureau data, one-fifth of all children live
below the poverty line, with children under age 18 constituting 40% of the poor. U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 1990, at 60 (1991), cited in
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Welfare policy reform cannot coherently respond to perceived
shortcomings in the welfare system unless it begins with a principled
understanding of the nature and purpose of society's redistributive efforts
and the tensions that attend those efforts. A theoretic approach capable
of unraveling those tensions is necessary to arrive at such an
understanding, but none of the major theories of distributive justice
meaningfully address the full spectrum of interests underpinning our
society's troubled yet tenacious attachment to welfare. 12
What is needed is a richer model for understanding the interests and
concerns which underlie the widespread disapproval of welfare, as well
as those interests that explain welfare's longstanding persistence in the
face of such opprobrium. 3  In this Article, I suggest that game
theory," by capturing the interdependence of decisions made by
policymakers and welfare recipients, offers a useful starting point. 5 I
Julie DaVanzo, Families, Children, Poverty, Policy, in URBAN AMERICA: POLICY
CHOICES FOR Los ANoELES AND THE NATION 83, 83 (James B. Steinberg et al. eds.,
1992). The situation appears only to be worsening. See Child Poverty Hits 25-Year High,
Growing By Nearly 1 Million Children in 1991, CDF REP. (Children's Defense Fund,
Washington, D.C.), Oct. 1992, at 1-3 (citing data released by the Census Bureau in
September 1992).
12. A theory's failure to address the intuitive judgments which are embedded in
a society's attitudes towards poverty is a quite serious shortcoming if, as John Rawls
contends, "one may regard a theory of justice as describing our sense of justice." JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 46 (1971) (emphasis added).
13. The centrality of such questions has been recognized. See, e.g., KATZ, supra
note 1, at ix ("How are we to understand the persistence of a welfare system so
thoroughly disliked and so often and authoritatively criticized?").
14. "Game theory" is a term of art which refers to a particular mode of formal
analysis which stresses the interdependence of actors. See, e.g., THOMAS C. SCHELLINO,
CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 215 (1984) (defining game theory as "the formal study of the
rational, consistent expectations that participants can have about each other's choices").
Regrettably, the name has "frivolous connotations." Id. at 240. My use of it is in no
way meant to trivialize or make light of the serious human issues involved in poverty
policy.
15. The relevance of game theory to distributive issues has been recognized. For
example, James M. Buchanan's analysis of a strategic game played between a "samaritan"
and a "parasite," while quite different from my model in its assumptions and
prescriptions, presents decision matrices applicable to questions of redistribution which
resemble the ones formulated in this Article. See James M. Buchanan, The Samaritan's
Dilemma, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY 71 (Edmund S. Phelps ed.,
1975) [hereinafter ALTRUISM]. See also RAWLS, supra note 12, at 269 & n.9 (discussing
prisoner's dilemma in analyzing the need for collective agreements for the provision of
public goods); AMARTYA SEN, ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 96-99 (1973) (applying game
theory to the problem of work motivation); Mark I. Lichbach, Will Rational People Rebel
Against Inequality? Samson's Choice, 34 AM. J. POL. SC. 1049 (1990) (using game
theory to analyze interaction between the "Haves" and "Have-Nots" to determine the
likelihood the latter group will rebel); Perry G. Mehrling, A Classical Model of the Class
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begin by identifying a strategic dilemma which, while necessarily
simplified, strikes at the heart of the public's discontented tolerance of
welfare.
The welfare dilemma grows out of the fact that poverty is extremely
costly to all of society, including the nonpoor. Because of the costs that
poverty imposes on all of society, the nonpoor would be willing to pay
to have it alleviated.16 Yet because the alleviation of poverty is very
costly (although less so than poverty itself), the nonpoor would prefer that
the dependent poor17 engage in self-help to lift themselves out of poverty
rather than "free-ride" on the nonpoor's transfers. 8 To the extent the
poor can be convinced to do this, however, the nonpoor can free-ride off
the poverty-reduction efforts of the poor, enjoying the benefits of reduced
poverty at no cost to themselves.
Thus, with respect to those among the dependent poor who have the
ability to alleviate their own poverty, 9 society's dilemma can be styled
as a strategic game which pits the nonpoor against each such
impoverished family. If neither provides for that family, disaster results
for both. Yet each would prefer that the other capitulated and bore the
cost of supporting the family.' The manner in which this basic
dilemma plays out, including the way in which the presence of
Struggle: A Game Theoretic Approach, 94 J. POL. ECON. 1280 (1986).
16. See, e.g., RiCHARD A. PoSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 463 (4th ed.
1992); RAWLS, supra note 12, at 267-68.
17. 1 use the term "dependent poor" to refer to those poor persons receiving
public assistance and to distinguish them from another group, the working poor, who are
already engaged in alleviating their own poverty.
18. As my later discussion will make clear, the "nonpoor" to whom I refer act
not on their own, but collectively through government. See infra part V.A (discussing the
"free rider" dilemma which requires collective societal action). For purposes of this
Article, I make the simplifying assumption that the nonpoor are collectively in control of
the policymaking apparatus.
19. Of course, many of the dependent poor may be unable single-handedly to
effect the alleviation of their own poverty (through work or resort to friends and family)
even if they would otherwise prefer to do so. Nevertheless, there is a widespread
perception that some subset of the poor presently receiving public assistance could,
through effort, alleviate their own poverty. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Rights and
Redistribution in the Wetfare System, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1431, 1509 (1986) (discussing
the "widespread sense" that many welfare claimants "could be self-supporting but for a
failure of will or integrity").
20. This is not to say, of course, that all of the poor prefer public assistance to
self-help. The working poor, who shun public assistance to work long hours at low-
paying jobs, obviously prefer self-help. In addition, there is no way to assess the
preferences of those among the poor who are unable to alleviate their own poverty; many
of them might prefer to help themselves, if only they were able. The dilemma I identify
here applies only to those poor persons who have chosen to receive public assistance but
who could, through personal effort, engage in self-help.
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impoverished children influences the strategic decisionmaking process, is
explored in highly stylized settings to lay the groundwork for a more
rigorous examination of underlying costs and strategic possibilities.2'
In elaborating on the analysis underlying the strategic game, I argue
that the stake which the nonpoor have in the game's outcome accounts for
the historical persistence of welfare in the face of the hostility and
discomfort it has always elicited. Vast material inequality impedes the
operation of real equality of opportunity and thereby creates inefficiencies
in the use of human capital which harm society as a whole. ' Poverty
and inequality also produce externalities which all of society (including
the more well-off) find extremely costly, such as social unrest manifested
in crime and rioting, and the aesthetic and economic problems that result
from visible evidence of people living in squalor.' The existence of
poverty may also represent a costly economic risk to people who are not
presently poor, but who fear that they might become poor at some point
in the future.'
For these reasons and others (such as feelings of compassion,
particularly for the children of the poor), the utility functions of the
nonpoor are intertwined with the utility functions of the poor. A person
who is well-off suffers disutility from the plight of a poor family, and
derives utility from the fact that a poor family is made less poor.'
Viewed in this manner, welfare is comprehensible as a societal response
to the tremendous costs which poverty and inequality inflict on all of
society.
Yet the costliness of the public alleviation of poverty, coupled with
the perception that the poor should be bearing the burden of poverty
alleviation themselves, explains society's dissatisfaction with providing for
the poor. To understand better the strategic dilemma this presents, I turn
to a discussion of the costs of the public alleviation of poverty. I take the
position that the most troublesome cost of alleviating poverty is the impact
that such efforts have on decisions made by the poor. Not only do some
of the poor who might otherwise decide to alleviate their own poverty fail
to do so, but people who might not otherwise be poor may also be led to
make decisions which land them in poverty or lengthen their stay in that
21. See infra parts III.B-C (exploring strategic options in a two-adult society, both
with and without the presence of children).
22. See infra part IV.A (discussing costs which result when inequality of resources
blocks the operation of fair equality of opportunity).
23. See infra parts IV.B-C (discussing crime and aesthetic costs associated with
poverty and inequality).
24. See infra part IV.D (discussing self-insurance against the risk of poverty).
25. See infra part IV.E (discussing the interdependence of utility functions).
1994:235
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
condition.' Put into the game theory context, this means that society's
"move" in providing for the poor may cause many of the poor to react
rationally by failing to engage in self-help. Society's provision of welfare
also removes the risk which might otherwise be associated with falling
into poverty or, once poor, changing one's position so that self-help is no
longer a viable option.
Complicating matters further is the possibility that the receipt of
public assistance could effect a socially costly change in those recipients
who lack the present ability to engage in self-help, but who would
otherwise prefer to do so. For example, one could argue that a person
who has been subsisting on welfare for an extended period has "become"
a different person in the sense that his or her behavioral and consumption
preferences have shifted in certain identifiable ways.' This could, in
turn, change her dominant strategy so as to make dependence preferred
over self-help, if and when self-help became possible for her.
These "decision costs" make resolution of the poverty problem a
complex, interactive process. A policy which seeks to alleviate poverty
may trigger decisions that tend to increase the intensity or incidence of
poverty, offsetting in some measure the gains in poverty alleviation
attained through that same policy. I will examine the extent to which
these "decision costs" turn on the specifics of particular redistributive
programs and consider the effectiveness of efforts to reduce these costs.
A second type of poverty alleviation cost stems not from choices
made by the poor, but is inherent in the transfer of funds from the more
well-off to the less well-off.' The existence and magnitude of several
such costs-reduced work incentives for the nonpoor, decreased liberty,
deleterious changes in savings, production, and investment patterns-have
been the subject of much debate.' I contend, however, that the most
significant cost of this type stems from the perceived unfairness of
transferring holdings from the more well-off to the less well-off. 0 The
costs associated with the resulting intrusion on the property rights of the
more well-off fall under this rubric.
The balance of the Article explores the options available to society,
given that the nonpoor and the poor are embroiled in a strategic game.
One way of reducing costs is to try to change the terms of the game, so
26. See infra part V.B (discussing costs associated with decisions made by the
poor).
27. See infra part VI.A.2 (discussing shifting preferences).
28. Of course, the choices made by the poor can affect the magnitude of this
second group of costs; nevertheless, these types of costs would be present even if welfare
policy did not trigger changes in decisionmaking by the poor.
29. See infra part V.C.2.
30. See infra part V.C.1 (discussing "unfairness costs").
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as to alter the payoff structure facing the dependent poor and shift them
to a dominant strategy that is less costly to society. Traditionally, efforts
to accomplish this have focused on making welfare unattractive by
stigmatizing welfare, attaching behavioral conditions to it, constructing
administrative hurdles, and the like. These strategies impose heavy costs
of their own. Another possibility is to convince the poor that self-help is
actually the preferred strategy by emphasizing the importance of work or
providing programs that might cause the poor to recognize suppressed or
under-developed aspects of their utility functions that would place greater
value on self-reliance.
To the extent the dependent poor's perception of the game changes
so that a dominant strategy of self-help emerges, costs associated with the
societal alleviation of poverty are avoided. Put differently, such
individuals will no longer be players in the problematic strategic game
described earlier, since their dominant strategy coincides with that of the
nonpoor. Other things being equal, society would want to maximize the
number of dependent poor who shift to a self-help strategy. Yet society
must also be concerned with how a particular welfare policy affects those
who are still in the game (i.e., individuals who retain dependence as a
preferred strategy), as well as those recipients who are not yet formally
"in the game" because they lack the present ability to lift themselves out
of poverty.
Another possibility for reducing the costs associated with the strategic
game involves adopting policy choices that make the public alleviation of
poverty less costly to the nonpoor (in nonmonetary ways, perhaps) than
it is presently. At one extreme, the entire game structure could largely
be avoided by creating policies which do not act upon "the poor" as an
identifiable group, but which instead provide broad-based benefits to poor
and nonpoor alike based on other characteristics.
I then explore the implications of the foregoing strategic analysis for
three real-world policy choices: the choice between cash and in-kind
benefits, the choice between unconditional benefits and benefits
conditioned on certain behaviors (such as work), and the choice between
universal and means-tested programs. 2 Finally, I propose a policy
direction suggested by the previous analysis.33 My purpose in doing so
is primarily illustrative. I seek to offer a mechanism for capturing the
relevant tradeoffs and asking the right questions in formulating welfare
policy, rather than a definitive statement of the right answers.
31. Of course, such a shift in policy focus might create a new game with costs of
its own. See, e.g., infra part VII.C (discussing incentive effects of policies providing
benefits to all families with children).
32. See infra part VII.
33. See infra part VIII.
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II. THE NEED FOR A MORE COMPLETE FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE QUESTIONS
In analyzing society's intuitive judgments as to what is "just" or
"fair" in the distributive realm, a number of conflicting themes can be
identified, each of which has been tremendously influential and persistent
in shaping welfare policy.' The intuitive idea that it is unacceptable as
a matter of justice for some individuals to have insufficient means to
obtain adequate food and shelter while others have means available to
indulge every whim represents one such theme. 5 The idea that it is
unfair for people to be deprived of opportunities which might enable them
to compete effectively is another such theme.' Acting as a
counterweight to these intuitive notions is the idea that money belongs to
those who "make" it, and that individual effort expended in productive
and important pursuits must be rewarded. A related theme centers on the
unfairness of giving money to those who have not worked for it, but
could have."
A theory of justice which ignores any of these important threads of
thought is of limited descriptive or prescriptive value. Because any such
theory minimizes or overlooks significant aspects of what people mean
when they speak of "justice" in the economic realm, it cannot generate
a useful vision of how "justice" can be furthered.3"
The theories of justice proposed by John Rawls" and Robert
Nozick4 are both premised on the absolute primacy of certain
34. The idea that justice is multifaceted and can simultaneously tend in opposing
directions is well recognized and has been emphasized by such writers as John Stuart Mill.
See JOHN S. MILL, Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND OTHER ESSAYS 272,328 (Alan
Ryan ed., 1987) ('[ln the mind of one and the same individual, justice is not some one
rule, principle, or maxim, but many, which do not always coincide in their
dictates .... ).
35. See, e.g., KAUS, supra note 10, at 15 (contending that notions of fairness
extend to "the availability of some basic minimum necessary to allow a person to
participate in society").
36. See infra part IV.A (discussing the unfairness of inequality in opportunity).
37. See infra part V.C. 1 (discussing the perceived unfairness of transfers).
38. As Robert H. Frank has noted, where, as here, there are opposing views on
an issue, "[having provided safeguards for fundamental constitutional liberties, a system
that attempts to sift through the preferences of the opposing camps in such disputes will
generally outperform one that chooses aimlessly between conflicting moral platitudes."
ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT PoND 269 (1985).
39. RAWLS, supra note 12, at 75 (describing the "difference principle" which
requires an equal distribution of resources except to the extent that inequalities improves
the lot of the "least advantaged members of society").
40. NOZICK, supra note 3, at 150-51 (discussing "entitlement theory," which
generally forbids society from forcibly redistributing money).
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individuals' interests, although they diverge widely as to whose interests
are worthy of such unassailable protection. In an effort to avoid tradeoffs
that would encroach on these favored interests, Rawls and Nozick
suppress or ignore those interests which are inconsistent with the
organizing principle of their respective theories. As a result, each arrives
at a narrow and incomplete view of justice.41
For Rawls, justice demands that the well-being of the least well-off
be maximized.42 Yet by monitoring the well-being of only the least
well-off, Rawls' theory ignores not only the interests of the upper classes,
but also those of the next-to-lowest classes, who could, under his theory,
end up bearing the burden of improving the lot of the least well-off.'
In contrast, the rights which Nozick recognizes as worthy of absolute
protection are the entitlements of possessors of holdings (e.g., money and
property) to maintain those holdings undisturbed, as long as the holdings
were acquired or transferred in accordance with a principle of justice in
acquisition or a principle of justice in transfer." But while Nozick's
argument against redistribution depends upon the underlying "justice" of
people's past acquisitions and transfers, he does little to establish the
validity of this premise.' 5 Indeed, his recognition that redistribution
41. The problem presented by such incomplete views of justice has long been
recognized. See MILL, supra note 34, at 329 ("No one of them [holding particular views
of justice] can carry out his own notion of justice without trampling upon another equally
binding.").
42. Rawls arrives at this theory of justice by means of a thought experiment in
which a social contract is struck behind a "veil of ignorance" by which one's individual
characteristics and place in society are unknown. According to Rawls, rational parties
contracting in this "original position" would agree to a theory of justice only if it
guaranteed that the position of the least favored would be maximized. RAWLS, supra note
12, at 150-61.
43. Rawls' theory permits inequalities which serve to better the position of the
least favored, but it does not place any additional constraints on the shape that inequality
takes. Hence, the gains of the least well-off could be financed under Rawls' scheme by
burdening those in the next-to-lowest classes, rather than by taxing the most well-off. Cf.
NozIcK, supra note 3, at 209 & n.* (noting that Rawls' theory could create conflicts of
interest between the least well-off and those in the middle).
44. NOZICK, supra note 3, at 151-52.
45. Nozick's arguments concerning the justice of holdings, and his allegations that
redistribution would be "on a par with forced labor," see id. at 169, hinge on the unstated
assumption that present holdings correlate closely with one's effort and productivity. Yet
Nozick himself emphasizes that no such correlation exists, since people come into
possession of holdings through a vast array of interactions, only some subset of which
involves an exchange for value or could be tied to an individual's own efforts or
productivity. See id. at 156-57; see also KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND
JUSTICE 180 (1983) (noting that "the rhetorical value of Nozick's [forced labor] example
requires a differentiation of the two sources of income [property income and labor
income] which, in general, he is loath to make").
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might be necessary to rectify past violations of the principles of justice in
acquisition and transfer would, if taken seriously, completely swallow his
theory.4 6
Neither of these theories of justice represents a workable policy
framework, since each embodies an incomplete view of what-and
whose-interests justice encompasses. Such divergent views of justice
have too often caused those who fundamentally disagree about
distributional questions to talk past each other, rather than engage in a
meaningful dialogue.' 7
A social utility framework, which has the capacity to balance
competing pluralistic preferences and interests, avoids (at least in theory)
the polarity embodied in both Rawls' and Nozick's approaches."
Nevertheless, while "utilitarian" or "economic" approaches are capable
of capturing more of the relevant reality, they fail to tell the full story.'9
While the benefit of a social utility model resides in its ability to add a
level of precision and order to the analysis so that balancing and tradeoffs
can be assessed, 5° a failure to "count" all of the interests which society
intuitively cares about can lead to false dilemmas and distorted
prescriptions.
46. NOZICK, supra note 3, at 152 (discussing principle of rectification). The long
history of widespread violations of principles of justice in acquisition and transfer makes
the very notion of an "entitlement" to present holdings suspect. See MICHAEL B. KATZ,
THE UNDESERvINa POOR 150 (1989) (noting that, using Nozick's principles, "few
historians would have difficulty reaching a conclusion opposite to that which he
implies-namely, the entitlement of contemporary Americans to the undisturbed enjoyment
of all their wealth"). Because the principle of rectification is fundamentally at odds with
the rest of Nozick's theory, those making use of Nozick's theory in the policy realm seem
to have simply ignored it, focusing instead on his arguments against redistribution. See
id. ("However Nozick intended his arguments to be used, they lent themselves easily to
the retrenchment of social benefits and the exaltation of greed fashionable in the early
1980's.").
47. See generally Philip E. Tetlock & Gregory Mitchell, Liberal and Conservative
Approaches to Justice: Conflicting Psychological Portraits, in PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE 234 (Barbara A. Mellers & Jonathan Baron eds., 1993)
(discussing divergent psychological assumptions of liberals and conservatives that lead to
conflicting visions of justice).
48. See, e.g., MILL, supra note 34, at 298.
49. Of course, analytic approaches based on utility maximization or cost-benefit
analysis are numerous and diverse, making categorical statements about the shortcomings
of this type of approach impossible. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to point out some of
the inadequacies often associated with such methods.
50. For example, social utility theory consciously sets out to do what intuitive
notions of justice have ignored or glossed over in the realm of redistribution: decide how
much is enough. See KAUS, supra note 10, at 12 ("Liberal rhetoric is filled with the
impulse to redistribute income from rich to poor. It's like a nervous tic. But there is no
impulse that tells us when the redistribution ought to stop.").
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However, the real problem with relying solely on a social utility
approach to the welfare problem lies not in the fact that such an approach
may fail to include-all of the necessary variables-such a shortcoming is
not endemic to the method and could be fixed by expanding the range of
interests incorporated into the analysis-but in the fact that utilitarianism
holds little practical value for distributive policy. The controversy
surrounding interpersonal utility comparisons, which are the keystone of
utilitarian prescriptions in the distributive arena, illustrates why this is so.
Where distributive questions are involved, the maximization of
society's overall utility necessarily requires interpersonal
comparisons-judgments as to how much utility different people get out
of money. The primary utilitarian justification for egalitarianism has
historically been based on an assumption that different people have similar
or identical utility functions as to money." This assumption, coupled
with the diminishing marginal utility of money,52 leads to the conclusion
that, in the absence of other factors affecting utility,53 transfers from the
more well-off to the less well-off will increase total utility.' This
concept fits with the intuition that an additional thousand dollars means
less to a millionaire than to a person with an annual income of ten
thousand dollars.55
But making such interpersonal comparisons is problematic, since
there is no way to really know what value different people actually assign
51. See SEN, supra note 15, at 16 (discussing the source of utilitarianism's
.reputation of being an egalitarian criterion").
52. The diminishing marginal utility of money refers to the fact that each
additional increment of money is of increasingly less marginal value. For any given
individual, the marginal benefit obtained from money can be depicted as a downward-
sloping curve which represents that individual's marginal utility function. See, e.g.,
EDwIN G. DOLAN, BASIC EcoNoMIcs 414-15 (3d ed. 1983) (explaining the principle of
diminishing marginal utility).
53. See POSNER, supra note 16, at 460 (noting that "the costs of redistributing
income ...could swamp the gains in total utility from the redistribution") (footnote
omitted).
54. See, e.g., AMARTYA K. SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 24, 95-96 (1992)
(discussing the "Dalton principle of transfers," which holds that transfers toward equality
are efficient, based on the diminishing marginal utility of income) (citing Hugh Dalton,
The Measurement of the Inequality of Incomes, ECON. J. 30 (1920)); RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 80 (1981); Peter Singer, The Right to Be Rich or
Poor, in READINO NOZICK: ESSAYS ON ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (Jeffrey Paul ed.,
1981).
55. See, e.g., KUTTNER, supra note 10, at 19 ("In traditional welfare economics,
the justification for some redistribution is that there are many people whose need for an
additional thousand dollars of income-by almost any standard-is plainly greater than the
millionaire's 'need' for an extra thousand.").
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to marginal increments of money.' Who can say with certainty that
Abigail derives any less utility from her millionth dollar than Bernard
does from his thousandth dollar?57 Although there are principled ways
of dealing with these difficulties,5" the controversy over interpersonal
comparisons points to a deeper problem with using utilitarianism to
address distributive issues: society will never be in a position to act upon
such comparisons, even if they could somehow be made. There is no
disinterested entity capable of placing dollars in the hands of the persons
who would derive the most value from them. Instead, the poor and the
nonpoor occupy conflicting positions with respect to distributive issues;
it is the manner in which that conflict plays out that holds real interest for
policy development.
In addition, the flat, one-dimensional view of human rationality that
dominates utilitarian thought fails to recognize the interdependence of
individuals in society and the important complexities within
individuals." This purely instrumental view of rationality fails to
appreciate the fact that individual preferences upon which choices are
based are dynamic, shifting and sometimes self-contradictory, rather than
56. See Lionel Robbins, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment, 48
ECON. J. 635, 636-37 (1938) (noting difficulties in assessing levels of satisfaction
experienced by different individuals), cited in SE4, supra note 15, at 81. This is another
way of saying that the height and shape of different individuals' utility curves may vary.
See supra note 52; POSNER, supra note 16, at 460; Bertrand De Jouvenel, The Ethics of
Redistribution, in INEQUALITY AND POVERTY 6-7 (Edward C. Budd ed., 1967). Amartya
Sen concluded, based in part upon these difficulties, that "[als a framework of judging
inequality, utilitarianism is indeed a non-starter. . ... " SEN, supra note 15, at 18.
57. Indeed, Richard Posner has suggested that a positive correlation might
plausibly exist between one's income level and the height of one's marginal utility curve,
asking whether it might be the case that "the people who work hard to make money and
succeed in making it are, on average, those who value money the most, having given up
other things such as leisure to get it." POSNER, supra note 16, at 460.
58. Abba Lerner introduced the idea of a probabilistic analysis which looks to
expected marginal utility, rather than to each person's actual (and unknowable) marginal
utility. See SEN, supra note 15, at 83-85 (giving a formal presentation of Lerner's result).
See also LESTER THUROW, GENERATINO INEQUALITY 34-35 (1975) ("[f individuals have
different utility functions but you do not know what individual has what function, a
completely equal'distribution of income is necessary to maximize the expected value of
social welfare.").
59. See, e.g., SHAUN H. HEAP, RATIONALITY IN ECONOMICS 3 (1989) (Figure
1.1) (identifying consequentialist prescriptive theories such as utilitarianism with an
instrumental view of rationality); id. at 91-115 (discussing interdependenceand preference
changes as aspects of human rationality which a purely instrumental view of rationality
fails to capture). See generally MARK A. LUTZ & KENNETH Lux, HUMANIsTIc
ECONOMICS (1988); Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural
Foundations of Economic Theory, in CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASuREMENT 84 (First
MIT Press 1982).
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static.' Moreover, it does not take account of the fact that choices
made by different individuals are interdependent, with choices made by
one actor affecting the preferences (and hence the choices) of the
others.6' Because the shifting of preferences and the interdependence of
decisionmaking are centrally implicated in welfare policy, a theory that
does not accommodate these complexities cannot meaningfully describe
reality or provide a framework for improving upon it.62
III. A GAME THEORETIC LOOK AT DISTRIBuTIvE DILEMMAS
Game theory,' by focusing on the interdependence of decisions
*made by the poor and the nonpoor, provides a useful starting point for
understanding the complex and conflicting interests at play in welfare
policy. Viewing welfare policy as a strategic game is admittedly
troubling, because it highlights the socially divisive nature of distributive
questions." My decision to use game theory to sharpen this unsettling
picture of societal conflict arises not from a desire to perpetuate division
or to "take sides," but from a desire to illuminate the forces underpinning
the division that already exists and to draw out the conflicting interests
responsible for the palpable undercurrents of hostility already present in
welfare policy debate.' Because game theory provides a way of better
60. See W.M. Gorman, Tastes, Habits and Choices, 8 INT'L ECON. REV. 218,
218 (1967) ("[I]t is commonplace that choices depend on tastes and tastes on past
choices."), quoted in JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF
RATIONALITY 112 (1983); ELSTER, supra, at 109; HEAP, supra note 59, at 103-12; Sen,
supra note 59, at 99. See also infra part VI.A (discussing preference shifts and their
impact upon choices).
61. See Amartya K. Sen, Behaviour and the Concept of Preference, in CHOICE,
WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT, supra note 59, at 72 ("[]nterdependence of different
people's choices ... discredits individualistic rational calculus.").
62. The usefulness of a theory turns on its capacity to accommodate these
complexities. See HEAP, supra note 59, at 10 ("Mhe capacity for a theory to generate
public policy insights is not marginal-it is absolutely crucial.") (footnote omitted).
63. See supra note 14 (defining game theory).
64. Indeed, game theory could be presented in a manner that would reinforce
exactly the same "us versus them" mentality that has plagued welfare reform efforts for
centuries. The game which James Buchanan constructs between a "samaritan" and a
"parasite" could be interpreted this way (although Buchanan indicates that his work may
have other, more important applications aside from welfare reform). See Buchanan, supra
note 15, at 74. For a thoughtful critique of Buchanan's work, including an analysis of the
highly questionable assumptions implicit in the morally charged labels Buchanan places
on the players, see Edward F. McClennen, Comment, in ALTRUISM, supra note 15, at
133.
65. The idea of focusing on societal conflict as a way of understanding welfare
is, of course, not new. See, e.g., FRANCES F. PIvEN & RICHARD A. CLOwARD,
REGULATING THE POOR 424-27 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing theories which posit class
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understanding the complicated, interactive reality involved in distributive
policy, it is a helpful starting point for assessing policy alternatives.6
Put differently, until we understand the game we are playing, we cannot
usefully look for ways to change the terms of the game, decrease the costs
associated with playing it, or find ways to stop playing it altogether.
A. Strategic Behavior in the Elimination of Poverty:
Defining the Game
With respect to poverty alleviation, the interests of the nonpoor and
the poor are at least partially in alignment: both the poor and the nonpoor
would like for the poor-and the children of the poor-to be more well-
off.6' This is true because poverty imposes costs on both the poor and
the nonpoor." To the extent these poverty costs are spread among
persons whose activities did not "cause" the poverty to occur, poverty
resembles an externality. 0
The economist's answer to a negative externality is to arrange affairs
so that the costs of the externality are internalized by the persons
engaging in the activity which generates that externality.' For example,
if a certain manufacturing process generates pollution, the appropriate
response is to place the costs of pollution on those engaging in that
manufacturing process, rather than have those costs spread throughout the
conflict as the catalyst for welfare programs).
66. For a discussion of the purposes and uses of game theory, see generally
Robert J. Aumann, What is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish?, in FRONTIERS OF
ECONOMICS 28 (Kenneth J. Arrow & Seppo Honkapohja eds., 1985).
67. See, e.g., Goran Therborn, Welfare States and Capitalist Markets, in
WELFARE LAW 93, 97 (Peter Robson ed., 1992) (discussing benefits which the upper
classes derive from alleviating the poverty of the lower classes).
68. See infra part IV (detailing the costs of poverty and inequality).
69. See, e.g., CHARLES J. GOETZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND
ECONOMICS 18-19 (1984) (describing externalities as effects of an act that are not felt by
the actor but by a third party); Therborn, supra note 67, at 97-98 (theorizing that the
welfare state is largely concerned with "coping with externalities"). .f. Sen, supra note
59, at 92-93 (characterizing sympathy, defined as any instance in which "a person's sense
of well-being is psychologically dependent on someone else's welfare," as an externality).
70. See, e.g., GOETZ, supra note 69, at 314-15 (discussing the need to adjust
liability rules so that actors will make decisions based on all the costs of their actions,
including those imposed on third parties). Facilitating such internalization of externalities
has been described as a "primary function of property rights." Harold Demsetz, Toward
a Theory of Property Rights, in THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS: READINGS
IN THE THEORY OF PROPERTY RIOHTS 23, 24 (Henry G. Manne ed., 1975); see also
RAWLS, supra note 12, at 268 ("One essential task of law and government is to institute
the necessary corrections" for externalities.).
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population.71 But while poverty may look like an externality, it is far
from self-evident what-and whose-activity "caused" it.
Some contend that poverty is a necessary and inevitable byproduct
of our political economy, that the wealth of our nation is made possible
by the abject poverty of some of its members.' Under the most
extreme form of this view, capitalism could be caricatured as a kind of
factory spewing out cash (in varying amounts) to most of society's
citizens while emitting noxious poverty fumes which randomly overtake
some percentage of unlucky persons. If this is an accurate and complete
characterization, it would make sense to place the costs of alleviating
poverty on the capitalist system itself, or on those who reap the largest
surpluses from it. The "cost of doing business" would go up, but that
would only reflect the internalization of the "true" cost of doing
business-including the poverty costs which are generated through
capitalist activity.
Others steadfastly maintain that capitalism does not "cause" poverty
at all, that poverty is instead caused by the personal behavior and life
choices of the poor themselves.' Under this view, the poor can be
thought of as willful poverty generators (or, more benignly, as poverty
magnets) whose activity-"living a life of poverty"-not only brings
misery upon themselves, but also creates excess misery which seeps out
to the surrounding population. If this is an accurate picture, the burden
of poverty alleviation should properly be placed on the poor (assuming,
for the moment, that the poor. would be capable of effecting such
alleviation). This second view has historically held sway in our
culture.7' It is not surprising, then, that society has long assumed that
71. This is the premise for market-oriented approaches to pollution abatement.
See, e.g., PAUL HEYNE, THE ECONOMIC WAY OF THiNKiNO 300 (5th ed. 1987) ("If the
tax per unit of pollutant can somehow be set equal to the spillover cost per unit, the
creator and presumed beneficiary of the costs is made to bear them.").
72. See, e.g., Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The
Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965) ("Today we see poverty as the
consequence of large impersonal forces in a complex industrial society .... [W]e are so
organized as virtually to compel this sacrifice by a segment of the population."); KATZ,
supra note 46, at 237 ("Poverty is not an unfortunate accident, a residue, an indication
that the great American mobility machine missed a minority of the people. On the
contrary, always it has been a necessary result of America's distinctive political
economy."); Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our
Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 43 (1987) ("IThe entire economic structure of
American society and a series of specific governmental policy decisions over time have
contributed to the existence, scope, depth, and perpetuation of poverty.").
73. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY 49 (1992)
(attributing poverty to "nonwork" rather than to "nameless social forces").
74. See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 46, at 7-8.
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the costs of poverty alleviation should fall on the poor themselves, if they
are able-bodied.75
It appears more likely, however, that the "cause" of poverty is
hopelessly mixed-up. It would be problematic to determine the role
played by luck, economic conditions, and personal attributes in "causing"
any given individual's poverty.76 By and large, society cannot wholly
attribute poverty to the personal traits of the poor, nor can the poor, by
and large, wholly blame their poverty on impersonal capitalistic forces.
Yet the fact that neither party is solely responsible for poverty does not
necessarily absolve either of all responsibility for the cost of alleviating
it.77
Another way of approaching the question of who should bear the
costs of alleviating poverty is to consider who is in a better position to do
so (or put differently, who can do so at the lowest cost). The answer to
this question depends, in turn, on what assumptions are made about the
ability of the poor to alleviate their own poverty.
If we make the simplistic assumption that all of the poor are utterly
unable to alleviate their own poverty, then the nonpoor s are in the better
position to alleviate poverty. The cost to the poor of alleviating their own
poverty under such a state of affairs is literally prohibitive. The poor,
unable to alleviate their poverty, would, in such a state of affairs,
continue to' incur poverty costs and those poverty costs would continue to
be spread throughout society. In such a situation, society makes the
efficient choice by simply alleviating the poverty. Indeed, society has
been quite willing to provide support to certain groups, such as the
75. See, e.g., id. at 12 (discussing Elizabethan poor laws, which "attempted to
separate the genuinely needy from rogues, vagabonds, and sturdy beggars," a distinction
which "translated over time into the restriction of aid to the impotent and the exclusion
of the able-bodied").
76. See, e.g., ELLWOOD, supra note 1, at 8 (noting the difficulty in determining
the "true" reason for a family's poverty).
77. Commentators have rightly identified one side of this truth. See CHARLES
LOCKHART, GAININO GROUND 2 (1989) ("But [Charles] Murray strikes home when he
argues that the notion that people are not responsible for all that happens to them can be
subtly transformed into the proposition that the poor are to be relieved from the arduous
tasks involved in alleviating their conditions.") (citing MURRAY, supra note 3). The other
side of this truth, of course, is that the fact that society is not solely responsible for
poverty conditions does not as a matter of fairness or efficiency absolve it from assisting
in alleviating those conditions.
78. The use of the term "nonpoor" in this discussion refers not to nonpoor
individuals acting on their own, but to the nonpoor acting through the mechanism of
government to provide public assistance. See infra part V.A (discussing free-rider
problem); supra note 18.
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disabled and the elderly, based on such assumptions about their
incapacity."
At the other extreme, one could assume that every able-bodied poor
person has the ability to lift himself or herself out of poverty through hard
work, thrift, and the elimination of costly vices. If this were the state of
the world, it would be more efficient to place the burden of poverty
alleviation on the poor, since they could alleviate their own poverty at a
lower total cost than could society as a whole. There would be no costs
associated with moving money, no infringement of the property rights of
the more well-off, and no costs associated with eroded incentives or
inefficient decisions.'
This second picture of the world-that the poor are able to help
themselves-is the dominant one in our culture, at least with respect to
able-bodied, working age adults.8 ' This view accounts for the hostility
and bitterness that many Americans feel towards such recipients of
welfare, but it does not explain why society "agrees" to bear the costs of
alleviating their poverty in the first place.
If we begin with the (intentionally oversimplified) assumption just
outlined-that the poor are fully capable of escaping poverty on their
own-the problem appears as one of a strategic dilemma or game. On
one side is an impoverished individual who has the ability to bring herself
and her children out of poverty, and on the other side are the nonpoor,
who, acting collectively through government, also have the ability to
alleviate the poverty of that poor individual and her children. Both
parties will benefit when the poor family is made better off, regardless of
who bears the cost of poverty alleviation. The poor family (we will
assume for now) would prefer that those costs be borne by the
nonpoor,' while the nonpoor would prefer that the poor family incurred
the costs involved in alleviating its own poverty. If neither party bears
the costs of alleviating poverty, the result is disastrous for both. Hence,
both sides are locked into a game very much like "chicken."
79. See infra note 98; see also infra notes 264-65 and accompanying text
(discussing distinctions drawn between "deserving" and "undeserving" poor).
80. See infra part V (detailing these costs of the public alleviation of poverty).
81. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
82. This assumption is made for purposes of illustrating a particular dilemma that
would be presented under the specified conditions, and obviously does not describe all
poor families. On the contrary, many poor families do prefer to attempt to alleviate their




The game of "chicken" is a dangerous highway game reputedly
played by foolhardy teenagers.' In highway chicken, two drivers start
their cars at opposite ends of a straight stretch of road and proceed
towards each other at high speeds. In order to avoid a head-on collision,
one driver or the other (or both) must swerve before the cars reach each
other. The driver who swerves first is called "chicken" and loses the
game."
Supporting the poor individual's family is here analogous to
"swerving" in highway chicken. The best outcome for either party is for
the other party to "swerve" by providing the needed support. If neither
the poor individual nor the government provides support, disaster for both
ensues. As in a game of highway chicken, each party's preferred strategy
depends on what the other party can be expected to do.
The payoffs for the nonpoor (acting through the government) (N) and
for the poor individual (P) are shown in Matrix 1, below.
MATRIX 1
PAYOFFS FOR (P, N)
N Supports P's N Does Not
Family Support
P Supports Family N/A 50, 100
P Does Not 100,50 0,0
Support II_ I
N (the nonpoor) must choose between the left column (in which it
supports P's family) and the right column (in which it provides no
support), while P (the poor individual) must choose between the top row
(in which she supports her own family) and the bottom row (in which she
does not support her own family). The intersection of the two players'
choices yields the payoffs for each; the first of the two numbers
represents P's payoff, while the second number represents N's. The
numbers which appear in the decision matrix are meaningless in
themselves, but serve only to provide a rank ordering of preferred options
83. See, e.g., WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER'S DILEMMA 197-98 (1992)
(citing BERTRAND RUSSELL, COMMON SENSE AND NUCLEAR WARFARE (1959)).
84. Id. This basic "chicken" framework has been used to illustrate problems
concerning the allocation of societal burdens. See, e.g., Hugh Ward, Three Men in a
Boat, Two Must Row: An Analysis of a Three-Person Chicken Pregame, 34 J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 371, 371-75 (1990).
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for each actor. For simplicity, I have (counterfactually) made the costs
and payoffs symmetrical for each party.'
I have also assumed, for purposes of the present analysis, that the
upper left cell does not represent a possible outcome for the parties.
Since the nonpoor's interest is in providing subsistence level assistance
only, we will assume that they would not provide assistance in the event
the poor individual attained subsistence on his or her own." Welfare
policy has, in fact, historically borne out this assumption.'
As the matrix illustrates, the best result for P (payoff of 100) is
found in the lower left cell, in which the government agrees to support
her family and she does not have to provide such support. The second-
best outcome for P (payoff of fifty) is found in the upper right cell, in
which the government refuses to support her family, but she supports the
family herself. The difference between these two outcomes (from P's
perspective) represents the disutility P would experience in supporting a
family, such as foregone leisure and poor working conditions. The worst
outcome for P occurs if neither she nor the government supports her
family (lower right cell, with a payoff of zero).
For the nonpoor, acting through the government, the best outcome
is found in the upper right cell, in which P supports herself and the
government does not. The payoff of 100 found in that cell represents the
value to N of having P's family supported, without expending its own
85. For example, the poor family would suffer more from the lack of a
subsistence income than would the nonpoor (even when their preferences were
aggregated); yet I have indicated a payoff of zero for each player for this "worst case"
scenario. Similarly, later discussion of the costs associated with redistributing income
suggests that it may cost the nonpoor more to provide assistance to the poor than it would
cost the poor to engage in self-help in those instances where self-help is a viable option.
Again, for simplicity, I have assumed that the cost to each player of providing subsistence
level income for the poor family is 50. These simplifying assumptions do not alter the
basic structure of the game; I have made them so that the basic dilemma can be presented
with a minimum of complexity.
86. Another simplifying assumption implicit in the decision matrix is that a
"subsistence level income" represents a discrete, indivisible block of assistance which is
either provided or withheld. In reality, of course, it would be possible for the burden of
providing this subsistence level income to be shared between the poor family and the
nonpoor. Policy design has historically made such sharing very difficult, since reducing
the grant level by the amount earned by the poor family results in a taxation level of
100%. See infra part V.B.2.b (discussing the work disincentive effects of welfare).
87. See infra part VII.B. In this respect, the strategic game attending
redistributive efforts differs from highway chicken. Decisions are not made
simultaneously by the parties, so adjustments based on the actions of the other party are
possible. In other words, the nonpoor are in a position to determine whether the poor
have, in fact, achieved subsistence on their own before deciding whether to assist them.
This is precisely what means-testing is all about.
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resources to obtain that result. The second-best outcome for N is found
in the lower left cell, in which N supports P. Again, this outcome is not
as favorable for N as the previous one, since it requires N to incur costs
associated with alleviating P's poverty. The lower left cell gives N a
payoff of only fifty, which represents the value N gains in having P's
family supported, less the cost of supplying that support. The worst
outcome for N is the scenario in which neither the government nor P
supports P's family; N's payoff is zero in that instance.
One possible strategy in highway chicken is to commit in advance to
the noncooperative strategy-driving straight ahead. If this commitment
is believably communicated to the other party before he or she has a
chance to make a similar commitment, the other party can be expected to
swerve. For example, it has been noted that a player in highway chicken
might commit by throwing the steering wheel out the car window as he
reaches maximum speed." An opponent observing that commitment
could be expected to swerve.8 Conversely, if one knew that the other
player had adopted a uniform policy of swerving, one could drive straight
ahead and win the game.
The parallels in the redistributive realm are striking. If the nonpoor
commit in advance to providing subsistence level assistance to poor
families, those families need not incur the costs required to alleviate their
poverty (by, for example, working long hours at a dismal job). Knowing
that the nonpoor will "swerve" before disaster strikes, poor individuals
can pursue a strategy which does not involve providing for their families.
The nonpoor, who have thus set themselves up to repeatedly "lose" a
game of chicken against every able-bodied poor individual in society, are
bothered by what they perceive as the apparent unfairness of this
result.'
88. HERMAN KAHN, ON ESCALATION 11 (1965), quoted in PoUNDsToNE, supra
note 83, at 212. See also Ward, supra note 84, at 371 (Where two of three men in a boat
must row in order to make sufficient progress, "the rational thing to do would be to
commit yourself to not rowing by grabbing the stern seat first, loudly announcing that you
are a bad oarsman, feigning blisters on your hands, or pretending that you do not care if
the boat stays still."); Avinash Dixit & Barry Nalebuff, Making Strategies Credible, in
STRATEGY AND CHOICE 162, 162-81 (Richard J. Zeckhauser ed., 1991) (discussing
various methods of making strategic threats credible).
89. Of course, if the opponent doesn't see the steering wheel fly out of the
window, the party who discarded the wheel "has a problem." KAHN, supra note 88, at
11, quoted in POUNDSTONE, supra note 83, at 212.
90. Note, however, that the basic structure of the game is morally ambiguous and
does not itself suggest which of the two equilibria points in the game should prevail. See
generalty SCHELLINO, supra note 14, at 198-99 (Strategic analysis "is usually about the
situation, not the individuals-about the structure of incentives, of information and
communication, the choices available, and the tactics that can be employed. There is little
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In response, some have suggested that the government simply
withdraw all aid to poor families-in other words, commit in advance to
the equivalent of "driving straight ahead," by throwing welfare out the
window, so to speak.91 When the poor see that the government has
discarded its means of delivering aid to their families, the argument runs,
they will avert disaster by providing for their own families.' If all poor
families "swerved" as expected, the outcome would be the best possible
one for the nonpoor. The nonpoor would reap the benefits of reduced
poverty without having to bear any of the costs of alleviating it.
Despite the obvious appeal of this strategy, serious risks are
associated with it. As with tearing out the steering wheel in highway
chicken, the success of the strategy depends upon the correctness of one's
assumptions about the other party's ability to react in an appropriate and
timely manner.' Thus far, we have been proceeding on the assumption
that the poor are capable of alleviating their own poverty. This is
undoubtedly true in some subset of cases. Yet there is reason to believe
that in some other nontrivial subset of cases, the poor individual would
be literally unable to engage in self-help.' Between these two extremes,
about the abstract situation that tells the analyst which side he ought to be on."). Not
surprisingly, though, "[in the inevitable struggle to capture a larger share of whatever
social surplus does exist, it is natural to expect each side to claim the moral high ground."
FRANK, supra note 38, at 128. Of course, if one assumes that it costs society more to
alleviate the family's poverty than it does for the family, this provides a neutral, utility-
based reason for preferring the self-help solution, from a societal standpoint.
91. See, e.g., MURRAY, supra note 3, at 227-28; Buchanan, supra note 15, at 76.
At a broader, theoretical level, James Buchanan has characterized modern society's
reluctance to rigidly abide by the noncooperative strategy in a number of settings as a
failure of "strategic courage" which will work to the long-term detriment of society. id.
at 81, 84.
92. For example, Charles Murray predicts that some proportion of welfare
recipients would change their behavior and no longer require assistance if welfare were
dismantled. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 228-29. Cf Buchanan, supra note 15, at 77.
93. Cf Hugh Ward, The Risks of a Reputation for Toughness: Strategy in Public
Goods Provision Problems Modelled by Chicken Supergames, 17 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 23,
27-28 (1987) ("The essence of Chicken is that, in making commitments and sticking to
them, players take the risk that others will do the same and that it will be impossible for
any player to back down fast enough to ensure that catastrophe is averted.").
94. See, e.g., NATHAN GLAZER, THE LIMrrs OF SOCIAL POLICY 8 (1988) (noting
that, even after provision is made for people with identifiable needs, such as the disabled,
"there will remain, in any modem society, people who still require special supports, either
temporarily or for longer periods of time"); MURRAY, supra note 3, at 229 (considering
those who would be "pauperized by the withdrawal of government supports and unable
to make alternative arrangements"); Peter B. Edelman, Toward a Comprehensive
Antipoverty Strategy: Getting Beyond the Silver Bullet, 81 GEo. L.J. 1697, 1751 (1993)
("IThere are an unquantifiable, but far from trivial, number of people on the welfare rolls
who are not very good candidates for work.").
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it is reasonable to assume that poor individuals occupy the entire spectrum
with respect to capacity for self-help: some are able to engage in some
degree of self-help; others are able to formulate a long-term strategy for
escaping poverty but require short-term assistance in order to implement
that strategy; and others might be capable of self-help during certain
seasons or under certain economic conditions but would be helpless at
other times.
If the government cut off all assistance, it is beyond question that at
least some subset of the able-bodied poor would be unable to find a
suitable job in time to avert personal disaster for themselves and their
children. Given that our economic system has consistently left some
segment of the population unemployed, it is unrealistic to think that every
person presently on welfare could, through sheer effort, find a full-time
position.95 A poor individual who falls into this category does not have
the capacity to support his or her family; instead, he or she is like the
participant in a game of chicken who is trapped in a car without any
steering mechanism.' Because such a person cannot choose to "swerve,"
the nonpoor's bluff can have no impact on his or her course of action.
If the nonpoor follow through with their commitment not to provide
assistance (which they must do if they want their threats to that effect to
be believed in the future)," the result is highly undesirable for both
parties-the equivalent of a destructive crash.
It is as if the nonpoor face a series of cars coming toward them.
Some of the approaching cars have steering mechanisms which are in
good working order; others have no steering wheels at all.' There is
no way to tell which cars have steering wheels and which ones do not."
95. 1 do not here include the possibility of government-created jobs specifically
designed to employ welfare recipients, since such jobs do not represent a true shifting of
costs for poverty alleviation to the poor. As will be discussed in Part VII.B, the monetary
cost to society of providing such jobs to the poor far exceeds the cost of simply providing
financial assistance to the poor.
96. See Buchanan, supra note 15, at 78 ("Having once adopted a rule, the
samaritan should not be responsive to the particulars of situations that might arise.")
(emphasis in original); id. at 76 ("Vague threats or promises to cut off [the samaritan's]
charity in the absence of work on the part of the recipient parasite will remain empty
unless there is demonstrated willingness to carry out such threats," including a willingness
to suffer by "watching the parasite starve himself while refusing work.").
97. Of course, the absence of a steering wheel at a given point in time may be due
to the poor person's own prior action of making certain decisions which place self-help
out of reach. This does not, however, change the analysis of how the other party should
react to an oncoming car with no steering wheel.
98. To the extent that it is possible to ascertain that particular groups lack the
ability to provide for themselves, society willingly and uncomplainingly does so. The lack
of controversy surrounding assistance to the disabled and the elderly illustrates this point.
Such groups are spoken of as the "deserving poor." These groups are not suspected of
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To make matters worse, all the approaching cars contain infants and
children as passengers.
For society to hold firm to a policy of "not swerving" is indefensible
in such a situation. Granted, society would "win" all (or most) of the
games of chicken against poor individuals capable of alleviating their own
poverty (that is, all or most of the cars possessing steering wheels would
swerve). However, there would be disastrous results with respect to those
poor families which, it turns out, could not support themselves after all.
The resulting "collision" would entail very high costs not only for the
families involved, but also for society as a whole.'
In addition, certain individuals who theoretically could alleviate their
own poverty might nevertheless fail to do so because they misread signals
from the government or misinterpreted their own position. By denying
assistance, society would suffer the worst possible outcome with respect
to this group as well. The fact that a miscalculation on the part of the
poor individual contributed to the outcome would do little to justify this
disastrous result, especially given the effects on children, who were not
responsible for the miscalculation.
Of course, if the government stated its intention to get out of the
poverty alleviation business, some of the more catastrophic effects
doubtless would be avoided by the intervention of private charity or local
assistance.101 To the extent such private charity substituted for public
welfare, the government's avowed threat to withhold all aid would not be
expected to induce self-help by the impoverished. 101  To the extent
private charity provided partial or inadequate coverage, some self-help
might be induced, but the risks associated with the failure to provide for
making a strategic choice to shift costs of poverty alleviation from themselves to society,
since it is assumed that they would be unable to alleviate their own poverty. Although
children also fit the classic model of the "deserving poor," their situation is
distinguishable since their fate is tied to the fate of adults who are often deemed less than
deserving. See infra notes 264-65 and accompanying text (discussing distinctions drawn
between the "deserving" and "undeserving" poor).
99. See infra part IV (discussing costs of poverty).
100. See, e.g., MURRAY, supra note 3, at 229-33.
101. Recognizing the ability of individual charitable action to supplant a collective
choice to pursue the noncooperative strategy, James Buchanan has made the drastic
suggestion that society impose "uniform behavioral rules on all potential samaritans."
Buchanan, supra note 15, at 82. These rules would apparently forbid individuals from
providing charity, so that a larger social good-a modification in "the response patterns
of potential parasites"-could be effected. Id. Buchanan himself recognizes the
tremendous liberty cost of setting such rules. Id. at 81-82. The fact that many among
the poor are incapable of self-help would make this a profoundly unsuccessful strategy for
the reasons discussed above.
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those incapable of self-help would be present in equal measure.102 If
private charity presented greater confusion and uncertainty as to what
benefits would be provided, as seems likely, the chance of miscalculation
by the poor as to the preferred strategy would be heightened, creating
greater risk of disaster for those persons and their children. In addition,
private charity would entail well-recognized "free-rider"
inefficiencies."
The foregoing analysis indicates that the institution of welfare is
explicable, despite its unpopularity, when it is thought of as society's
rational reaction to a repeated game. Shaun Hargreaves Heap has
explained that repeated reactions to a game will, over time, result in the
formation of institutions: "[Algents who repeatedly interact in similar
circumstances will come to learn efficient ways of handling that
interaction. They will develop rules of thumb concerning how best to act
in such settings and these rules of thumb become 'institutions.' The
interaction is formally handled as a repeated game." 10,
By choosing the cooperative strategy of providing for the poor,
society avoids the worst outcomes-those which would result if nobody
provided for the poor. Although this strategy is the most rational one to
adopt when one does not know what the other party-here, the poor
individual-will do, it does entail costs. Indeed, some of the most
troubling costs from a societal standpoint are the costs associated with
decisions made by the poor in light of society's announced strategy of
providing for them."°5
B. Exploring Strategic Options in a Two-Person Society
As the previous discussion indicates, society is torn between its
desire to reduce the costs of poverty (which detrimentally affect the
nonpoor as well as the poor) and its desire to have the poor bear the costs
of that reduction." Put simply, the nonpoor want the poor to stop
being poor, at their own expense.
To illustrate the manner in which these interests play out, imagine a
two-person society populated solely by Ellen, who is more well-off, and
102. This assumes that private charities would be no more adept than the
government at distinguishing between those among the poor who would be capable of self-
help and those who would not be capable of such self-help.
103. See infra part V.A (discussing free-rider problem).
104. HEAP, supra note 59, at 72.
105. See infra part V.B (detailing these "decision costs").
106. David Ellwood terms this conflict "the security-work conundrum."
ELLWOOD, supra note 1, at 19 ("When you give people money, food or housing, you
reduce the pressure on them to work and care for themselves.").
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Fran, who is less well-off, both of whom are stranded on the proverbial
desert island. Although Ellen has ample goods available for her own
happiness, she is troubled by the fact that Fran is starving to death.
Ellen's total utility would be increased by transferring some-say one-
third-of her holdings to Fran, because the costs associated with the
transfer are outweighed by the benefit she would get from knowing that
Fran has been made more well-off. Therefore, Ellen transfers one-third
of her holdings to Fran.
After doing so, however, Ellen cannot help noticing that every day
while she is industriously digging for clams, Fran is lying idly on the
beach reading a pulp novel and letting the surf wash over her toes. It is
evident to Ellen that the holdings she transferred to Fran will soon be
consumed without being replenished by Fran. Ellen can foresee that she
will soon have to make another transfer of her own holdings (which have
been steadily accumulating as a result of her continuous efforts at clam-
digging) or Fran will once again be starving.
Ellen thinks that if Fran applied herself to digging for clams, Fran
could support herself. This, of course, would make Ellen better off.
Since Fran's well-being is part of Ellen's own utility function, Ellen
wants Fran to have some minimum standard of living. To the extent
Ellen could convince Fran to dig clams herself, Fran would be able (we
will assume) to attain that standard of living on her own, without any
need for Ellen to transfer Ellen's own holdings. This would be the best
possible situation from Ellen's point of view. Yet Ellen also knows that
even if Fran refuses to work, she will not be able to let Fran starve.
Ellen's own utility function is so intertwined with Fran's that the worst
possible outcome would be Fran's starvation. Ellen would rather continue
to transfer her own holdings than allow such a result to occur.
From Fran's point of view, the best possible situation is the one in
which she can consume unlimited leisure, avoid the dull, unpleasant task
of clam-digging, and still avoid starvation. She knows that even if she
dug for clams on a nonstop basis, her clam-digging skills are such that
she could only just barely subsist. Hence there is nothing to be gained
from expending that effort, provided Ellen is willing to transfer sufficient
clams to her so that she does not starve. Ellen, as we already know, is
willing to do so, although she would greatly prefer it if Fran engaged in
clam-digging herself.
Matrix 2 below depicts the payoff schedules of Fran and Ellen in this
state of affairs:'°
107. This matrix is identical in its basic structure to Matrix 1, contained in the




PAYOFFS FOR (FRAN, ELLEN)
Ellen Transfers No Transfer From
Ellen
Fran Digs Clams N/A 50, 100
Fran Digs No 100, 50 0, 0
Clams
As the payoff schedules indicate, each person's dominant strategy
depends on how the other player is going to behave. If Fran is not going
to dig clams, Ellen will be better off making a transfer; if Fran will dig
clams, she will not have to make a transfer. If Ellen does not make a
transfer, Fran is better off digging for clams; however, Fran is better off
not digging for clams if Ellen will make a transfer.
How can Ellen convince Fran to dig for clams and thus increase
Ellen's own utility? Ellen could conceal her preferences and pretend as
if she did not care whether Fran starved to attempt to bluff Fran into
clam-digging, or make more conditional threats about cutting off her
transfers (for example, by placing a time limit on how long Ellen will
continue to support Fran with Ellen's own clams). This strategy would
only succeed to the extent Ellen's false threats appeared believable to
Fran. Because Ellen has already saved Fran from starvation once, Fran
has some insight into Ellen's utility function and may well discern that
when it came down to it, Ellen would again save Fran regardless of
Fran's failure to dig for clams. As long as Ellen is harvesting enough
clams to support herself and also to support Fran, her threats may not be
credible.
Ellen could attempt to commit in advance to. letting Fran starve by
only digging enough clams for her own use each day and spending the
rest of her day in a leisurely manner. Fran, observing this behavior,
might well begin to dig for clams herself, perceiving that Ellen would
have no clams to spare. Yet this strategy also has disadvantages for
Ellen. If Ellen has misjudged Fran's (as yet untested) clam-digging
capacities, Fran might actually starve. Ellen then would suffer great
disutility and be unable to help her.
Better still would be the strategy of pretending to commit to letting
Fran starve by openly harvesting only the number of clams Ellen needs
for her own use, while secretly (perhaps under the cover of night)
building a stockpile. Yet the success of this strategy would probably be
short-lived. Either Fran would find out about Ellen's clandestine
behavior, or eventually some emergency would arise, forcing Ellen to
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make use of her stockpile. Once Fran learned about the stockpile, Ellen's
threats to let her starve would lose all credibility.
Another possibility for Ellen would be to make her transfer of clams
so demeaning and unpleasant for Fran that it would alter Fran's payoff
schedule to make clam-digging the dominant strategy. For example,
Ellen could make Fran grovel at her feet while she hurled demeaning
insults at her. Or, she could dole out the clams on a meal-by-meal basis
and constantly monitor Fran's activities.
Yet this strategy has some disadvantages also. First, by treating
Fran in a demeaning manner, Ellen would suffer disutility. Aside from
the psychic distastefulness of treating any person in such a manner and the
wasted effort she would expend in doing so, Ellen would be cutting off
the possibility of community between them-a thing of great value in a
two-person society. Second, the pattern of insults and supervision might
be counterproductive to Ellen's goal of having Fran engage in clam-
digging. To the extent Fran internalized Ellen's negative statements
concerning her character and abilities, she might come to believe herself
incapable of supporting herself and settle into a sort of despondency. If
this occurred, Ellen would be worse off than if she simply gave Fran
some of her holdings in a gracious manner.
On the other hand, Ellen could attempt to give Fran an incentive to
dig clams by continuing her transfer to Fran whether or not Fran also
digs clams. If we assume that Fran, although less adept at clam-digging
than Ellen, is nevertheless able to dig about as many clams on her own
as she receives from Ellen, Fran's "income" of clams would roughly
double if she worked under such a regime. Even after subtracting the
disutility Fran experiences in digging clams,'" the added income might
well convince Fran to work rather than consume leisure. A new payoff
schedule (Matrix 3) includes the outcome when Fran digs for clams and
Ellen makes a transfer and can be depicted in this manner:
108. Although Fran is able to obtain twice as many clams by choosing this option




PAYOFFS FOR (FRAN, ELLEN)
Ellen Transfers No Transfer From
Ellen
Fran Digs Clams 150, 75 50, 100
Fran Digs No 100, 50 0, 0
Clams
In this payoff matrix, Fran's best strategy is to dig clams;1  the
best outcome for Fran is found in the upper left cell, which yields a
payoff of 150. If Ellen's goal is to get Fran to work, it could be
accomplished under these assumptions if Ellen committed to making a
transfer whether or not Fran also digs clams.
But this scenario, in which Ellen makes a transfer and Fran also digs
clams, does not yield the best outcome for Ellen. While the fact that
Fran is working may take away some of Ellen's disutility in making a
transfer, Ellen still incurs some costs in transferring clams to Fran. The
payoff of seventy-five which I have assigned to Ellen for this outcome
represents the fact that Ellen is somewhat happier making a transfer when
Fran is working than when Fran is idle (lower left cell, payoff of fifty),
but that Ellen would be happier still (upper right cell, payoff of one
hundred) if Fran dug clams and Ellen did not make a transfer.
In other words, since Ellen was motivated to transfer clams in the
first place by the specter of Fran starving, she might find that the utility
that she, Ellen, would gain from the transfer is not worth the cost to her,
if Fran were to support herself and avoid starvation without any help from
Ellen. Once Fran demonstrates her ability to support herself through
clam-digging, Ellen could be expected to react by withdrawing her own
transfers." 0  And when Fran sees that Ellen will no longer make
transfers while Fran is supporting herself, the decision matrix shifts back
to the earlier "chicken" situation."' Knowing that Ellen will provide
her with a subsistence living, Fran might quit working.
What options are left for Ellen? Must she simply resign herself to
supporting Fran for the rest of her life? The only viable alternative would
be for Ellen to convince Fran that she would be better off digging her
109. Notice that clam-digging remains Fran's best strategy in this matrix,
regardless of what option Ellen actually selects.
110. A similar withdrawal of assistance has historically followed the institution of
.works" programs. See infra note 348.
111. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
The Welfare Conundrwn
own clams than sponging off Ellen. Ellen would have to convince Fran
that Fran's payoff schedule is faulty and that, in fact, there are intangible
benefits to clam-digging that are of greater value to Fran than the leisure
she would otherwise consume. 112  For example, Ellen could try to
convince Fran that clam-digging would bring a sense of pride, that it
would allow Fran to develop important skills that could save Fran's life
in the event something happened to Ellen, that it would improve Fran's
physical condition, that it would allow Fran to sleep more soundly at
night, and the like. In other words, Ellen would be attempting to get
Fran to accept her self-interested, revisionist view of Fran's payoff
schedule and to adopt the dominant strategy contained therein:
MATRIX 4
ELLEN'S REVISIONIST VIEW OF FRAN'S
PAYOFF SCHEDULE
Ellen Transfers No Transfer from
Ellen
Fran Digs Clams N/A 150
Fran Digs No 100 0
Clams
Alternatively (or in combination with the foregoing strategy), Ellen
could offer to teach Fran her superior clam-digging technique, so that
Fran could harvest a larger number of clams than she would receive via
Ellen's transfer. While there would be some up-front costs to Ellen (she
would be slowed down in her daily clam-digging by having to perform
demonstrations for Fran), it would be well worth it to her if Fran's
development of clam-diggingprowess altered Fran's payoff schedule to
make digging clams Fran's dominant strategy. Not only would Ellen
benefit, in order to preclude her starvation, but Fran too would
presumably be building up a stockpile which could benefit Ellen in the
case of a catastrophe.
From Fran's point of view, the training would be costly in terms of
giving up leisure time; however, if the expected payoff represented a
112. See POSNER, supra note 54, at 52 (noting that utilitarianism "does not exclude
the possibility that A may know B's true preferences better than B does-the possibility,
that is, of paternalism"). The question of what constitutes one's "true" preferences is
itself difficult to answer, however, given that preferences can shift based on external




large enough increase over what she could expect to receive in a transfer
payment from Ellen, she would be willing to undertake it. Of course, if
the training failed and she found herself unable to master the quicker
clam-digging technique, both she and Ellen would be "out" some costs
and would be back in the initial state of affairs in which Fran must decide
whether to work very hard just to subsist. Hence the training would be
offered-and undertaken-only if it appeared likely to succeed.
C. The Impact of Children on Strategic Decisions
An elaboration of the "Fran and Ellen" example illustrates the role
that children play in redistributive interactions. Assume that our
miniature society includes not only Ellen and Fran, but also Fran's
daughter Gina, who is an infant and far too young to dig for clams. In
this example, Ellen is completely intolerant of any adult who does not
work and would not voluntarily share any of her clams to save Fran's
life. Yet, Ellen cannot countenance the thought of little Gina going
hungry. In other words, even though Fran's well-being does not appear
in Ellen's utility function, Gina's well-being does.
Gina is too young to digest clams; she is still nursing and therefore
all her sustenance must be obtained from her mother, Fran. Thus there
is no way for Ellen to ensure the well-being of Gina without also ensuring
the well-being of Fran. Nevertheless, Ellen strongly believes that Fran
should be able to dig enough clams to support herself and her daughter
without any help from Ellen. Ellen does not in any way wish to
encourage Fran to live a life of leisure, because this will result in greater
costs to herself, though they are costs Ellen will willingly incur to avoid
the worst outcome-the starvation of Gina.
From Fran's standpoint, the starvation of Gina would be disastrous.
However, the task of caring for Gina while attempting to dig sufficient
clams to subsist is daunting to her; focusing solely on childcare tasks
seems like a much more manageable way to pass the day. As long as
Fran perceives that Ellen will ensure the survival of Gina, she is made
better off by not undertaking to do so herself. Significantly, as long as
Ellen is unwilling to let Gina starve, Fran's survival is also protected,
regardless of how disapproving Ellen may be of Fran's daily activities.
In this scenario, it is unlikely that Ellen can believably bluff Fran
into working. Even though Ellen's attitude toward nonworking adults is
significantly less tolerant than in the last example, the presence of
innocent children makes that difference irrelevant. Any attempt to create
a disincentive for Fran's perceived laziness translates into the punishment
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of an innocent human being, a result that is intolerable for Ellen."'
Although Ellen may detest Fran for her lax work habits, she can do little
to force Fran to improve her productivity, aside from the options
discussed in the earlier example.
IV. SOCIETY'S STAKE IN THE GAME: THE Cosrs OF
POVERTY AND INEQUALITY
One of the principal intuitions underlying the game theoretic analysis
presented in the preceding Part is that the nonpoor find the alleviation of
poverty to be in their own interest, so much so that it creates a strategic
dilemma for them. This is true because poverty imposes heavy costs on
all segments of society. Although the idea that society as a whole has a
great deal to lose if poverty is not relieved seems self-evident and
uncontroversial, this important reality has too often been suppressed in
economic analyses that emphasize the costs of transferring income to the
less well-off.
A. The Inefficiency of Inequality in Opportunity
Gross inequalities of income and wealth impair the operation of true
equality of opportunity," 4  creating costly inefficiencies in the
development and use of human resources.115 While the removal of
formal barriers to opportunity (such as discrimination based on race or
sex) furthers equality of opportunity and leads to greater efficiency in the
use of human resources, inefficiencies associated with unequal material
resources remain. Because these inefficiencies keep individuals in society
from putting their abilities to their highest and best use, all of society
suffers.
113. See infra notes 362-64 and accompanying text (discussing the impact on
policy design of this reality).
114. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPrrAL 121 (3d ed. 1993)
("Generally, the most important cause of differences in opportunities is differences in the
availability of funds.") (footnote omitted); RAWLS, supra note 12, at 278 (inequality of
wealth beyond "a certain limit" places the equality of opportunity "in jeopardy"); Michael
Rosenfeld, Substantive Equality and Equal Opportunity: A Jurisprudential Appraisal, 74
CAL. L. REv. 1687, 1707-08 (1986); R.H. Tawney, Equality, in INEQUALrrY AND
POVERTY, supra note 56, at 27, 35.
115. See ARTHUR OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BiG TRADEOFF 80-81
(1975) (characterizing "the inadequate development of the human resources of the children
of poor families" as "one of the most serious inefficiencies in the American economy
today"); see also Lynn A. Stout, Some Thoughts on Poverty and Failure in the Market for
Children's Human Capital, 81 GEO. L.J. 1945 (1993).
1994:235
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
Since the scarce goods and services which make economic success
likely are sold to the highest bidders, or distributed to those with the
greatest economic resources, inequality of result (i.e., income or wealth)
itself impedes equality of opportunity, even in the absence of formal
barriers to opportunity. As long as the private market rations factors that
facilitate economic success on the basis of ability to pay, equality of
opportunity will in large measure remain a function of equality of
result. "6
At the most basic level, it is evident that subsistence-level food and
housing is necessary before one can take advantage of the "opportunities"
that might theoretically be available.1 7  Other goods which are
instrumental to success, such as education,"' health care, and legal
services" 9 can be purchased in greater quality and quantity by the more
well-off, thus enhancing their life chances. Other factors relevant to
success are positively correlated with a higher income, even though they
are not purchased at all. For example, an individual born into a wealthy
family is more likely to have family members and family friends in
positions of importance and influence, and hence is likely to reap greater
benefits by virtue of personal connections than is a person born into
poverty. 12
116. Nevertheless, an artificial dividing line between "equality of opportunity" and
"equality of result" has been central to thought about equal opportunity. See, e.g.,
LOCKHART, supra note 77, at 56 ("We may usefully distinguish between equality of
results, which has not achieved considerable support in theory or in practice among
Americans, and equality of opportunity, which in limited senses, at least, has become a
core American value."); MURRAY, supra note 3, at 233 ("Billions for equal opportunity,
not one cent for equal outcome. . .).
117. Lack of these resources can inflict significant and lasting damage to one's
ability to succeed. For example, a recent study indicates that persistent poverty during
early childhood is responsible for lower lQs. Spencer Rich, Poverty is Blamed For 9-
Point Deficit in 5-Year-Olds' IQs, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 1993, at A3 (citing a study
conducted by Greg J. Duncan of the University of Michigan).
118. While a high school education is publicly available to all, people with
sufficient economic resources can purchase an arguably better private school education.
JAMES S. FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, AND THE FAMILY 69 (1983).
Moreover, post-secondary education, which can vastly increase earning potential, see,
e.g., BECKER, supra note 114, at 17, must usually be purchased.
119. Although certain medical and legal services are available for the less well-off,
a more well-off person can purchase more* and better quality, medical and legal services.
See, e.g., WILLIAM RYAN, BLAMINO THE VicTim 159 (1971) ("The poor are less healthy
for the same reason they have less of everything else: they can't afford to buy health.");
id. at 203 ("mhe judicial process does not seem to sort out the innocent from the guilty,
so much as the well-to-do from the poor.").
120. See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 38, at 188 (discussing criticism that
"differences in access" to "favored networks of contacts" is partially responsible for
resulting gaps in income distribution). Others also contend that more well-off children
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Thus, inequalities in income and wealth drive a wedge between merit
and one's position in society, creating costly inefficiencies for all of
society in the form of suboptimal use of human resources.'
Moreover, given society's commitment to the ideal of equal opportunity,
the fact that inequality in one's economic starting position in life
precludes the fair operation of equal opportunity could be expected to
generate disutility associated with the resulting unfairness of economic
results.
B. Aesthetic Disutility
When some members of society have insufficient means to subsist in
a manner consistent with human dignity, there is a utility loss for all who
come into contact with this human suffering. Even such an opponent
of redistribution as Charles Murray has observed that "[flor the sake of
my own quality of life, I do not want to live in a Calcutta with people
sleeping in the streets in front of my house."" z  Mickey Kaus has
similarly observed that "[in many of our major cities, the latter groups
[criminals and the. homeless] have all but ruined the enjoyment of
communal facilities for the rest of society."" *
The aesthetic disutility resulting from contact with the poor is more
than merely psychological; it results in real economic loss for the affected
communities. Other things being equal, people who have the option to
avoid contact with areas in which the symptoms of poverty are pervasive
will tend to do so."z Similarly, market transactions will be performed
are given "differential developmental opportunities," including "culture in the home," "a
secure home environment," and "successful role models" which are not available to less
well-off children. E.g., FIsHKIN, supra note 118, at 51.
121. If the poor could borrow money through lending markets to purchase goods
and services instrumental to success, many of these inefficiencies would disappear.
BECKER, supra note 114, at 144 (listing "improved capital markets" as among the factors
that would "generally improve the allocation of the total investment in human capital").
It has been noted, however, that such lending markets are not generally available to the
poor. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 115, at 1948 & n.15 and sources cited therein. See
also infra part VIII (proposing use of a family loan program).
122. This disutility results from direct contact with the poor, not from the abstract
knowledge that poverty exists (although such knowledge is distressing to many in its own
right). See infra part IV.E (discussing preferences for a more equal pattern of
distribution).
123. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 202.
124. KAUS, supra note 10, at 55.
125. See, e.g., id. at 56 (describing how this phenomenon negatively affects the
use of public spaces); BARBARA EHRENREICH, FEAR OF FALLINo 249 (1989) (discussing




outside blighted communities rather than within them whenever possible.
Tourism falls, businesses fold, and people seek housing in different areas,
making the community in question even less desirable than before."
C. Crime and Rioting
Another kind of disutility resulting from poverty stems from the
possibility that vast disparities in wealth and income create conditions
conducive to crime and rioting." By decreasing disparities, the
relatively poor have less of an incentive to risk punishment by resorting
to crime and violence. This decrease in incentive would seem to result
chiefly from the increased income of the relatively poor, since the needs
which might motivate a poor person to resort to crime would be
alleviated. Perhaps more important, an individual with a minimally
adequate income (and the accompanying dignity and social status) has
"more to lose" from resorting to crime and violence.
It is also possible that a reduction in ostentatious displays of wealth,
which might occur if overall inequality were reduced, would reduce the
sense of outrage and injustice that may motivate some social unrest. In
a larger, societal sense, the poor may indeed have "more to gain" by
breaking the law when inequalities are vast, if those inequalities bear little
relation to natural ability.'2
Francis Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward have theorized that
poverty programs have historically been driven by a need to control the
behavior of the poor-a need that grew more pressing when traditional
methods of controlling behavior, such as employment, broke down."2
Under this theory, it is not surprising that the 1991 riots in Los Angeles
triggered a reassessment of welfare policies." 3 Although President
126. Fear of crime associated with the underclass makes these effects especially
severe. See, e.g., KAUS, supra note 10, at 107.
127. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 16, at 463-64; THUROW, supra note 58, at 38-
39. See also FRANK, supra note 38, at 127 ("If the rich refuse to compensate the poor
as part of a distributional contract, it is by no means clear that they can then count on
having a climate of peaceful interaction."). But see Lichbach, supra note 15 (using a
game theoretic model to question the relationship between inequality and social conflict).
128. See James M. Buchanan, Before Public Choice, in THE ECONOMICS OF
LEOAL RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 70, at 67, 75-76 (positing, based on game theoretic
analysis, that when distribution fails to correlate with human capital, law-abiding behavior
can be expected to break down).
129. Piven and Cloward, who first set forth this theory in 1975 in their book,
Regulating the Poor, have recently reaffirmed their conclusions, with minor clarifications.
See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 65, at 222-46, 456-66.
130. See, e.g., Lemann, supra note 8, at Cl ("Within hours of the outbreak of
disorder in Los Angeles, the riots began to be blamed on the Great Society.") See
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stated he would no longer "dump largesse" on urban areas,' 3' the social
unrest had the effect of focusing attention, at least momentarily, on the
underclass. The consensus was that something should be done, even if
the content of the specific policy to be pursued was unclear. 132
The social costs of crime and rioting extend, of course, far beyond
their immediate victims. Law enforcement costs are involved in quelling
violence and catching criminals, as well as social costs in the punishment
of criminals."3 In addition, the insecurity which such violence elicits
exacts both financial and nonfinancial costs on those in the area."'
Indeed, one cost of crime may be the perpetuation of poverty, since crime
in an impoverished area will tend to discourage the very investment that
might improve economic conditions for residents.131
D. Risk of Falling
Another reason why individuals who are not themselves presently
poor might wish to alleviate at least the most egregious extremes of want
is self-insurance. To the extent nonpoor individuals can imagine
themselves falling from their present standard of living into poverty, risk
aversion may lead them to place a limit on how far their fortunes may
fall. 6
generally URBAN AMERICA, supra note 11.
131. See Lemann, supra note 8, at Cl.
132. See, e.g., HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 5, at 29 ("Overt, collective
protest by the poor produces public response, but whether that response is liberal or
repressive is not predictable by the fact of protest alone. The most that can be said is that
from time to time, welfare policy does respond to quell social disorder.").
133. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,
76 J. POL. EcoN. 169, 179-81 (1968) (noting that punishment of crime, as well as crime
itself, is costly to society).
134. See Edelman, supra note 94, at 1749 & n.244 (noting that violence causes
high levels of anxiety and fear among children); see generally John J. Dilulio, Jr., The
Impact of Inner-City Crime, PUB. INTEREST, Summer 1989, at 28.
135. PETER REUTER ET AL., MONEY FROM CRIME 86 (1990) (citing Dilulio, supra
note 134).
136. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 16, at 465 ("An affluent person who is risk
averse will want to insure against the possibility of becoming poor sometime in the future,
because of business reverses, poor health, changes in the labor market, or other
misfortunes."); THUROW, supra note 58, at 39 ("[Plublic income redistribution schemes
may be a form of insurance-minimum-income insurance."). For a game theoretic
analysis of this self-insuring aspect of altruism, see Peter Hammond, Charity: Altruism
or Cooperative Egoism, in ALTRUISM, supra note 15, at 115.
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Social Security, a massive redistributive program,137 has been
accepted as a necessary component of American social policy based on
precisely such reasoning. The rhetoric surrounding Social Security,
which presented it as an insurance program rather than a redistributive
plan, has been viewed as largely responsible for its public acceptance.13
Also critical to its success was the universality of the condition triggering
payment-old age. Americans had little trouble imagining the financial
difficulties that might greet them (or their parents) upon reaching
retirement age. The virtual inevitability of the "insured-against" event
made the extraction of "premiums" from each paycheck remarkably
palatable to the average American, even though many of those at the
higher end of the pay scale would never recover anything approximating
the moneys put in, and even though many at the lower end of the pay
scale would reap benefits in great excess of contributions. 39
The insurance model for public assistance is a compelling and
philosophically important one. 10 John Rawls' Theory of Justice is, at
bottom, an exercise in self-insurance. The participants behind the
Rawlsian veil of ignorance are paying premiums of expected future utility
to insure against the effects of being born without marketable skills or at
the low end of the social stratum. 4' Ronald Dworkin his advanced a
theory of justice that similarly relies on an insurance model, albeit an
insurance model in which premiums and terms are negotiated with
somewhat more self-knowledge on the part of the participants than Rawls'
137. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 19, at 1454-55 (discussing growth of Social
Security and its redistributive aspects).
138. See, e.g., HANDLER & HASENFIELD, supra note 5, at 19 ("Despite the fact
that its insurance features are attenuated and the program has strong redistributive effects,
it has always been sold on the basis of 'insurance' and 'contributions.'"); GILBERT Y.
STEINER, THE STATE OF WELFARE 3 (1971) ("[Dlespite major modifications made as
early as 1939 in the principle of individual equity in social security, three decades later
the system continues to benefit politically from its insurance mythology.").
139. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 19, at 1454-59 (discussing the manner in which
Social Security policy became attenuated from the private insurance model); tenBroek &
Wilson, supra note 1, at 247 (discussing "disproportion .. . between benefits and
premiums, between premiums and wages, and between wages and work," such that "the
property of one person is taken for the use and benefit of another in the manner of all
taxes").
140. See, e.g., MARMOR EL' AL., supra note 6, at 31 (characterizing welfare state
as an "insurance/opportunity state"); Simon, supra note 19, at 1441-44.
141. Rawls' theory thus assumes that people are "fantastically risk averse."
POSNER, supra note 16, at 461. See also OKUN, supra note 115, at 92 and sources cited
therein ("[D]ifference principle would appeal only to people who hate to take any risk
whatsoever.").
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veil of ignorance permits."
E. Costs Arising From the Interdependence of Utility Functions
Without question, individuals in society can derive benefit not only
from their own holdings, but also from the holdings of others.4 This
is true not only because of the specific costs which have been identified
in the preceding sections, but also for intangible reasons relating to
"justice" or "fairness."'" Nonpoor persons may prefer a society in
which the poor have sufficient holdings to subsist in a manner befitting
a human being." They may further derive utility (or disutility) from
the overall shape of the distribution curve for income or wealth."
Thus, "people not only derive utility from their own incomes but can also
derive utility from (i) the income of others or (ii) the shape of the overall
income distribution curve."" Other things being equal, a person might
prefer to live in a society in which incomes did not vary widely, for
intangible reasons relating to the perceived justice, fairness, or
opportunity for community associated with that relative equality. 4"
142. Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHL.
& PUB. AFF. 283, 315 (1981) ("We may capitalize on the similarities between handicaps
and relative lack of skill to propose that the level of compensation for the latter be fixed,
in principle, by asking how much insurance someone would have bought, in an insurance
sub-auction with initially equal resources, against the possibility of not having a particular
level of some skill."); id. at 344-45 (describing the level of self-knowledge at the time of
the sub-auction, which is greater than that in the Rawlsian model). See also Milton
Friedman, The Distribution of income, in INEQUALITY AND POVERTY, supra note 56, at
38, 40.
143. See, e.g., THUROW, supra note 58, at 38; Sen, supra note 59, at 92
(describing "sympathy" as the benefit one derives from an improvement in the condition
of another).
144. See, e.g., Guillermina Jasso, Self-Interest, Distributive Justice, and the
Income Distribution: A Theoretical Fragment Based on St. Anselm's Postulate, 3 SOC.
JUST. RES. 251 (1989) (presenting a formal analysis of the postulate that individuals seek
not only .their own advantage, but also seek justice).
145. See, e.g., THuRow, supra note 58, at 38 ("1 may be happier if my neighbors
are well-off and not in poverty.").
146. Id. at 39 ("Mhe distribution of income may itself appear in my utility
function. I want to live in a society with a certain kind of economic lottery, and I am
willing to contribute some of my own income in order to get the right structure of
prizes.") (footnote omitted).
147. Wil Arts & Peter van Wijck, Share and Share Alike? Social Constraints on
Income Equalization, 3 Soc. JUST. RES. 233, 235 (1989).
148. See, e.g., Arthur M. Okun, Further Thoughts on Equality and Efficiency, in
INCOME REDISTRIBUTION 13, 14-16 (Colin D. Campbell ed., 1977) (discussing society's
preference for equality); W.S. Vickery, An Exchange of Questions Between Economics
and Philosophy, in ECONOMIC JUSTICE 35, 47 (Edmund S. Phelps ed., 1973) (postulating
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preference is obviously not a universal one; some people derive utility
from the very fact that other people are not as well-off as themselves,149
while others may value the wider range of economic outcomes for the
possibilities and risks it offers. 5" Therefore, the type of intangible
social "cost" of poverty and inequality which I am describing exists only
to the extent the disutility suffered from the present structure outweighs
the intangible utility this arrangement brings.
Although the direction and intensity of these preferences is largely
indeterminate, in at least one area the interdependence of utility functions
appears to be quite significant-the case of children in poverty. Whether
the disutility associated with children in poverty is described as simple
compassion or as a disutility arising from the unfairness of poverty
inflicted on one who did nothing to deserve it, it seems to be nearly
universally true that the personal well-being of individuals in society is
caught up, to at least some extent, with the well-being of society's poorest
children.
V. THE COSTLY PUBLIC ALLEVIATION OF POVERTY
A. Why Public Alleviation?
The discussion in the preceding Parts indicates why all of society,
including the nonpoor, find poverty very costly. Because poverty is costly
to the nonpoor, the nonpoor have always been willing to spend money to
alleviate it. In this sense, poverty alleviation is a valuable public
good"' which the nonpoor would willingly purchase in order to increase
their own utility. The question remains, however, as to who should bear
the cost of alleviating poverty.
It is sometimes suggested that the costs of poverty should be
alleviated through private charities rather than through the governmental
apparatus. 5 2  The appeal of private charities over public welfare is
obvious: because private charities are completely voluntary, the coercive
power of government is not involved and hence one could not complain
that there may be "social" satisfactions associated with equality).
149. See, e.g., MICHAEL LEWIS, THE CULTURE OF INEQUALITY 44 (1978).
150. See, e.g., OKUN, supra note 115, at 48-49 ("The possibility of 'making it
big' seems to motivate many Americans, including some who have not made it at all.").
151. See Arts & van Wijck, supra note 147, at 235 (characterizing income
distribution as a public good).
152. Charles Murray, for one, has proposed that the entire public welfare system
be dismantled, yet he does not oppose redistributive efforts carried out by private




that one's property or liberty rights were being violated, or that one was
being compelled to perform "forced labor."153 Yet it is well recognized
that private provision of assistance presents a free-rider problem which
results in provision of a sub-optimal level of redistribution."
This is true because individuals benefit when poverty is relieved,
whether or not they personally assist in its alleviation.'55 Each person
acting in his or her own interest would seek to "free-ride" off the
redistributive efforts of others. While each person might independently
be willing to pay a particular share towards the alleviation of poverty, he
or she has an incentive to conceal or misrepresent that willingness in an
effort to reap benefits entirely funded by others.
Because the free-rider problem typically results in suboptimal
provision of the public good in question, society as a whole (but
especially the putative recipient) suffers. For this reason, "voluntarism
never was and never will be able to meet the needs of poor and dependent
Americans."" In addition, altruists may end up paying for more than
their "fair share" (and getting the benefit of only a suboptimal result) as
a result of other people's attempts to free-ride. 57 Or, altruists may no
longer feel it is "worth it" to contribute, without the assurance that
everyone else will contribute as well.' 58 They may be willing to chip
in to purchase a comprehensive poverty alleviation program, the argument
runs, but unwilling to make a "drop in the bucket" contribution which
would make no discernible difference in the overall poverty
condition.' Taken together, these "free-rider" considerations make
a compelling case for the government provision of welfare."w
Given the foregoing, one might think that the public provision of
welfare would solve the free-rider problem. Yet one of the most difficult
and troubling dilemmas in welfare policy can be conceptualized as an
even more basic "free-rider" problem-with the poor and the nonpoor
153. See supra note 45 (quoting NOZICK, supra note 3). It is also possible that
differences in administrative costs between public and private assistance could be
identified, especially if public assistance is accomplished through the mechanism of the
state. See KurrNER, supra note 10, at 22-23.
154. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 12, at 267-68; POSNUR, supra note 16, at 464-
65; Arts & van Wijck, supra note 147, at 237-38 (expressing the free-rider problem as
it pertains to redistribution of income).
155. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 16, at 464; Arts & van Wijck, supra note 147,
at 235.
156. KATZ, supra note 1, at 291.
157. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 16, at 464 ("Mhe major cost of poverty,
however, is the disutility it imposes on affluent altruists.").
158. See NOzIcK, supra note 3, at 265-68; RAwLS, supra note 12, at 267.
159. See NOZICK, supra note 3, at 265-68.
160. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 12, at 267-68.
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each seeking to reap the benefits of poverty alleviation without incurring
the costs necessary to bring it about. The game theoretic model presented
in Part III above demonstrates how this free-rider dilemma plays out.
If that analysis is correct, society chooses to adopt a policy of
alleviating poverty because it is "worth it" to avoid the costs of poverty
associated with a complete failure to provide for the poor. At the same
time, society is somewhat dissatisfied and uneasy with that strategy
because it could reap even greater benefits if the poor alleviated their own
poverty, relieving society of incurring those alleviation costs. Not
surprisingly, criticisms of welfare policy tend to focus on these costs of
public poverty alleviation, rather than on the costs of failing to alleviate
the poverty which created the strategic dilemma in the first place. In
order to better understand society's position in the game, it is necessary
to examine these costs in some detail. They fall into two major
categories.
First, the public provision of welfare is costly because it may
encourage decisionmaking on the part of the poor which will generate
additional costs for society. Second, even aside from the effects on
decisionmaking, the public provision of welfare is inherently costly to
society in that it involves the movement of resources from one group to
another.' 6 ' I focus primarily on one cost in this category that I feel to
be most significantly implicated in welfare policy: the perceived
unfairness of moving funds belonging to the more well-off into the hands
of the less well-off.
B. Costs Associated With the Decisions of the Poor
As the game theoretic analysis presented in Part III suggests, what
makes the societal alleviation of poverty so problematic is the fact that the
actual and potential recipients of welfare are not merely acted upon; they
make decisions and interact with the policy structure in a manner that can
raise or lower the costs of redistribution, including nonmonetary costs.
This may have the effect of eliciting reactions which trigger further
changes in costs. Only by tracing through all the impacts on
decisionmaking can the true cost associated with a given level and method
of redistribution be assessed. Coase's admonition in another context is
equally apt here: "[I]n choosing between social arrangements within the
context of which individual decisions are made, we have to bear in mind
161. Of course, the magnitude of this second group of costs is affected by the
decisionmaking of the poor. If more people decide to opt for public assistance rather than
self-help, more money will have to be moved. Nevertheless, the basic categories of these




that a change in the existing system which will lead to an improvement
in some decisions may well lead to a worsening of others." 62
Because of the interdependent relationship between the costs and
benefits of redistribution and various decisions made by recipients of
transfer payments, it is possible that, as an empirical matter, beyond some
point additional expenditures on welfare actually lead to a decrease in
total benefits obtained. This possibility-that added expenditures might
have a negative marginal value and actually "make things worse"-has
had widespread intuitive appeal. But it is widely misunderstood. The
fact that a particular welfare policy causes people to make decisions which
are costly does not necessarily mean that the policy causes net harm or
yields a net increase in poverty. A welfare policy reduces poverty costs
by transferring money to the poor; when that same policy causes some
persons to make socially costly decisions, those "decision'costs" simply
represent an offset against the gains achieved through the policy. Only
if the decision costs were to increase poverty to such an extent as to
completely offset all the gains realized under anti-poverty programs would
it be accurate to say that the welfare policy was actually making things
worse.
In other words, decisions triggered by welfare policy may well cause
poverty to be greater under a particular welfare policy than would be the
case in the absence of such decisions, holding welfare policy constant.
Whether poverty costs in such a situation are worse, in absolute terms,
than they would have been in the absence of that policy is a separate
question. "6
1. THE COMPLEX RATIONALITY OF THE POOR
In assessing the costs associated with decisions made by the poor, I
begin with the assumption that the poor are rational actors who seek to
162. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 44 (1960). See
also Robert Jervis, Systems Effects, in STRATEOY AND CHOICE 107, 107 (Richard J.
Zeckhauser ed., 1991) ("'When you pick up one piece of this planet, you find that, one
way or another, it's attached to everything else-if you jiggle over here, something is
going to wiggle over there .... ') (quoting Dr. Sylvia Earle, a leading marine biologist
and ecologist).
163. For example, a welfare policy providing food to 50 women and their children
would decrease the total costs associated with poverty even if that same policy were
responsible for 10 of those women making decisions leading to prolonged dependency.
In that case, the decrease in poverty costs associated with providing nutrition to 40 women
and their children who would otherwise starve (let us assume) is somewhat offset by the
costs of 10 women and their children becoming more dependent. Yet poverty costs still
go down in absolute terms, when compared to a world with no welfare policy.
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maximize their own well-being and that of their families.' However,
some unique aspects of that rationality should be recognized.
First, unlike more well-off individuals, poor individuals' rationality
is bounded by the pressure of subsistence-level needs. 16 Because needs
must be fulfilled in a short time frame to avoid loss of health or life, a
rational actor will pay virtually any price to fulfill them. A longer range
plan of action which would lead to a more efficient meeting of those
needs is useless to a person under the immediate pressure of hunger,
unless that plan also permits those immediate needs to be satisfied."
To borrow an example from literature, if Robinson Crusoe can barely dig
enough clams each day to keep himself from starving, he cannot (without
borrowing clams) save up enough clams to buy a shovel, even though a
shovel would increase his daily clam-digging capacity. 67
Second, the rationality of any person is keyed to his or her own
preferences and goals, which may change over time.'" What is rational
for a person on welfare, therefore, may be different from what is rational
for a more well-off person."
164. See, e.g., MARIAN W. EDELMAN, FAMILIES IN PERIL: AN AGENDA FOR
SOCIAL CHANGE 75 (1987) ("[TJhe work behavior of the poor shows that the poor,
including those who rely upon welfare benefits to meet their needs, overwhelmingly
respond to the same choices and motivations as the rest of us."); Alejandro Portes,
Rationality in the Slum: An Essay on Interpretive Sociology, 14 CoMp. STUD. Soc'Y &
HIST. 268, 286 (1972) (concluding, based on his study of a Chilean slum, that
"individuals [in the slum] continuously look for the most efficient way of improving their
positions within the limits and the barriers created by the existing social and economic
organization").
165. LUTZ & Lux, supra note 59, at 23-26. There are difficulties, however, in
distinguishing "needs" from mere "wants." See, e.g., PAUL HEYNE, THE ECONOMIC
WAY OF THINKINo 16 (4th ed. 1983) ("[Nleeds turn out to be mere wants when we
inspect them closely."), quoted in LUTZ & Lux, supra note 59, at 23. See also infra
notes 292-94 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between needs and wants).
Despite these conceptual difficulties, I will assume for present purposes that some things
can be usefully thought of as basic human "needs" in our society, without which one
would suffer a loss of health, life, or human dignity.
166. Charles Murray seems to be referring to this aspect of the rationality of the
poor when he says that the poor "play with fewer chips and cannot wait as long for
results." MURRAY, supra note 3, at 155 (footnote omitted). See also OKUN, supra note
115, at 80 ("[Mlany of the poor act like there's no tomorrow because their main problem
is surviving today. Saving and investment are hardly rational at the cost of survival.").
167. LUTZ & Lux, supra note 59, at 24 (discussing an example from HEYNE,
supra note 165).
168. See, e.g., HEAP, supra note 59, at 103-15 (discussing preference shifts);
Vickery, supra note 148, at 43-44 (discussing changes in preferences, as well as efforts
specifically directed at effecting same); infra part VI.A.2.
169. Society can, however, attempt to change preferences that it believes are
objectively inferior through education, changes in the law, or other forms of social
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Third, decisionmaking by the poor does not occur in a vacuum, but
instead interacts with decisionmaking by the nonpoor, which also has an
effect on their well-being. This means that the choices made by the poor
may make sense only in the context of decisionmaking by other actors;
the poor might make different choices if their well-being depended solely
upon their own actions."
Finally, it is important to remember that welfare policy is but one
factor affecting an impoverished person's decisions, and by no means is
it always the most, important one. 171 Social and cultural forces, as well
as interactions with family and friends, also contribute to the context in
which decisions are made, and necessarily affect the content of those
decisions." The poor do react rationally to changes in welfare policy,
but they are also simultaneously reacting to other forces in their lives."
Welfare policy is not the sole determinant of the behavior of the poor.
This unexceptional observation, which merely recognizes the
complexity of all human decisionmaking," should not, however, lead
one to abandon all analysis which examines the incentive effects of
particular welfare policy features. Ignoring the incentive effects of such
policies makes no more sense than ignoring the disincentive effects of
taxation on the work effort of the more well-off, simply because other,
nonmonetary factors are also involved in the choice between work and
leisure at the margin. The marginal effect of welfare policy on behavior
remains an area of legitimate concern, tempered by the recognition that
other forces may counterbalance or intensify that effect.
conditioning. See, e.g., Jack Wiseman & S.C. Littlechild, The Political Economy of
Restriction of Choice, in JACK WISEMAN, COST, CHOICE & POLITICAL ECONOMY 186,
189-90 (1989) (discussing societal attempts to change preferences for such activities as
drinking, smoking, and using drugs). See also infra Part V.B.2.b (discussing efforts to
change preferences for work).
170. The strategic dilemma outlined in Part III, supra, illustrates the
interdependence of decisions made by the poor and the nonpoor.
171. See, e.g., MARMOR ET AL., supra note 6, at 219-20.
172. For example, it has been pointed out that shifts in societal factors, such as
"the perception of out-of-wedlock births or of single parenting" could "dwarf the effects
of the economic incentives [incorporated in welfare policy]." Id. at 220.
173. For this reason "the multiple pressures and diffuse expectations created by
economic forces are much harder to sort out." Id.
174. See ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 125 (1993) ("Like a
large jigsaw puzzle, where each piece fits only in the space left by all of the other pieces,
each person's actions are performed within the space of constraints and incentives left
open by the actions of all the others.").
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2. WORK DISINCENTIVES CREATED BY WELFARE
a. Choosing between welfare and work
The existence of welfare, which provides qualifying individuals with
subsistence-level benefits, provides an alternative to whatever work that
same individual might be able to obtain. As David Ellwood has pointed
out, assistance inevitably "reduce[s] the pressure" on the individual to
support herself and her family."" When welfare benefits (including in-
kind benefits like Medicaid) equal or exceed the full-time wages available
at an entry-level minimum wage job, it is unsurprising that many facing
that choice would opt for welfare.
This is the basic premise underlying Charles Murray's "Harold and
Phyllis" example. 6 According to Murray, the package of leisure and
benefits attending welfare (which can be supplemented by the income of
a live-in nonspouse) may be perceived as more attractive than relying on
a dull, low-end job as the primary source of income.1" The higher the
benefits provided under welfare and the fewer behavioral and
consumption restrictions upon which its receipt is conditioned, the better
it will look to a potential recipient when compared to other prospects."
The troubling result is that, in society's efforts to assist the poor, it
unwittingly "cheapen[s] the efforts of those who are struggling hard just
to get by.""7 This results in palpable unfairness to the working poor,
who often are unable to attain the poverty level."8  One apparent
175. ELLWOOD, supra note 1, at 19 (referring to the "[slecurity-[w]ork
[clonundrum"); see also HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 5, at 37 ("The relief of
misery is contradicted by the need to uphold the work ethic."). The reduction of pressure
to survive that accompanies transfer payments has long been recognized. See KATZ,
supra note 1, at 17 (To many nineteenth century observers, "private charity and outdoor
relief encouraged idleness by undermining the relation between work and survival.").
176. See MURRAY, supra note 3, at 156-64.
177. See id. at 160-62.
178. Interestingly, efforts to reduce perverse incentives for those already on
welfare, such as permitting welfare recipients to keep some percentage of their earnings
without suffering a corresponding reduction in benefits, increases the attractiveness of the
total welfare "package" and, on balance, would be expected to induce more potential
recipients to select it. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 163-64 (citing Frank Levy, The Labor
Supply of Female Household Heads, or AFDC Work Incentives Don't Work Too Well, 14
J. Hum. RESOURCES 76 (1979)).
179. ELLWOOD, supra note 1, at 6.
180. See JOHN E. SCHWARZ & THOMAS J. VoLOY, THE FORGOTTEN AMERICANS
130-31 (1992) ("[O]ur present policies to assist the poor create another grave injustice that
ought not be ignored-namely, that Americans who work full-time the whole year
frequently end up with incomes at or beneath the level that public assistance grants to
many welfare recipients who are employed intermittently or not at all.").
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solution would be to reduce welfare benefits to the point that entry level
work becomes the preferred strategy. Yet the gap between welfare
benefits and the wages one could earn at an entry-level job is caused not
by overly generous welfare benefits (in most cases, benefits do not even
bring a recipient halfway to the poverty line); 8' it is caused by the
inadequacy of full-time entry level wages (which are virtually never
accompanied by benefits such as health insurance)."
Nevertheless, cutting welfare benefits would doubtless cause some
potential welfare recipients to choose work over welfare, since it would
alter the relative attractiveness of the two choices. At the limit, the
elimination of all welfare benefits would make work virtually the only
option for the poor.'8 However, the extent to which the poor would
be able to exercise their "option" to work depends on whether
unemployment among welfare recipients is voluntary or involuntary. The
fact that millions of working families are unable to escape poverty even
when a family member works full-time strongly suggests that there are
simply not enough "steady, decent-paying, full-time jobs to go
around. "'"
The magnitude of welfare's effect upon decisions between work and
welfare depends on the relative size of two groups among thepoor-those
who "could" support themselves but would prefer not to, and those who
"could not" support themselves.' Making welfare benefits more
181. See DaVanzo, supra note 11, at 103 ("[Tiwo-thirds of the states in the United
States had AFDC grant levels that were less than 50 percent of the poverty line."). See
also JENCKS, supra note 7, at 205-08 (citing study of Chicago welfare mothers conducted
by Kathryn Edin, which showed that welfare recipients must somehow supplement their
AFDC payments-through off-the-books jobs, vice, or support from friends-in order to
meet basic living expenses).
182. See EDELMAN, supra note 164, at 74 ("The trend toward earnings inadequate
to support children and families is shocking."). These low earnings push many American
workers and their families below the poverty line. See SCHWARZ & VOLOY, supra note
180, at 61 ("During 1989, 56 million Americans-22.8 percent of the American
population-resided in households with incomes that could not realistically provide for
basic necessities.") (footnote omitted).
183. This assumes that the poor would be unable to obtain assistance from other
sources, such as family members or private charities, and that work would yield greater
net benefits than panhandling or criminal activity, all of which are empirically uncertain.
184. SCHWARZ & VOLoY, supra note 180, at 106.
185. Whether welfare recipients "can" find employment also may depend upon
what assumptions one makes about the mobility and adaptability of the recipients. Some
have argued that the availability of welfare blocks the natural adaptive process that
recipients would otherwise follow by, for example, migrating to places where jobs could
be found and creating stable, two-parent homes which would increase the chances of
success for their offspring. See, e.g., KAus, supra note 10, at 119-20 (citing John D.
Kasarda, Urban Change and Minority Opportunities, in THE NEW URBAN REALITY 59-60,
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stingy would affect the behavior of the first group only; to the extent
individuals in this group were induced to take jobs rather than go on
welfare, society's costs would be reduced. The price for this cost
reduction, however, is increased poverty among the second group-those
who would be unable to react to reduced benefits by finding a job."
b. Incentive structures for welfare recipients
Once on welfare, recipients are given little incentive to work by the
present benefit structure.1" Even during a family's first few months on
AFDC, when the first thirty dollars of earned income and one-third of
income earned thereafter are disregarded in determining eligibility and
benefit levels,18 the effective marginal tax rate for welfare recipients is
high. When these disregards become inapplicable, welfare recipients face
an even steeper marginal tax rate on earned income.1" The result is a
"poverty wall" which discourages exit from the welfare program." ° A
welfare recipient would have to find an entry-level job that paid
significantly more than available welfare benefits in order to make
worthwhile the effort of getting and keeping the job, as well as the
necessary expenditures for transportation, appropriate clothing, and
childcare.91
66 (Paul E. Peterson ed., 1985)); see also Irving Kristol, Thoughts on Equality and
Egalitarianism, in INCOME REDISTRIBUTION, supra note 148, at 38 (citing the "Okies,"
who fled the dustbowl during the Depression to seek work in California).
186. Cf. infra notes 281-91 and accompanying text (discussing costs associated
with efforts to deter welfare participation through stigma).
187. See, e.g., MARTIN ANDERSON, WELFARE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
WELFARE REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES 43 (1978) (alleging that "[the virtual
elimination of poverty in the United States" has been obtained at the price of "the almost
complete destruction of work incentives for the poor on welfare").
188. The exclusion of one-third of earned income becomes inapplicable after it has
been applied for four consecutive months, and the $30 exclusion is inapplicable after it
has been applied for 12 consecutive months. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(B)(ii)(1)(a) (1988).
Once these provisions become inapplicable, they may not be invoked again until 12
months have expired without the receipt of assistance under the program. Id.
§ 602(a)(8)(B)(ii)(I)(b). Moreover, even during the time limitations, the "income
disregard" provisions are inapplicable in a variety of circumstances, such as when a
person has refused or terminated employment. Id. § 602(a)(8)(B)(i)(I)-(III).
189. While other income disregards may remain applicable, such as flat disregard
amounts for child care expenses and child support received, see id. § 602(a)(8)(A), these
do not serve to lower the marginal tax rate faced by a welfare recipient once she exceeds
these flat disregard amounts in a given month.
190. See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 187, at 50; POSNER, supra note 16, at 467-
68 (discussing disincentive effects of high marginal tax rates on welfare recipients'
earnings).
191. See, e.g., JENCKS, supra note 7, at 223-26.
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One way to induce people to leave the welfare rolls is to design a
program so that one can be made better-off by engaging in the kinds of
behavior (such as work) that would, at least in theory, lead to eventual
independence from public assistance. For example, the effective tax rate
on earnings received while on welfare could be reduced by allowing
welfare recipients to keep some greater proportion of their earnings
without an offset in benefits. Yet attempts to lower the marginal tax rate
applicable to welfare recipients face formidable political barriers. As
Martin Anderson has noted, to reduce the marginal tax rate without
lowering the present welfare "floor" would "increase the cost of welfare
to taxpayers by such phenomenal sums" that it would be a politicalimpossibility."9
The resulting dilemma has been termed an "iron triangle," defined
as "the triangle created by the inherent conflicts among the income
guarantee level, the work incentive (how much of an imputed 'tax' on
earnings), and total costs."' In other words, to reap the benefits
associated with lowered marginal tax rates on recipients (i.e., stronger
work incentives causing more welfare recipients to work, thus reducing
costs from perceived unfairness, dependency costs, and the like), society
must do one of two things. On the one hand, society can incur increased
program costs, as where the floor remains stable with welfare recipients
retaining a greater percentage of outside earnings. Alternatively, society
can lower the floor and incur increased costs as a result of the dire
poverty of those who do not (or cannot) find work to supplement their
benefit checks."9
Another way of accomplishing the same thing would be to leave the
effective tax on work unchanged but make work attractive enough that
welfare recipients would find it worth their while to hurdle the "poverty
wall." For example, the minimum wage could be increased, or wages at
entry-level jobs could be supplemented by the government either in cash
192. ANDERSON, supra note 187, at 49.
193. GLAZER, supra note 94, at 28 (citing Sheldon K. Danzinger, Budget Cuts as
Welfare Reform, AM. ECON. REV., May 1983, at 65, 73 n.2). Danzinger referred to the
"iron triangle" in the context of efforts to pass the Family Assistance Plan; however, the
concept applies equally to efforts to insert work incentives into AFDC or similar benefit
programs.
194. Work requirements, school requirements, and other conditions of transfer
pose a variant of this "iron triangle" problem. Either welfare participants who meet the
behavioral requirements are rewarded with higher benefit levels (which raises monetary
costs), or the welfare participants who fail to meet the requirements are penalized with
lowered benefit levels (which entails higher nonmonetary costs). See infra part VII.B
(discussing behavioral conditions placed on welfare).
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or in benefits. 95 Specifically, it has been suggested that a health
benefits package equal to the benefits available through Medicaid to
welfare recipients be appended to all jobs, including entry-level work."
All these solutions involve costs of their own, however. Raising the
minimum wage "would make low-paid jobs more attractive, but it would
also make employers less willing to hire the unskilled, and it would risk
greater export of jobs to countries with cheaper labor."1 7 Government
wage subsidies, embraced by some commentators as an externality-free
way to encourage work and reward workers,'" would be very costly,
as they would extend benefits to those who are now ineligible to receive
them. Moreover, any benefit cutoff point that is selected will create its
own disincentive effects. If wage supplements are cut off for a certain-
sized family when its income (without the benefit) reaches a certain level,
there is a strong incentive to avoid reaching that level, since arriving at
the cutoff point would entail a net loss in income.
This benefit cutoff problem was recognized as one of the reasons for
the failure of President Nixon's proposed Family Assistance Plan
("FAP") which, much like plans proposed today, sought to provide a
grant to all low-income families." Similar effects at the benefit cutoff
195. See, e.g., GLAZER, supra note 94, at 13-14 (suggesting that society "attach
to low-income jobs the same kind of fringe benefits-health insurance, social security,
vacations with pay-that now make higher paying jobs available," given that these benefits
"paradoxically are now available in some form to those on welfare") (footnote omitted).
196. See JENCKS, supra note 7, at 234. President Clinton's proposed health care
plan would similarly universalize health insurance coverage. See generally WHITE HOUSE
DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL, HEALTH SECURITY: THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT TO THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE (1993).
197. LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTrrLEMENT 84 (1986).
198. See, e.g., KAUS, supra note 10, at 125 (suggesting that the governmentcreate
public jobs and then "supplement the wages of all low-wage jobs, both public and private,
to ensure that every American who works full-time has enough money to raise a normal-
sized family with dignity, out of poverty"); JENCKS, supra note 7, at 233-34.
199. See DANIEL P. MOYNmiAN, THE POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED INCOME 474-
81 (1973) (discussing tables constructed to illustrate benefits that hypothetical families in
four cities would receive at various income levels). Moynihan recounts the following
colloquy concerning the net benefit reductions that were built into the FAP bill as income
levels increased:
SENATOR WILLIAMS: . . . If they increase their earnings from $720 to
$5,560 under this bill, they have a spendable income of $6,109, or $19 less
than if they sit in a rocking chair earning only $720. Is that not correct?
MR. PATRICELLI: That is correct....
SENATOR WILLIAMS: They are penalized $19 because they go out and earn
$5,500. Is that correct?
MR. PATRICELLI: That is correct....
SENATOR WILLIAMS: What possible logic is there to it?
MR. PATRICELLI: There is none, Senator.
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point have been observed with respect to the Earned Income Tax
Credit.' A second problem with wage subsidies is the risk that
employers would reduce wages accordingly. In a labor market in which
many people are seeking jobs, one would expect the total wage (including
the subsidy) to be bid down to present levels. 1
The present welfare system also keys eligibility to the absence of
savings, hence discouraging saving.' Under the present statutory
scheme, accumulating assets in excess of $1,000 defeats a family's
eligibility for benefits. By permitting welfare recipients to
accumulate savings, good financial habits are fostered and money is
amassed for use in escaping poverty (through, for example, college or
investment in a new business). But such a policy choice is also costly.
Since society's primary goal is elimination of severe want, the dispensing
of benefits sufficient to permit accumulation by recipients will not only
cost more money, it will also entail costs linked to the perceived
unfairness of such a system.
The difficulties involved in removing perverse incentives from
welfare programs have caused some commentators to reject the idea of
incentives in favor of bureaucratically enforced norms,' expulsion of
the able-bodied from the welfare rolls," or complete dismantlement of
the welfare system." While such solutions might reduce perverse
incentives, they would entail increased poverty costs.2
Id. at 481.
200. See Guy Gugliotta, How to Aid 'Working Poor'?, WASH. POST, Apr. 15,
1993, at Al, A8 ("There are indications that some Americans deliberately work hard
enough to obtain maximum EITC benefits-but no harder.").
201. The minimum wage would, of course, provide a limit on such wage-cutting
behavior. Nevertheless, one would expect many jobs which currently pay at a somewhat
higher rate to be bid down accordingly. But see SCHWARZ & VOLGY, supra note 180,
at 171-72 (contending that there is little evidence to suggest that such supplements actually
result in the lowering of wages, and noting that an employer would not be able to easily
adjust wages to offset the supplement because the employer would not have access to
information concerning which employees were receiving supplements, or the amount of
such supplements).
202. See, e.g., Thomas Sancton, How to Get America Off the Dole, TIME, May
25, 1992, at 44, 45 (relating a story of a welfare family subject to reimbursement order
for AFDC benefits received, because one child saved part-time earnings for college in
excess of the statutory limit).
203. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(7)(B) (1988).
204. MEAD, supra note 197, at 178.
205. See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 187, at 162.
206. See generally MURRAY, supra note 3.
207. See supra part III (discussing the "crash" outcome in the "chicken" game).
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3. COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH "DEPENDENCY" PATTERNS
Much current thinking about welfare stresses the need to end patterns
of dependency into which some welfare recipients have allegedly
slipped.' It is worth considering with some specificity what perceived
costs underlie such statements. The work disincentive costs of welfare
discussed above are certainly part of the picture-the word "dependency"
would be meaningless if applied to a working person-but the concept of
dependency goes beyond the mere failure to work. Costs attach to long-
term (possibly intergenerational) welfare dependence, above and beyond
the costs attributable to those individuals' failure to work.
The emphasis which opponents of redistribution place on the length
of time some individuals spend on welfare underscores the importance of
this factor. If the failure of the poor to support themselves were the only
relevant cost, one would expect a rational society to be indifferent as
between supporting the same five million persons for ten consecutive
years versus supporting a different set of five million people in each of
those ten years. - Yet the first situation is more troubling for
intangible reasons relating to the development of a relatively permanent
"underclass."210
Some have alleged that the formation of an underclass of the
chronically dependent was made possible by (if not completely caused by)
the availability of welfare. 2" It is certainly true that some percentage
208. See, e.g., MEAD, supra note 73, at 2 (describing a "new agenda" in which
"[i]ssues of dependency and dysfunction" are dominant); PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note
65, at 397 (citing a number of authorities who have focused on dependency issues);
Marshall & Kamarck, supra note 9, at 218 (advocating new presidential policies "to
empower the poor and help them liberate themselves not only from poverty, but also from
a debilitating dependence on welfare").
209. Indeed, if administrative costs were considered, it would be cheaper to
provide assistance to the same set of five million for all ten years, since the costs of
registering new recipients and clearing old ones from the rolls would be eliminated.
210. The term "underclass" is used variously to connote a number of collateral
societal problems aside from, and in addition to, lack of material resources. Christopher
Jencks has identified four dimensions upon which the classification of a poor person as
a member of the "underclass" may be based: (1) "income level"; (2) "income sources";
(3) 'cultural skills"; or (4) failure to adopt certain 'moral norms" regarding work,
reproduction, or violence. JENCKs, supra note 7, at 144. Linked in this manner to
behavioral patterns, the term "underclass" corresponds to earlier designations of "the
undeserving poor." Id. at 149-50.
211. See, e.g., KAUs, supra note 10, at 121 ("Welfare may not have been a
sufficient condition for the growth of the underclass, but it's hard to see how
contemporary liberals can deny that it was a necessary condition."); Robert K.
Fullinwider, Citizenship and Welfare, in DEMOCRACY AND THE WELFARE STATE 261, 271
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1988) ("Contemporary critics of Federal welfare programs charge
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of those on welfare stay on welfare for an extended period of time,"'
perhaps bearing children who grow up on public assistance and continue
to receive welfare when they reach adulthood."' To the extent that
these same individuals would be leading independent lives but for the
public provision of welfare-a proposition that is by no means
certain214-the resulting dependency represents a cost of welfare.
There are a number of salient dimensions to "dependency." First,
there is a disutility associated with the same persons being on welfare for
an extended period of time. Second, a disutility is associated with
decisions by welfare recipients which increase the length of time they will
remain on welfare and therefore increase the total number of persons who
will be on welfare."' Third, there is a disutility associated with the
perception that a "culture" has arisen in which decisions which tend to
increase the length of time and increase the number of persons on welfare
are valued over decisions which would decrease those numbers.1 6
that they erode this sense of citizenship [based on ability to support oneself] and create
long-term, habituated welfare dependency.").
212. See, e.g., EDELMAN, supra note 164, at 73 ("[Djetailed studies of the AFDC
caseload suggest that roughly half of all recipients move off the rolls within two years.
The remainder rely upon AFDC benefits for a much longer period of time-most at least
six years, and a third for eight years or more."). Studies done by Mary Jo Bane and
David Ellwood have identified differences between groups of welfare recipients as to
length of time on welfare: for example, "non-white unmarried mothers who dropped out
of high school will average 10 years on welfare." Id. (quoting Mary Jo Bane & David
Ellwood, The Dynamics of Dependence: The Routes to Self Sufficiency 30 (June 1983)
(unpublished manuscript)). See also KAUS, supra note 10, at 118 ("Mhe average welfare
stay, for those on the rolls at any given moment, is 11.6 years.") (footnote omitted).
213. Studies have indicated such intergenerational effects, showing a significant
correlation between a woman's participation in the welfare system and her mother's
participation. See, e.g., Wefare Dependency: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Social
Security and Family Policy of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 130-33
(1991) (statement of Janet L. Norwood, Commissioner, Bureau of Labor Statistics) and
sources cited therein.
214. This returns us to the question of whether unemployment is voluntary or
involuntary. See supra text accompanying note 184. To the extent the individuals in
question would be unable to obtain work in any event, the public provision of welfare
could not be said to "cause" their dependency. If welfare were not present, those same
individuals would nonetheless be either dependent-on private charity, family members,
or on society as a whole through a life of crime-or dead.
215, See supra part V.B.2 (work disincentive costs); infra part V.B.4 (family
structure costs).
216. For example, Lawrence Mead has emphasized the importance of parents as
role models: "if the parents signal by their withdrawal that life is futile, no program is
likely to teach the children otherwise." MEAD, supra note 73, at 164.
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Specifically, the poor are criticized for "deciding" to consume leisure
rather than spending time working or learning,2 7 and for deciding to
procreate rather than forestalling procreation until they have sufficient
means to care for their offspring.218  This "culture" of deviant
decisionmaking is allegedly passed on from generation to generation, in
an unending cycle of dependency. 1 9
4. FAMILY STRUCTURE COSTS
As the previous discussion on dependency indicated, one area in
which welfare is alleged to create deleterious incentives is in the area of
decisionmaking about family size and configuration.' Specifically,
welfare is blamed for creating perverse incentives in favor of childbearing
and in favor of single parenthood.? 1 The presence of welfare also
allegedly discourages men from providing for their families.m While
the substantial literature in this field strongly suggests that factors other
than welfare programs, such as male joblessness, are primarily
responsible for structural changes in families,2 the possibility remains
217. It is questionable whether sufficient appropriate employment and/or affordable
educational opportunities exist. If no jobs are available which a particular person can
perform, the "decision" to stay home and consume leisure is no decision at all.
218. See, e.g., JENCKS, supra note 7, at 189-90 (discussing American "norms"
regarding childbearing which the "reproductive underclass" violates).
219. The existence and significance of such a so-called "culture of poverty" has
been the subject of controversy for decades, and has been embraced at various times by
both liberals and conservatives. See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 46, at 16-23 (discussing the
political history of the "culture of poverty" formulation).
220. See, e.g., ELLWOOD, supra note 1, at 20 ("No issue in poverty policy
engenders more controversy than does the charge that the welfare system may be inducing
changes in the family."); see also Edward M. Gramlich, Economists' View of the Welfare
System, 79 AM. EcON. REV. [Papers and Proceedings, 101st Meeting of the Am. Econ.
Ass'n] 191, 192 (1989) (identifying the "growth in single-parent families" as one of two
'poverty-inducing trends" which may (or may not) be caused by changes in welfare
programs).
221. See, e.g., KAUS, supra note 10, at 117-20 (contending that welfare played an
"enabling" role in the development of the underclass, permitting more poor, single women
to bear children).
222. See, e.g., GEORGE GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY 115 (1981) ("The man
has the gradually sinking feeling that his role as provider, the definitive male activity from
the primal days of the hunt through the industrial revolution and on into modem life, has
been largely seized from him; he has been cuckolded by the compassionate state.").
223. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. WILsoN, THE TRuLY DISADVANTAGED 90-92 (1987).
Even if joblessness, rather than welfare per se, is to blame for changes in family
structure, the question of what causes joblessness remains. Some would argue that
joblessness is itself linked to the welfare program. See supra part V.B.2 (discussing work
incentive structures).
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that welfare programs may make marginal differences in family structure
choices. To the extent welfare encourages (or fails to discourage) costly
family structure choices, costs are incurred.
Since the presence of a child in the home is a threshold requirement
for AFDC eligibility, it has been contended that poor young women are
not sufficiently discouraged from bearing children. While it is hard to
make the case that women affirmatively choose to become pregnant
simply to receive AFDC's meager benefits, the presence of AFDC does
protect women who bear children from the full impact of their decision.
Since AFDC buffers the costs that might otherwise deter pregnancy and
childbearing, one would expect higher rates of childbearing among poor
young women than would exist in a world without welfare.' As
Mickey Kaus puts it, "[w]ith AFDC in place, young girls look around
them and recognize, perhaps unconsciously, that other girls in their
neighborhood who have had -babies on their own are surviving, however
uncomfortably."' Conversely, if women knew that having a baby
would spell certain disaster for themselves and their child, they would be
willing to incur greater costs to avoid childbearing. Mickey Kaus has
suggested that, to maximize this deterrence effect, young women be given
no benefits except "in-kind nutritional assistance to avoid health
problems" even during the period immediately following childbirth.'
It has been noted that the contention that welfare encourages
excessive childbearing is based more on hyperbole and myth than on fact.
Bearing additional children while on welfare is not exactly a profit-
generating activity; in most cases "the additional grant [for an additional
child] is so small that it cannot support that child, much less improve the
mother's standard of living."' In fact, welfare families are no bigger
than other families, and welfare mothers actually bear fewer children
while on welfare than do women not on welfare.?
224. It was previously contended that AFDC rules permitting teenage mothers to
set up a separate household and receive benefits gave young women an additional
incentive to become pregnant-independence from their parents. A 1988 amendment to
the statutory scheme now allows states to condition the availability of benefits to mothers
under the age of 18 on those women remaining in the household of their parents or other
relatives, thus removing any such incentive. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(43) (1988); see Marshall
& Kamarck, supra note 9, at 227.
225. KAUS, supra note 10, at 117.
226. Id. at 130. It is interesting that Kaus concedes the need to give mothers food
"to avoid health problems" but urges that the government give them no cash benefits. Id.
Such cash benefits would allow them to obtain shelter, the lack of which, in cold weather
or in crime-riddled cities, could quickly cause more than mere "health problems" for
mothers and their babies.
227. EDELMAN, supra note 164, at 70.
228. Id. at 70-71.
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Although these facts explode the myth that welfare makes
childbearing profitable, they do not establish that women on welfare are
making socially' efficient choices about childbearing.' It cannot be
disputed that increased benefits for additional children, like the availability
of benefits for a first child, shield a welfare recipient from the full impact
of her reproductive choice.' Each additional child born to a welfare
mother makes her climb from poverty more difficult and is likely to
lengthen her family's stay on welfare. Society incurs costs as a result,
both the monetary costs associated with supporting the family, and the
nonmonetary costs associated with long-term welfare dependency. 31
A controversial New Jersey law has tried to alter this incentive
structure by freezing benefits at a certain level, regardless of family
size.? Opponents point out that the freeze unfairly punishes children
for the perceived errors of their parents.' This is but one species of
a central dilemma in welfare policy formulation-the incidental impact on
229. The fact that a given welfare family has no more children than a more well-
off family does not answer this concern, since inefficiency stems not from the absolute
number of children born to a family, but from the number of children born relative to the
family's ability to support those children. Unless society wishes to foster population
growth for independent reasons, or decides to recognize a "right" to bear and raise
children at state expense, society incurs costs when children are born to families who
cannot afford to support them.
230. A comparison of the number of out-of-wedlock births to poor women in
various states has been cited as an indication AFDC is not responsible for higher levels
of childbirth to poor women. See, e.g., Edelman, supra note 72, at 16 ("If young women
are having children with the intent or at least the expectation of continuing to be
dependent, one would think they would do so at least somewhat more frequently in states
with higher welfare payments. They do not.").
The lack of empirical support for finely calibrated reactions to differences in benefit
levels does not rule out the possibility that welfare benefits could have behavioral impacts.
Even in a state with very low cash AFDC benefits, a woman is still shielded from many
of the costs of childbearing by a number of supplemental benefits, such as Medicaid and
food stamps. While women's childbearing choices may not be sensitive to marginal
changes in this package of benefits (perhaps because of lack of full information about how
their state's benefits stack up to the cost of raising a child in that state), it is still possible
that the complete absence of any benefits at all would yield lower levels of such
childbearing. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 223, at 77-78 ("Because all states have
AFDC and food stamp programs, there can be no true test of the effects of welfare on
family structure. There is no control population that has not been exposed to these
welfare programs.").
231. See supra part V.B.3 (discussing costs associated with welfare dependency).
232. Marshall & Kamarck, supra note 9, at 226. The New Jersey law does,
however, permit families bearing additional children to keep more of their outside
earnings, which reduces the actual effect of the "freeze." Id. California is also
considering a law which would limit benefits for additional children. Id. at 227.
233. See Lucia Mouat, Controversial Wetfare Law Takes Effect in New Jersey,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 2, 1992, at 2.
The Welfare Conundrum
children of attempts to dictate the behavior of their parents.2 ' If the
bluff works and women are successfully deterred from having children,
society unquestionably saves money and no children suffer as a result.
But if the bluff doesn't work (because, for example, women have
inadequate information about or access to effective birth control), society
suffers increased costs from the poverty of children, and the intangible
costs associated with the unfairness of childhood poverty.
In addition to affecting the number of children born, welfare is also
said to discourage marriage and encourage the formation of families
headed only by the mother. Although AFDC now requires all states to
make intact, two-parent families eligible for benefits,' states can limit
benefits to such families to six out of each twelve months.' A welfare
program that makes single parenthood a condition of receiving full
benefits would, of course, be expected to lead to lower levels of marriage
and higher levels of divorce.2 37
Even a program which is neutral as between family types (as where
benefits are provided on an equal basis to single-parent and two-parent
families with children) can be expected to lead to higher levels of family
dissolution than would no program at all. Simply by providing benefits,
women have the financial ability to establish their own households if they
otherwise would prefer to do so. 38 The same effect would occur if the
same women had an income from a job.' Because single-parent
234. See supra part III.C (Fran and Ellen example); infra part VII.B (discussing
this dilemma in the workfare context).
235. See 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1988 & Supp. 1991). The 1988 Family Support Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988), added this requirement to the AFDC
statutory structure. Prior to passage of the 1988 Act, states could choose whether or not
to provide benefits to intact families in which the primary wage-earner was unemployed
and, as of 1988, 23 states had declined to provide such benefits. S. REP. No. 377, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2776, 2823.
236. See 42 U.S.C. § 607(b)(2)(B)(ii)(ll) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
237. See EDELMAN, supra note 164, at 72 ("Data from states that have eliminated
welfare for two-parent families show a dramatic increase in the percentage of families that
then join the regular AFDC rolls as single-parent families."). But see ELLWOOD, supra
note 1, at 22 (citing studies showing little relationship between structure of welfare
programs and family structure).
238. See EDELMAN, supra note 164, at 72 ("[Wielfare-meaning the existence of
a bare subsistence grant independent of the man's income-may make women less likely
to enter into bad marriages, or more apt to leave ones that have turned bad.").
239. See id.; MEAD, supra note 197, at 64 ("The role of AFDC in [family]
breakup is mainly to provide an independent income to the mother, freeing her to leave
or oust the father. Earnings from a job, if the mother has one, have much the same
effect."). There is also a countervailing "income effect," whereby higher family income
increases the comfort of life and leads to a decrease in breakup, but it appears that this
"income effect" may be overwhelmed by the "independence effect." See, e.g., GLAZER,
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families tend to be economically less successful than two-parent
families,' society is torn between its desire to assist such families, and
the unintended effect of facilitating and encouraging their existence.
David Ellwood captures this difficulty, which he terms "the assistance-
family structure conundrum," by stating: "the economic insecurity of
single-parent families leads to a natural desire to provide some level of
support through welfare, yet such aid creates a potential incentive for the
formation and perpetuation of single-parent families."241
A closer look at the reasons families separate reveals the true moral
ambiguity of any concerted effort to force parents to marry or stay
together. As Ellwood points out, "[s]urely a system that allows children
and their mothers to escape an unhappy, destructive, or even dangerous
family environment can be beneficial to society."' 2 While a stable,
nurturing two-parent family might provide intangible benefits to children
that would be unavailable in a single-parent household,' the mere fact
that a household has two parents rather than one does not, in itself, make
it a better family environment. Regardless of the abstract merits of two-
parent families generally, "it is not apparent that children who currently
live in single-parent families would be better off if their families were
two-parent families."' *
Of course, the primary economic problem with single-parent families
stems not from the fact that the parents live separately; it stems from the
fact that one potential breadwinner must also double as the nurturer of the
children. 5 The failure of the absent parent (virtually always the father)
supra note 94, at 31.
240. It is undisputed that children raised in mother-only households are more likely
to be poor. See, e.g., DaVanzo, supra note 11, at 85-87; Barbara D. Whitehead, Dan
Quayle Was Right, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1993, at 47, 62 ('Half the single mothers
in the United States live below the poverty line.").
241. ELLWOOD, supra note 1, at 21.
242. Id. at 22.
243. See DaVanzo, supra note 11, at 93 (noting "adverse consequencesof growing
up in a single-parent family, regardless of income"). According to DaVanzo, these
negative consequences include a greater likelihood of involvement with crime, drugs and
alcohol. Id. See also Whitehead, supra note 240, at 47 (discussing negative effects of
disrupted families on children, including a higher likelihood of emotional and behavioral
problems, including a greater chance of dropping out of high school, becoming pregnant,
abusing drugs and running afoul of the law).
244. DaVanzo, supra note 11, at 101 (emphasis added) (citing studies indicating
"that marital discord has a stronger relationship with delinquency and aggression than
parental absence").
245. See ELLWOOD, supra note 1, at 21 (discussing the dual role of nurturer and
breadwinner which a single parent must fill); ROBERT H. HAVEMAN, STARTINo EvEN 73
(1988); DaVanzo, supra note 11, at 90 ("Why are children in female-headed households
more likely to be poor? The income difference is, not surprisingly, primarily due to the
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to provide for his children is largely responsible for economic troubles in
female-headed households; the fact that the parents are unmarried only
affects the incentive of the father to provide voluntarily for his
children-it does not alter his legal or moral responsibility.
Granted, administrative costs are avoided if the family is intact. If
the father is present in the house, the state generally need not intervene
to force him to fulfill the obligations of parenthood. Yet one must
consider whether the administrative and social costs required to entice
parents who would otherwise wish to live separately into marrying or
staying married' outweigh the administrative costs of simply forcing
fathers to provide for their children.2 7 In sum, what is most troubling
from an economic standpoint is not the family structure per se, but the
failure to enforce appropriately the financial responsibility of fathers.'
C. Costs of Transferring Money to the Poor
1. INFRINGEMENT OF PROPERTY INTERESTS AND DISUTILITY
ASSOCIATED WITH PERCEIVED UNFAIRNESS IN TRANSFERS
A major cost of welfare is the fact that money distributed to the less
well-off must necessarily come from the more well-off. Assuming
(counterfactually) that the transfer of holdings is completely costless-that
no money is lost in the process of moving it from the more well-off to the
less well-off 9-the operation would still be socially costly insofar as
it involves the expropriation of holdings which "belong to" particular
individuals.
The problem with collecting money from the more well-off for
redistribution to the less well-off is often couched in terms of interference
loss of economic support from absent fathers, who generally earn more than mothers.").
246. Programs proposed in Wisconsin, known as "Bridefare" or "Wedfare" offer
financial incentives designed to induce marriage, by allowing married couples to keep a
greater proportion of their earnings while on welfare. See Marshall & Kamarck, supra
note 9, at 227.
247. But see GILDER, supra note 222, at 115 (suggesting that efforts to force
fathers to pay child support are doomed to fail).
248. Not surprisingly, numerous commentators support the idea that absent fathers
should be forced to provide support for their children. See, e.g., ELLWOOD, supra note
1, at 78; IRWIN GARFINKEL, ASsuRINo CHILD SUPPORT: AN EXTENSION OF SOCIAL
SECURrrY (1992); JENCKS, supra note 7, at 231; KAUs, supra note 10, at 131; MEAD,
supra note 73, at 180.
249. In fact, the transfer of holdings involves a number of costs. See generally
part V. As Okun put it, we can only carry money from the rich to the poor in a "leaky
bucket." OKUN, supra note 115, at 91-92.
1994:235
294 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
with property rights.' But property is a plastic concept shaped by
rules governing exchanges, not an absolute right over all that one can
obtain. "1 In fact, a large number of laws circumscribe the manner in
which a lawful property interest arises. 2  Pollution laws, antitrust
laws, child labor laws, minimum wage laws, and the like place restraints
on how one may translate effort and investment into profit.23  Indeed,
the very structure of property rights assumes that certain abilities and
capacities to obtain property will not be recognized:
[Opponents of measures tending to increase equality] do not
complain that persons endowed by nature with unusual qualities
of strength, audacity or cunning are artificially prevented from
breaking into houses, or terrorizing their neighbors, or forging
cheques. . . . On the contrary, they deprive certain kinds of
achievement of their fruits, in order to encourage the pursuit of
others more compatible with the improvement of individual
character and more conducive to the good, of society.'
Thus, the fact that government takes holdings away from individuals
(or otherwise limits their ability to obtain or use holdings) does not in
itself establish the violation of a cognizable property right. Even Nozick
250. See, e.g., NOZICK, supra note 3, at 168 (noting that under entitlement theory
"redistribution is a serious matter indeed, involving, as it does, the violation of people's
rights"); POSNER, supra note 16, at 461 (describing involuntary redistribution as "a form
of theft") (footnote omitted).
251. See, e.g., ARROW, supra note 45, at 186-87 ("The property system is in fact
a social construct. . . ."); NOZICK, supra note 3, at 171 (noting that "constraints ... set
by other principles or laws operating in the society" limit the "acceptable options"
encompassed within one's property rights); Dworkin, supra note 142, at 283 ("Private
ownership . . . is not a single, unique relationship between a person and a material
resource, but an open-textured relationship many aspects of which must be fixed
politically."). Arrow goes on to note that externalities are a manifestation of the
"incompleteness of property rights." ARROW, supra note 45, at 187; see supra notes 69-
71 and accompanying text (discussing poverty as an externality).
252. For example, some things, such as constitutional rights, cannot lawfully be
purchased with money. MICHAEL WALzER, SPHERES Op JUSTICE 100-03 (1983) (citing
OKUN, supra note 115, at 19-22).
253. See, e.g., THoMAs NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 122-23 (1991)
(discussing regulatory laws); Harry W. Jones, The Rule of Law and the Wefare State, 58
COLUM. L. REV. 143, 154 (1958) (citing minimum wage laws as an example of a
limitation placed by government on free exchange).
254. Tawney, supra note 114, at 34; see also OKUN, supra note 115, at 35 ("My
right to pick my job is restricted in many ways. I cannot sell heroin, pornography that
lacks redeeming social value, letter-delivery or telephone services, nor, given my
particular training, legal or medical services.").
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concedes as much, allowing government to collect the funds necessary to
administer a "night-watchman" state.'
The compulsory collection of funds through the taxing mechanism
always places a limitation upon the property interests of individuals,
whether the money is collected for national defense, for schools, for
highways, or for welfare. Yet the interference with property rightsfor
the purpose of redistribution seems to involve a uniquely troubling
element which makes the diminution of property rights all the more
unpalatable and painful for the more well-off. This added element of
distaste relates to the perceived unfairness of confiscating money-money
by and large earned through work-for the purpose of providing an
income to able-bodied, working-aged persons who have failed to earn
their own living through work. It is a short step to the assertion that the
more well-off are being forced to work for the benefit of others (and
rather undeserving others, at that), at which point analogies to "forced
labor" spring readily to mind.'
When analyzed in this way, the real affront to property rights is not
so much the fact that money is taxed away from the more well-off, as the
fact that the money is put to a purpose which is itself at odds with the
idea of accumulating private property through one's own efforts. It is the
perceived unfairness of the use of the money, not the fact that the
government has taken it away, which triggers such impassioned defenses
of property rights. It is not surprising that Nozick, in seeking to show
that the "night-watchman" state is the maximum defensible state, chose
to focus on money taken for purely redistributive purposes rather than,
say, money taken for the purpose of constructing national monuments or
administering national parks.'"
Because the sense of unfairness associated with taxation for the
purpose of welfare amplifies the psychic cost associated with the
interference with property rights, it is worthwhile to examine the
theoretical underpinnings of this perception. Critical to the perception
that the transfer of holdings from the more well-off to the less well-off is
inherently unfair is the belief that the results generated by the market
255. See NOzICK, supra note 3, at 27 ("IThe night-watchman state appears
redistributive to the extent that it compels some people to pay for the protection of others
. . . ."). However, Nozick attempts to distinguish the night-watchman function from
other forms of redistribution on the grounds that it is supported by "compelling
nondistributive reasons." Id.
256. See id. at 169.. See also AYN RAND, CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL
324-25 (1967) (characterizing redistribution as "slave labor").
257. See NozicK, supra note 3, at 149-23 1.
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correspond closely to the merit of individuals."5  This belief draws on
two assumptions, both of which are empirically suspect: first, that the
more well-off obtained their holdings through their own efforts; second,
that the less well-off are poor because of the lack of such effort.
Though the strongest justification for the inviolability of private
property turns on its supposed relationship to individual effort and
productivity,' individual merit and contribution often have very little
bearing on the holdings of individuals in society.?1 The distribution of
material resources is instead determined by a great many factors, many
of which are wholly unrelated to personal merit or effort."' Indeed,
one need not look very deeply into American history to see that many
holdings are based upon nothing more meritorious than the exploitation
of human beings and sheer forcible theft, whether of land or of labor.' "
In what sense does a person own (or deserve to own) money obtained
through inheritance or gift, derived from the exploitation of the labor of
others, earned in a setting which did not embody fair equality of
opportunity, or earned in a setting in which competition did not operate
so as to limit the surplus gleaned from particular transactions?
The other side of the "unfairness" equation is the presumption that
the poor would not be poor unless they were deficient in some important
way.' A limited exception has historically been recognized where
258. See, e.g., JAMES R. KLUEaEL & ELIOT R. SMITH, BELIEFS ABOUT
INEQUALITY 37 (1986); LEWIS, supra note 149, at 130 ("All of these people [interviewed
in a study), whatever their differences, perceive success and failure and therefore
inequalities as functions of individual characteristics.").
259. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing Nozick's implicit
dependence on such a relationship in condemning redistribution).
260. See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 252, at 108; Okun, supra note 148, at 29 &
n.25 (noting that few economists would contend that market rewards fairly reflect the
personal contributions of the recipients); see also NOZICK, supra note 3, at 157
(emphasizing that the distribution of holdings is "non-patterned," meaning that it does not
correlate with any single factor such as effort, intelligence or marginal product).
261. See, e.g., JOHN A. BRrTAIN, INHERITANCE AND THE INEQUALITY OF
MATERIAL WEALTH 9 (1978) ("An intergenerational transfer is due to forces over which
the recipient has little control and is rarely a reward for productive effort."); id. at 9-10
("[lUndependent first-generation accumulation-even out of wages or salaries-is often
aided by a favorable start in life or even by sheer luck."); KUTFNER, supra note 10, at
16 ("In practice, a good deal of the outcomes produced by the market reflect nothing
more than luck-good or bad.").
262. See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 46, at 150 (noting that "evidence of fraud,
collusion, violence and the violation of individual rights abounds in America's past").
263. See, e.g., FAY L. COOK, WHO SHOULD BE HELPED: PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR
SOCIAL SERVICES 170 (1979) ("[The study result showing] lower support for poor adults
under 65 is quite strongly linked to the fact that they are seen to be responsible for their
plight."); HENRY GEOROE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY 303-04 (50th Anniversary ed.,
Robert Schalkenbach Found. 1948) (1879) ("There is, and always has been, a widespread
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identifiable factors beyond the control of the individual poor person, such
as mental or physical disability or old age, hindered him or her from
competing economically. Such persons were (and are) regarded as "the
deserving poor"' and have been set apart from "the undeserving poor"
both in policy measures and in popular opinion.' The lack of
correlation between personal merit and market outcomes and the absence
of fair equality of opportunity' calls the appellation "undeserving" into
serious doubt,
All of this makes the complaints of the nonpoor as to the unfairness
of the transfers somewhat suspect. Yet no matter how distorted the
perception of unfairness may be, it cannot simply be dismissed. The
disutility which accompanies transfer payments to those who are thought
to be undeserving must be taken seriously because of its practical
importance for the political feasibility of any such option.'
Attempts have consistently been made, both historically and recently,
to place behavioral conditions upon the receipt of welfare.' These
conditions, to the extent they can be enforced, would serve to alleviate the
disutility from perceived unfairness by requiring the recipient to exhibit
characteristics that would make him or her more deserving.'
However, placing behavioral conditions on the receipt of welfare (such as
belief among the more comfortable classes that the poverty and suffering of the masses
are due to their lack of industry, frugality and intelligence.").
264. Children are also widely regarded as being among the deserving poor. See,
e.g., MURRAY, supra note 3, at 223 ("There is no such thing as an undeserving five-year-
old."). However, the fact that such children are often in the charge of able-bodied
.undeserving" persons has hindered delivery of benefits to them. See COOK, supra note
263, at 161-62 (hypothesizing from study showing low levels of public support for
programs to help poor children that this is the case "not because of traits ascribed to
them, but because they are perceived to have easily available alternative sources of
aid-parents or other caretakers who should take responsibility .for them").
265. See generally KATZ, supra note 46, at 9-35. For an analysis of the
psychological underpinnings for such distinctions, see generally Linda J. Skitka & Philip
E. Tetlock, Of Ants and Grasshoppers: The Political Psychology of Allocating Public
Assistance, in PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE 205 (Barbara A. Mellers &
Jonathan Baron eds., 1993).
266. See supra part IV.A (discussing the inefficiency of inequality in opportunity).
267. Studies show "locus of causality of plight is a very powerful determinant of
[public] support .... " COOK, supra note 263, at 169.
268. See infra part VII.B (discussing attempts to place behavioral constraints on
welfare recipients).
269. Of course, to the extent the behavior patterns tend to.reduce dependence on
welfare, the requirement of compliance with them could have other benefits in terms of
reducing the length of time on the welfare rolls.
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
a work requirement) can result in much higher monetary costs, at least in
the short run.' °
2. OTHER COSTS OF THE PUBLIC PROVISION OF WELFARE
A number of other well-known costs of the public provision of
welfare must also be taken into account in assessing welfare programs.
One of the most familiar economic arguments against redistribution is the
alleged damage it inflicts on individuals' incentives to work,"' damage
which, it is argued, threatens the economic health and productivity of the
nation.' While some economists have questioned whether and to what
extent such disincentive effects actually result,' to the extent those
effects exist and inflict net harm, costs are incurred.
Other possible costs of redistribution which have been noted include
distortions in savings, consumption or production patterns, 4 and liberty
costs associated with increased governmental control over money.2
Not surprisingly, there is a great deal of disagreement as to these points
270. See infra notes 350, 352-70 and accompanying text (discussing costs of
workfare programs).
271. Here, I am referring only to the work disincentive effects on the nonpoor.
See supra part V.B.2 (discussing the effects of welfare on the work incentives of the poor
(i.e., welfare recipients and potential recipients)).
272. Some interesting challenges have been raised to the assumption that work
disincentives are bad for the economy. See FRANK, supra note 38, at 248-49 (arguing that
taxation removes a distortion in work effort that would otherwise be present, based on the
fact that people undervalue leisure and overvalue consumption goods in their competition
for relative status); see also Fred Block, Rethinking the Political Economy of the Welfare
State, in THE MEAN SEASON 109, 133-34 (Fred Block et al. eds., 1987) ("[We have
succeeded so well in attaching status to work that the need now is for correctives in the
opposite direction to prevent overcrowding in the labor market with all of its negative
human and economic consequences .... The point is that we need more disincentives
to work, not fewer."); Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 90-
91 (1992).
273. See, e.g., THUROW, supra note 58, at 49 (citing empirical studies indicating
"that high taxes either did not affect work effort or might even increase work effort
among executives and professionals").
274. See, e.g., Walter J. Blum, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation in
1976, in INCOME REDISTRIBUTION, supra note 148, at 152 (arguing that redistribution
would result in lower levels of savings); De Jouvenel, supra note 56, at 9-10 (arguing that
at certain levels of redistribution, " [the production of all first-quality goods would cease,"
since "[the skill they demand would be lost and the taste they shape would be
coarsened").
275. See, e.g., SARA. LEVrrAN & CLIFFORD M. JOHNSON, BEYOND THE SAFETY
NET 93 (1984) ("'A nation that decreases its economic freedom must be less politically
free.'") (quoting former Treasury Secretary William E. Simon); Kristol, supra note 185,
at 42 ("The passion for equality is always dangerous to liberty .... ").
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as well. 6 Finally, it is uncontested that the public provision of welfare
entails some administrative costs.r These costs, however, will vary
greatly depending on the design of the welfare program selected.
VI. FINDING THE OPTIMAL STRATEGY:
TECHNIQUES FOR IMPROVING SOCIETY's GAME
Given that society is faced with a strategic dilemma in which it
values the alleviation of poverty, but incurs costs by undertaking such
alleviation, what should it do to minimize its costs? My analysis in this
Article has assumed that society stands to gain more from alleviating
poverty than it stands to lose; if it were really better off ignoring the
poverty problem, there would be no "game" presented at all and no
public assistance would be provided. Further, I assume that the benefits
of "bluffing" some segment of the poor into self-help by withdrawing
assistance are outweighed by the costs society would incur in connection
with the "unbluffable" segment 78
If these assumptions are accepted, then society must try to improve
its position within the framework of the strategic game or to change the
terms of the game. First, it can try to change the way the poor view the
game by altering the relative attractiveness of welfare and self-help (either
by making welfare less attractive or making self-help more attractive).
If the self-help alternative is more attractive than the welfare alternative,
then a strategic game is no longer presented-the poor do exactly what the
nonpoor want them to do by opting for self-help.' Second, efforts can
276. See, e.g., JOHN K. GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 71 (2d ed. rev.,
Houghton Mifflin Co. 1969) (1958) (noting that empirical evidence is inconclusive as to
the effect of redistribution on capital formation); KUTTNER, supra note 10, at 57 (noting
that "many forms of collective savings (pension funds, national budget surpluses) ... do
not depend on income inequality at all"); LESTER C. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY:
DISTRIBUTION AND THE POSSIBILmES FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE 194-95 (1981) (suggesting
that present demand for goods and services may be distorted "[i]f income and wealth are
not distributed in accordance with equity," since "individual preferences are weighted by
incomes before being communicated to the market"); Okun, supra note 148, at 20
(Society can "twist some ... dials" to get "the saving-and-investment rate it wants with
more or less inequality of income."); id. at 30 (postulating that there would be no loss of
liberty if equalizing measures were restricted to redistribution of income and did not
involve further state ownership of the means of production).
277. See generally STAFF OF JOINT COMM., SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POLICY, 92D
CONO., 2D SESS., ISSUES IN WELFARE ADMINISTRATION: WELFARE-AN
ADMINISTRATIVE NIGHTMARE (Comm. Print 1972).
278. See supra part III.A.
279. Formally, this means that both the poor and the nonpoor would select the
same cell in the decision matrix-the one in which the nonpoor do not provide for the
poor family and the poor family provides for itself. See supra part III.A.
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be made to reduce the costs which the nonpoor incur in providing
assistance by altering the policy design to make welfare less painful, in
some way or another. The goal of these techniques is to minimize the
costs of poverty and its alleviation.
A. Changing the Terms of the Game for the Poor
Through welfare policy, society can seek to change the way the poor
view the game by altering the relative attractiveness of welfare and self-
help. There are many ways to try to do this, both by making welfare
look worse or making self-help look better,2R but the true test is the
overall impact on costs among all groups: actual and potential welfare
recipients, the working poor, and the nonpoor. As the following
discussion indicates, the historical method of attempting to deter resort to
welfare through stigma or other means entails high costs that may have
often gone unrecognized. Other means of changing the terms of the
game, such as encouraging socially useful preference shifts among welfare
recipients, are far more promising and less costly.
1. THE HISTORICAL FOCUS ON DETERRENCE: THE IMPACT OF
STIGMA ON DECISIONMAKING BY THE POOR
A well-recognized way to influence would-be welfare recipients to
opt for work rather than welfare is to raise the effective cost of welfare
by making its receipt more complicated, difficult, or demeaning. It is
beyond question that the way welfare is perceived affects the number of
persons who will partake of it. It is not surprising that much
consideration has been given to the question of whether welfare is an
entitlement, which one takes as a matter of right, with neither shame nor
gratitude, or a gratuity which is granted at the pleasure of one's donors
and may be revoked if one fails to adopt the required behaviors."'
280. See, e.g., HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 5, at 132-33 (contrasting
"historic approach" of denying aid with the "incentive strategy" of reducing "the effective
marginal tax rate on [welfare recipients'] earnings").
281. See, e.g., STUART BUTLER & ANNA KONDRATAS, OUT OF THE POVERTY
TRAP: A CONSERVATIVE STRATEOY FOR WELFARE REFORM 14 (1987) ("As welfare has
been transformed from a privilege into a right, it has become less acceptable for the
providers of welfare to pass judgment on the conduct of those receiving help . . . );
Reich, supra note 72, at 1256 ("[Slociety has obligations to provide support, and the
individual is entitled to that support as of right."). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 261 (1970) (holding that due process rights attach to welfare benefits); Charles A.
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 787 (1964) (arguing that government
entitlements such as welfare are forms of property).
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The expansion of welfare rolls that occurred in the 1960s has been
attributed in part to welfare rights litigation and the provision of public
information about the availability of welfare, factors which increased the
acceptability of welfare in the eyes of those eligible to receive it.' As
Mickey Kaus explains, "[qluite simply, at some point in the mid-sixties
it seems to have become much more acceptable to go on welfare."'
To the extent the acceptability of welfare expedited the transfer of
dollars into the hands of those in need of them, it represented an efficient
development. In other words, given that society had decided to
redistribute money to people possessing certain income and familial
characteristics, having would-be recipients come forward and identify
themselves decreased the administrative costs of transferring funds to
them.
On the other hand, as the Ellen and Fran example illustrated, society
would like people to support themselves rather than perceive welfare as
a viable option. By making the receipt of welfare sufficiently unpleasant,
many persons who might otherwise qualify for welfare would find the mix
of benefits and humiliation to be inferior to the mix of money and
foregone leisure available through employment and would choose the
latter. Hence, a lower level of welfare utilization would be expected
where the experience of receiving welfare is difficult and demeaning.'
Simply by constructing bureaucratic hurdles such as exhaustive
paperwork and documentation requirements, a welfare department can
reduce the number of people on its rolls.' Closing or understaffing
offices has much the same effect, since it forces recipients to travel
farther or endure long waits.' All these tactics, coupled with public
disapproval of welfare, tend to raise the actual cost of welfare to a
recipient, making it less likely to be the dominant strategy.' Piven
and Cloward elaborate on this theme:
[T]he degraded social status of the welfare recipient, a
degradation rooted in welfare procedures and investigations,
282. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 65, at 330-31 (discussing impact of the
welfare rights movement of the 1960s on welfare rolls).
283. KAUS, supra note 10, at 115.
284. See, e.g., JENCKS, supra note 7, at 227 ("As New York City discovered
during its financial crisis in the mid-1970s, a welfare department can cut its rolls
substantially by hassling recipients.").
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. See James Coleman, Income Testing and Social Cohesion, in INCOME-TESTED
TRANSFER PROORAMS 67, 72 (Irwin Garfinkel ed., 1982) ("Stigma can be seen as the
price that nonrecipients exact from recipients to make receipt of the benefit costly, and
thus it induces avoidance of the stigma-and-benefit whenever possible.").
1994:235
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
also deters utilization. So too do the circuitous, exhausting, and
humiliating procedures associated with establishing eligibility for
means-tested programs drive people away. . . What is
wrong-and Murray's discussion of Phyllis and Harold provides
one example of the error-is the assumption that the calculus of
dollars is the only calculus .... 2s
Conversely, when welfare is perceived as a right or an entitlement
(and the consciously demeaning features of a welfare program are
removed), the welfare "package" becomes more desirable and may
constitute the preferred strategy for some who would choose a different
strategy under a more demeaning welfare regime.' Okun has made
the broader argument that decreasing the stigma associated with welfare
will generally weaken the work ethic in a society, thus increasing the
work disincentive effects resulting from a welfare program.' For this
reason, Okun has postulated that "welfare checks delivered with a smile
may be a dangerous product."I
However, attempts to discourage welfare participation through the
use of stigmatizing, humiliating, or unpleasant procedures are extremely
costly. The effort spent by welfare providers in implementing demeaning
procedures is itself a social cost. Those welfare recipients who decide to
endure the humiliation. suffer needless disutility from the humiliating
delivery of funds.
Importantly, the deterrence rationale only carries weight to the extent
the "demand" for welfare is elastic. If welfare were like most other
goods, one would expect demand for it to go down when its "price" is
288. Frances F. Piven & Richard A. Cloward, The Contemporary Relief Debate,
in THE MEAN SEASON, supra note 272, at 85-86.
289. See BuTrLER & KONDATRAS, supra note 281, at 14 ("When everyonetells you
it is your right to be on welfare and that there is nothing to be ashamed of, is it any
surprise that people should be less inclined to leave the welfare system?"). However,
even when welfare is perceived as a right, stigma remains associated with it. See J.
Donald Moon, The Moral Basis of the Democratic Welfare State, in DEMOCRACY AND
THE WELFARE STATE, supra note 211, at 32 ("[Pjroviding relief to those in need, even
when they have a right to it, may nevertheless still cause them to lose status and self-
respect.").
290. Okun, supra note 148, at 29-30. Indeed, nineteenth-century poorhouses,
which delivered a particularly demeaning brand of assistance, have been described as "the
ultimate defense against the erosion of the work ethic in early industrial America."
KATZ, supra note 1, at 3. The societal importance of attitudes toward work has been
emphasized by Sen, who maintains that "[every economic system has... tended to rely
on the existence of attitudes towards work which supersede the calculation of net gain
from each unit of exertion." Sen, supra note. 59, at 97.
291. Okun, supra note 148, at 30.
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raised through the addition of humiliating procedures. Yet welfare differs
from the ordinary good in one very important respect: it is "purchased"
to address minimum needs necessary to sustain life. As Lutz and Lux
have noted, mainstream economic theory is inept at addressing "needs"
as distinct from mere "wants."' When needs are involved, market
exchanges to meet those needs do not improve one's condition; rather,
they are entered into so that one does not become worse off (through
dehydration, malnutrition, disease, or death).' Put into economic
terms, an individual's demand for something which is truly needed to
sustain life is inelastic: no matter how high the price is raised, the
individual is willing to pay it.'
Thus, those who truly "need" welfare (in the sense that there is no
other available means to meet their basic needs) would not be deterred
from collecting it for themselves and their families simply because
collection is made more humiliating. It is, of course, difficult as an
empirical matter to determine what proportion of welfare recipients fall
into this "undeterrable" category. However, 'to the extent poverty and
unemployment are deemed to be inevitable byproducts of our political
economy, 5 such that some relatively predictable percentage of persons
will at any given time be eligible for welfare, some persons will always
"need" to be on welfare at any given time.
292. LuTz & Lux, supra note 59, at 21-28. Of course, what does and does not
constitute a "need" is open to some interpretation. See HEYNE, supra note 165, at 16,
cited in LUTZ & Lux, supra note 59, at 23.
293. LUTz & Lux, supra note 59, at 26. Simply viewing needs as those things
which one must have to avoid becoming worse off has its limitations, however;
expenditures for many "inessential" goods and services-routine maintenance on a Jaguar,
or preventative veterinary care for a string of polo ponies, for example-are made to
avoid becoming worse off. Nonetheless, it is still possible to define needs as those things
required to avoid becoming worse off through the loss of health, life or basic human
dignity.
294. Of course, there are exceptions to this rule. Many individuals would starve
before committing acts they felt were morally repugnant. If the commission of such acts
were the "price" of needed food or water, the price would be judged too high and demand
would go down accordingly. For purposes of this Article, however, I am assuming that
the protection of individual rights in our society would preclude it from "pricing" welfare
in any such range. Indeed, such overpricing of welfare, such that starvation ensued,
would result in great costs to society, see generally supra part IV (discussing costs of
poverty). I am assuming society only wants to deter people from going on welfare if
some other alternative to starvation (e.g., work or reliance on family members) exists. Q.
KAUS, supra note 10, at 126 (explaining that under his proposed 'Work Ethic State," no
one would be allowed to starve); MURRAY, supra note 3, at 227-33 (detailing alternative
means of support for the poor if the welfare system were dismantled).
295. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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Although humiliating procedures may deter some would-be recipients
from going on welfare at all, those who do endure the humiliation of
welfare may be less likely to emerge from the humiliation quickly, given
the greater psychological impact of collecting welfare in the first place
under such a regime.' A welfare recipient, by the mere act of
accepting welfare, is necessarily required to make some psychological
adjustments to reconcile her world-view with such receipt. The more
humiliating the experience of welfare becomes, the greater these
adjustments must necessarily be. When welfare is made more
humiliating, relatively greater changes might be required in the recipient's
attitudes toward intangible sources of utility such as self-esteem and pride
in supporting one's own family. If these adjustments were extreme, the
recipient might eventually stop counting those elements in calculating her
preferred strategy.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, society incurs intangible costs
in implementing such demeaning 'procedures. Treating other human
beings in a demeaning manner destroys the potential for community
between recipients and non-recipients. Costs are also associated with the
unfairness of such treatment: to the extent market rewards are not
correlated with effort, and to the extent our political economy makes
poverty for some proportion of society inevitable, 7 treating those who
were the least fortunate in obtaining rewards in a demeaning manner
would be unfair. Moreover, engaging in demeaning treatment of welfare
recipients would commit society to the principle (however untrue it might
in fact be) that welfare recipients are inferior in important ways. The
cultivation of such notions of separateness and superiority divides society
and fosters socially costly traits, such as inhumanity and resentment.
Moreover, by branding welfare recipients as morally unworthy, society
sets the stage for wholesale discrimination against recipients (e.g., in
employment, housing, and educational opportunities), which makes their
climb from poverty even more difficult and unlikely.
At best, measures aimed at deterring people from being on welfare
would limit the population of welfare recipients to that proportion of the
population which will inevitably be unemployed and impoverished in any
event (in other words, those that truly "need" to be on welfare). The
negative effects visited on this "undeterrable" segment?" would tend to
296. In this respect, welfare may be likened to other institutions such as prison.
Although harsh conditions may deter entry, the dehumanization of those who do enter may
make their reassimilation into larger society more difficult and unlikely.
297. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
298. Significantly, this segment would include those people who were only
temporarily "undeterrable." If resort to welfare is unavoidable at any time, one must
endure the humiliating procedures and suffer the concomitant negative consequences.
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reduce turnover on welfare rolls, leaving the same persons (and their
descendants) on welfare interminably. Less demeaning procedures, while
perhaps lowering the barrier to going on welfare in the first place, also
entail a lower psychological barrier to leaving welfare. In other words,
less damage is done to portions of an individual's preference schedule
involving intangibles such as pride and self-respect, making it more likely
that those will be "counted" in assessing alternatives which may
ultimately become available. Under such a welfare program, the absolute
number of persons on welfare would be expected to be greater (since the
welfare rolls would include some deterrable persons as well as the
undeterrable), but the turnover of recipients would be expected to be
greater, decreasing the disutilities associated with long-term
dependency.'
2. FACILITATING THE DEVELOPMENT OF PREFERENCES FOR SELF-HELP
Welfare has sometimes been analogized to a "narcotic" which
distorts the decisionmaking capabilities of the recipient.' Under this
model, a person who is on welfare (or at least who has become "hooked"
on welfare) has a distorted payoff schedule which does not produce the
proper dominant strategy. Although the welfare recipient behaves
"rationally" in accordance with the perceived payoff schedule, the course
pursued is objectively wrong. The idea is that once the "narcotic" effect
of welfare is removed, the welfare recipient's eyes will be opened to a
"true" payoff schedule in which the dominant strategy is, among other
things, to get off welfare. The assertion is frequently made that those
who are caught in the cycle of dependency would be happier, more
fulfilled, and simply better off if they were no longer dependent on
transfer payments."'
For this to be true, it must be the case that welfare recipients are
voluntarily choosing a course (accepting payments in lieu of earnings)
which is not in their own best interest. Since we are assuming that
welfare recipients are rational,' the only explanation for such behavior
would be that the recipients do not possess sufficient information about
the "true" payoff associated with each cell in the decision matrix they are
facing. The remaining possibility is that recipients are actually doing the
299. See supra part V.B.3 (discussing costs associated with welfare dependency).
300. See ELLWOOD, supra note 1, at 4 (asserting that conservatives "see welfare
as a narcotic"); Wefare and Work: Putting the Poor to Work, ECONOMIST, Nov. 26,
1988, at 19, reprinted in 16 CURRENT MUNICIPAL PROBLEMS 65 (1989-1990) (stating that
the poor "get hooked on government help").
301. See, e.g., MURRAY, supra note 3, at 229.
302. See supra part V.B.1.
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well-informed, perfectly rational thing, and that they really would not be
any "better off" without welfare, given their current set of
preferences.m
If receiving welfare is actually an enlightened choice which
maximizes personal well-being, the simplest way to alter that preferred
course is to make welfare less attractive or make the alternatives more
attractive.' Alternatively, society can actually seek to alter the
preferences of the poor, by, for example, fostering a stronger "work
ethic."' Moreover, to the extent decisions are made based on a faulty
decision matrix which does not incorporate all the relevant costs and
benefits, provision of added information could, in theory, lead the poor
to select a different path.
Relatedly, society could try to get the poor to recognize and "count"
some of the intangible benefits of work and self-sufficiency that may have
been suppressed-that it would bring an intangible sense of pride, or that
it would provide an example for their children which would lead them to
avoid a life of dependency. In such an instance, society would be
appealing to the welfare recipient's "higher self," attempting to convince
the recipient to recognize the preference schedule of his or her own better
nature.' This requires a recognition that the preferences of individuals
are not immutable, and that a particular person can have different sets of
preferences that operate under different circumstances.' Indeed, as
Lutz and Lux have noted, our system of language reveals that differing
preferences are at war within us in everyday life."05
303. As discussed above, for that subset of welfare recipients who could not
support themselves in any event (because, for example, no work is available) there is no
"choice" to be made at all. See supra part III.A.1.
304. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
305. See, e.g., Sen, supra note 59, at 97-98 (discussing the crucial role that
"[social conditioning" plays in fostering the "existence of attitudes towards work which
supersede the calculation of net gain from each unit of exertion"; such attitudes have been
important to "[every economic system").
306. See LUTZ & Lux, supra note 59, at 110-11 (discussing Harry G. Frankfurt's
theory of first order and second order desires, with the second order desires corresponding
to "the higher self"); cf Sen, supra note 59, at. 99 (discussing John Harsanyi's
"distinction between a person's 'ethical' preferences and his 'subjective' preferences";
the former refers to the preference one would have if societal considerations were taken
into account, while the latter relates to actual, individualistic preferences).
307. See LUTz & Lux, supra note 59, at 111 (citing William James' notion of a
"divided self"); id. at 110-21 (developing idea of a "dual self," in which one "self"
strives for higher values while the other "self" seeks simply to gratify lower wants); see
also SCHELLING, supra note 14, at 58, 62, 93-94 (discussing idea of "dual selves");
HEAP, supra note 59, at 103-15.
308. For example, Lutz and Lux point out that the statement "I wish I could give
up hamburgers," reflects two levels of preferences-two "Is." One "I" obviously prefers
1994:235 The Welfare Conundrum
The idea of "dual selves" with differing preferences has intuitive
appeal in the welfare context. Could, for example, welfare itself trigger
a shift to a different set of preferences among some welfare recipients
who initially go on welfare with the idea of "getting back on their feet"
as soon as possible? Despite the removal of some of the more demeaning
aspects of public assistance,' going on welfare remains an extremely
humiliating experience for most recipients. 1  It seems likely that
certain aspects of one's psyche, such as pride, and certain sources of
personal value, such as the ability to provide for one's family, are
suppressed in order to permit one psychologically to accept welfare and
the concomitant change in personal status.3 In other words, one could
not exist on welfare without adopting a world view in which welfare,
while perhaps not desirable, is an acceptable part of one's life rather than
a shameful sign of moral failing.
These psychic adjustments are not a sign of moral weakness; they are
psychologically necessary for survival on public assistance in a world
which equates personal worth with earning power. It is not constructive
for a person already on welfare to regard being on welfare as the most
terrible and demeaning fate imaginable and to continually berate herself
for her status as a welfare recipient. However, it is possible that these
hamburgers, while the other "I" would prefer that no hamburgers were eaten. LUTZ &
Lux, supra note 59, at 111.
309. For example, the Supreme Court's 1968 decision in King v. Smith, 392 U.S.
309 (1968), struck down the "man-in-the-house" provision, which had previously been
responsible for humiliating and intrusive nighttime enforcement raids. See, e.g., Reich,
supra note 72, at 1248 (discussing "widespread practice of conducting 'midnight raids'
on homes receiving aid to dependent children, to see if there is a 'man in the house'
310. See, e.g., Fullinwider, supra note 211, at 270-71 ("'Welfare' . . . is
shaming. Part of the shame may derive from reformable features of welfare policy, but
part inheres in the condition of disabling poverty itself."); Moon, supra note 289, at 27,
34 ("It is certainly true that the way welfare is administered can worsen the stigma
associated with receiving it; but as long as people are expected to support themselves, that
stigma is inevitable.").
311. Similarly, Charles Murray has suggested that acceptance of welfare may
represent the crossing of a psychologically significant "natural boundary." MURRAY,
supra note 3, at 184.
312. See Jon Elster, Is There (or Should There Be) a Right to Work?, in
DEMOCRACY AND THE WELFARE STATE, supra note 211, at 53, 69 ("[People often
rationalize defeat by adapting their preferences to the feasible set (sour grapes).");
ELSTER, supra note 60, at 109-40 (discussing "adaptive preferences"). See also HEAP,
supra note 59, at 219 (explaining that when a person's "self-image confronts the
experience of failure . . . [tlwo possibilities for reconciliation are present: either the
individuals lower their own estimate of their worth, i.e. self-esteem drops; or they find
an external explanation for their failure in the form of faulty competition rules, and the
disaffection attaches to these arrangements").
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adjustments alter a recipient's world-view sufficiently to change his or her
dominant strategy. Having suppressed the intangible benefits associated
with earning one's own way, choices are made based only on the mix of
benefits, money, and leisure they provide. If a decision matrix containing
only these elements yields a dominant strategy of staying on welfare, a
welfare recipient might choose that strategy even though a matrix which
fully accounted for other intangibles such as personal productivity and
self-actualization (i.e., that matrix which the same individual might have
confronted prior to going on welfare) would yield a different strategy.313
Similarly, the consumption of "leisure" 314 while on welfare could
prove demoralizing in itself and, over time, could alter the preferences of
individuals in ways that would make the climb from poverty less
likely."' As the memory of work (or learning) recedes into the past,
intangible benefits associated with those experiences (such as a feeling of
competence or pride in the mastery of certain skills)31 6 also fade and
stop being counted in the decision matrix. For an individual who cannot
find employment, affirmative suppression of those intangible benefits may
be psychologically necessary. Again, it does no good for a person to pin
her entire self-worth on her employment if no employment is available.
When and if employment eventually becomes available (or, by learning
new skills or moving to a new area, work could be found), the
suppression of the intangible benefits associated with working would be
costly to society insofar as it leads the welfare recipient to make decisions
against productive activity based on an incomplete decision matrix.
313. Such a theory would make sense out of Charles Murray's insistence that the
poor are better-off without welfare, while simultaneously demonstrating through his
elaborate "Harold and Phyllis" example that the dominant strategy for poor persons
themselves is to get and stay on welfare. See MURRAY, supra note 3, at 186. It would
also explain Irving Kristol's observation of those "who prefer[red] to work hard at low-
paying jobs, earning less than if they had gone on welfare." Kristol, supra note 185, at
42.
314. It is questionable whether the term "leisure," which has pleasant connotations
implying a break from regular productive activity, is an appropriate descriptive term for
the chronic inactivity of an unemployed person. See Elster, supra note 312, at 64
("[Bleing unemployed is not like being on holiday. It is an open-ended mode of existence
that is difficult to fill even at the best of times . . .).
315. The possibility that long spells of unemployment can fundamentally change
people has long been recognized. See id. at 67-69. In 1886, one employer asserted that
"we have always found, as to the artisan, that if he happens to be out of work for 3
months, he is never the same again." Id. at 68 (quoting PETER KELVIN & JOANNA
JARRETT, UNEMPLOYMENT: ITS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOOICALEFFEcrS 35 (1985)). Moreover,
"[i]f unemployment induces changes in people, it would not be surprising to find that
some of the changes make it more difficult for them to find new employment." Id. at 67.
316. See id. at 62-67 (discussing nonpecuniary benefits of work).
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The effect of altered preferences resulting from long-term subsistence
on welfare while not working is typically described with phrases such as
"a weakening of character."317 Such descriptions reinforce notions of
"the undeserving poor" and are of little value in setting policy. It is more
helpful to think of the poor as rational actors faced with an altered
decision matrix which yields preferred strategies which others might find
objectively sub-optimal. The challenge then is to set policy such that the
decision matrix more fully reflects all long-term costs and benefits of
different strategies.
B. Changing the Way the Nonpoor View the Game
Influencing the choices of the poor so that they choose self-help
rather than welfare is only one way of escaping from the strategic
dilemma presented by distributive issues. Changing the way the nonpoor
view the provision of assistance to the poor could also provide a way out
of the strategic conflict described in this Article. In other words, it is
conceivable that (at least in some cases) the poor and the nonpoor could
both pursue as a dominant strategy the equilibrium point in which the
nonpoor provide for the poor.31'
If such an idea seems preposterous, consider the case of Social
Security benefits for the aged. No one would dispute that one effect of
these benefits is to provide for the support of some retirement-aged
persons who would otherwise be poor. While some of those potentially
poor persons could perhaps be bluffed or cajoled into self-support during
their retirement years (through work, advance savings for retirement, or
reliance on family members), society has made the judgment that for this
group of people, public support is preferable to self-help. The reasons
for that judgment are complexly linked to policy design (which is
universal, rather than means-tested) and rhetoric (which stresses the
connection with work and the analogy to private insurance). Put simply,
the design of the program does not place the nonpoor and the poor in
strategic conflict; by making criteria other than wealth determinative, the
nonpoor and the poor find themselves on the same side.
317. See, e.g., EDWARD C. BANFIELD, THE UNHEAVENLY CITY 123 (1970).
318. See supra part III.A (describing the decision matrix for the strategic game).
The elimination of the strategic dilemma would by no means eliminate all of the costs
associated with redistribution. Nevertheless, the existence of the strategic conflict is
responsible for much of the "unfairness" costs discussed in part V.C.1. Costs would still
be associated with transferring money to the less well-off, however, and to the extent a




VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR WELFARE POLICY
A. Cash Versus In-Kind Transfers
Once a society has decided to shift some of the holdings of the more
well-off to the less well-off, it must decide what form those transfers will
take. The most administratively simple and inexpensive way to transfer
holdings from the more well-off to the less well-off is through a cash
grant to eligible persons (also known as "the negative income tax"). 9
The size of the grant can be tailored to effect the desired change in
income distribution and thus society can literally "buy" a more equal
distribution curve.
It is likely, however, that society cares less about the actual income
distribution than it does about the satisfaction of certain subsistence-level
needs of the poor.' Nevertheless, to the extent the utility functions of
the poor yield decisions which are also utility-maximizing from society's
viewpoint, a cash grant would do the trick. In-kind transfers are needed
to increase the utility of society only if they constitute forced consumption
decisions which diverge from those the poor would make on their
own.5
21
In-kind transfers are predicated on an assumption that welfare
recipients' preferences differ significantly from those of society as a
whole.' A sort of res ipsa loquitur argument may be used to support
this negative perception. As Richard Posner puts it, "[s]ome people are
319. Milton Friedman was an early proponent of this idea. See, e.g., KATZ, supra
note 46, at 103.
320. See, e.g., PoSNER, supra note 16, at 467 ("Mhe affluent may not be
concerned with the subjective utility of the poor but rather with the consumption pattern
of the poor.").
321. One form of in-kind transfer that has recently gained popularity based on
skepticism regarding the consumption choices of the poor is the distribution to panhandlers
of "vouchers" which can be redeemed for food but not for liquor. See Lourdes L.
Valeriano, Business Bulletin, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 1993, at Al; Award for Program
Excellence-Programs for the Disadvantaged, PuB. MOMT., Oct. 1993, app. at A-12
(International City/County Management Awards) (discussing the Berkeley Cares Voucher
& Donation Program). The suggestion that money not be permitted to govern the
allocation of certain kinds of goods and services, such as basic health care, is another way
of recommending in-kind transfers of those specific goods and services to the poor. See
generally WALZER, supra note 252; James Tobin, On Limiting the Domain of Inequality,
13 J.L. & ECON 263 (1970).
322. Making such assumptions about individuals is, of course, considered
paternalistic. See Wiseman & Littlechild, supra note 169, at 189 (discussing the
"paternalist framework" which posits that certain groups "are insufficiently well informed
or competent to make adequate judgments about the consumption of certain goods or
services").
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poor because they are incompetent at managing money; if so, unrestricted
cash grants may be squandered without alleviating poverty. " '
Therefore, he argues, "[t]he affluent may hope that if the poor can be
forced to buy some things rather than others, poverty will be reduced in
the long run."'
For example, assume that society would prefer that Heidi, a welfare
recipient with an infant son, engaged in consumption pattern X (which
includes, we will assume, certain levels of such items as nutritious food,
milk, warm clothing, shelter, and adequate medical care-and may
specifically exclude items such as alcohol, tobacco, and lottery tickets).
If Heidi's own preferences correspond to this consumption pattern, there
is no need to incur additional administrative costs to provide her with
these benefits "in-kind"; she will procure them on her own with the
money provided in a cash grant. If, however, Heidi's own personal
utility (as she perceives it) is maximized through a different consumption
pattern (pattern Y), her expenditures will not be utility-maximizing for the
rest of society.
Providing Heidi with in-kind benefits also generates costs. First, in-
kind benefits entail administrative costs and inefficiencies. 3" Second,
when benefits are provided in-kind, Heidi is unable to communicate the
strength of her preferences for particular goods or services. 3" Related
to this point is the phenomenon of over-utilization of certain in-kind
health benefits such as medical services.' Each additional doctor visit,
for example, entails no marginal cost other than the cost of leisure (free
if she is unemployed) and the cost involved in getting to the care
provider. With in-kind benefits, Heidi would be expected to consume
medical services right up to the point at which she obtains no benefit from
them.3"
323. POSNER, supra note 16, at 467.
324. Id.
325. For example, client nonparticipation has been a problem with the food stamp
program, indicating that in-kind benefits may not be able to deliver assistance in the most
efficient manner. See STEINER, supra note 138, at 213-20. See also KATZ, supra note
46, at 104 (discussing Heineman Commission's contention that market system can
distribute goods and services more effectively than can the government).
326. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 16, at 468.
327. Id. at 442, 448.
328. See id. at 474 ("[fin the case of health, only the sky sets a potential limit on
expenditures."). Although at first blush one might think this is the appropriate amount
of health care to consume, where resources are limited each marginal dollar spent on
health care (whether. by an individual, an insurance company or the government) should
be spent on the individual who can gain, the most from it. When money no longer serves
as a mode of expressing how much a particular service is valued, there is no way to know
whether providing that service to a given individual represents the most efficient use of
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The decision as to whether benefits should be provided in cash or in-
kind depends on whether the societal disutility (including any disutility to
Heidi's son) associated with Heidi's choosing consumption pattern Y over
consumption pattern X outweighs the disutility to Heidi in not being able
to realize her preferences,3' the increased administrative costs
associated with such transfers, liberty costs associated with increased
government control of allocation decisions, and the costs resulting from
distortion of preferences and overutilization of services.
B. Work Requirements and Other Conditional Transfers
The idea of conditioning welfare benefits on work or other behavioral
requirements is far from new,' ° but it has enjoyed a recent resurgence
of popularity." 1  The reasons such programs appear attractive are
straightforward. By conditioning the disbursement of welfare benefits on
certain behavioral patterns such as work, society seeks to both decrease
the absolute level of such expenditures and increase the utility derived
from the transfers that are made.
If a work requirement were feasible and could be enforced, it would
arguably deter some people who might otherwise do so from going on
welfare by making the mix of leisure and benefits associated with welfare
less attractive.332 This has been an age-old motivation for work
limited resources.
329. This disutility may, however, be viewed favorably by the nonpoor, insofar
as they are attempting in the context of a strategic game to make welfare appear less
favorable than self-help. See supra part VI.A. By restricting the freedom of choice a
welfare recipient has in consumption decisions, the value of the welfare option to her is
decreased.
330. For example, during the nineteenth century, relief was conditioned on
entering an almshouse in which the poor were overseen by a "poorhouse superintendent
who made them work and watched their behavior. . . ." KATZ, spra note 1, at 23. See
also PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 65, at 396 ("Monitoring and excoriating the behavior
of the poor, and conditioning access to benefits on changes in behavior, are as old as
relief arrangements.").
331. See, e.g., Marshall & Kamarek, supra note 9, at 226 (discussing increasingly
widespread consensus "that welfare and other social benefits be conditioned on changes
in the recipients' behavior"); id. at 226-28 (discussing recent state welfare reform
initiatives requiring certain behaviors); KAUs, supra note 10, at 125; MEAD, supra note
197, at 68 ("[Glovemment must couple benefits with functioning requirements.").
332. This assumes that people suffer disutility from working (at least at the types
of jobs that would be available for those fulfilling a welfare work requirement). To the
extent the poor view work as utility-generating, however, adding a work component to
a welfare program would theoretically increase rather than decrease its attractiveness and
have the unintended effect of increasing program costs by attracting, rather than deterring,
those at the margin who are deciding whether to opt for welfare or some other
The Welfare Conundrum
requirements, dating from nineteenth century "poorhouses."333 The
more stringent and unforgiving the work requirement (again, assuming it
could be enforced), the greater the disincentive effect would be.
Moreover, by making welfare less attractive, behavior patterns that
necessitate resort to welfare, such as childbearing by unwed teenagers,
would also be deterred.3'
In addition, society potentially gleans increased utility from the
transfers that are made where work requirements are enforced. This
increased utility takes at least two forms. First, and most importantly,
costs associated with perceived unfairness are reduced. Assuming work
requirements could be enforced and meaningful work could, in fact, be
found or "made," people will feel better about welfare expenditures.
Simply knowing that the welfare recipients are putting in an honest day's
work, day after day, takes some of the sting out of redistributive efforts
aimed at alleviating their want.3' Mead has similarly asserted that
work is one of the "common obligations that Americans expect of one
another. "I
The imposition of a work requirement, coupled with the provision of
guaranteed jobs, serves to remove the best excuse of the
nonworking-that one is unable to find work.337 At least in theory, it
provides a litmus test of deservedness, separating those who are willing
arrangement. See infra note 347 and accompanying text (noting the conflict between the
deterrence rationale for work programs and the idea that such programs can foster a
preference for work).
333. See KATZ, supra note 1, at 22-23.
334. See supra notes 224-26 and accompanying text (discussing deterrence of
childbearing).
335. See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 38, at 258 ("Even if the transfer recipient's task
were to dig a hole and then fill it back up, many taxpayers would surely feel less resentful
than if their tax payments had simply been given away."); see also GILDER, supra note
222, at 168 ("Make-w6rk, despite the claims of altruism by its advocates, is more often
selfish. It is done to satisfy the donor rather than the donee."). Christopher Jencks
asserts it is politically necessary for welfare to be dispensed only as a "rewardi] for
work," contending that "[in America, social-welfare policy cannot afford to be seen as
offering the indolent something for nothing." JENCKs, supra note 7, at 234.
336. MEAD, supra note 197, at 241. It seems far from clear, however, that all
Americans are truly expected to work. Any disutility arising from the perceived
unfairness of the idleness of the independently wealthy pales in comparison with the public
indictment of the perceived idleness of welfare recipients even though some members of
the former group may be, by any objective measure, more indolent. The critical
difference, of course, is that the latter group is receiving public funds-money which, in
popular opinion, should be "earned."
337. See, e.g., id. at 125 ("[Blecause jobs are guaranteed, [welfare recipients]
cannot escape by claiming work is unavailable."); KAus, supra note 10, at 141
(characterizing work test as only a way of ascertaining whether people who are not
presently working could be working).
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to work from those who simply refuse to do so, by artificially removing
the external factor of job scarcity, a factor which clouds the relationship
between un-deservedness and poverty.3"
Second, and far less certain, is the possibility that by requiring
welfare recipients to work, the preferences of those recipients will shift
in ways that will ultimately benefit both themselves and the rest of
society.339 In other words, some hope that the experience of working
will make welfare recipients and their children value the experience of
working.' The premise for this line of reasoning is the idea that lack
of work is inherently demoralizing. Hegel recognized this problematic
aspect of providing public assistance to the poor. In his view, the support
of the poor "without the mediation of work" runs "contrary to the
principle of civil society and the feeling of self-sufficiency and honor
among its individual members."" If, therefore, certain aspects of
welfare recipients' utility functions (such as taking pride in one's work)
have been suppressed through lack of work (or were never fully
developed), it could be argued that the work experience would stimulate
the integration of such factors into their utility functions. Once such
intangible factors are recognized and "counted," work becomes more
attractive relative to the passive receipt of welfare.' 2
338. In practice, works programs do not always provide such clear-cut results.
See MEAD, supra note 197, at 140-41 (noting that discretion to excuse recipients from
work requirements for "good cause" is often construed broadly by staff persons seeking
to avoid "onerous procedures and paperwork" involved in sanctioning recalcitrant
recipients).
339. This motivation for requiring work also has a long history. See KATZ, supra
note 1, at 23 (explaining that nineteenth-century poorhouses were designed not only to
deter poor from seeking relief, but were also "supposed to transform the behavior and
character of their inmates"). Nevertheless, there is "overwhelming historical evidence
that [work policies] have generally failed to reduce the welfare rolls in any appreciable
way or to improve the economic self-sufficiency of the poor." HANDLER & HASENFELD,
supra note 5, at 196-97.
340. See MEAD, supra note 73, at 164 ("[Wlithout requiring the parents to do
something to improve their own lives, particularly to work, children probably will not
learn to identify with a life of self-reliance."); Elster, supra note 312, at 69 (discussing
view that "exposure to work develops a taste for work").
341. G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RioTrr § 245, at 267
(Allen W. Wood ed. & H.B. Nishet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1821); see
Moon, supra note 289, at 28-30 (discussing Hegel's observations on this point).
342. ' The argument could also be made that the mere presence of a work program
generally reinforces societal norms regarding work, facilitating the formation and
development of preferences for work across all segments of society. See, e.g., HANDLER
& HASENFELD, supra note 5, at 40 (stating that the "key purpose" of work requirements
is "to reaffirm the work ethic").
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Of course, it is unknown to what extent a work program would be
capable of effecting such a change in preferences. Some would contend
that the very guaranteed nature of the job prevents it from constituting a
realistic work experience. Because there is no risk of being fired, there
is no incentive to expend more than minimal effort.' The superfluous
nature of the work itself may also keep participants from obtaining a
meaningful work experience, since the supervisor "knows that it makes
no difference whether the jobs are done or not."' For these reasons,
forcing welfare recipients to perform an obviously worthless job may be
unlikely to enhance self-esteem or effect socially useful shifts in their
preference schedules.' Despite these defects, however, some remain
optimistic about the potential effect of works programs on participants.
As Fullinwider explains, even the "pseudoexperience" of make-work
"may be enough to diminish welfare dependency and accomplish a
transition to self-support."'
Even assuming the preferences of welfare recipients could be altered
by providing them with the experience of working, the net effect of such
shifts in preferences remains uncertain. If welfare recipients come to
value and enjoy work, so that they assign it a positive utility value (as
society apparently wishes they would), the "workfare" experience would,
in theory, become even more attractive to them. If work comes to be a
highly valued and sought-after experience, what welfare recipient would
willingly forego the guaranteed work provided under a public works
program for the uncertainty of the private sector where work is
notoriously difficult to find and difficult to keep, especially in times of
high unemployment? 7 Hence, it is possible that fostering a work ethic
in welfare recipients would not have the intended effect of getting people
off welfare; rather, it would place the government in the position of
343. See GILDER, supra note 222, at 200 ("Crucial to a real job is the risk of
being fired if the work is not performed.").
344. Id. at 189.
345. See Elster, supra note 312, at 67 ("Self-esteem is undermined by the belief
that one is parasitic on others. If true, this claim implies that highly and visibly
subsidized work or make-believe work, like digging ditches and filling them up again, is
not a source of self-esteem.").
346. Fullinwider, supra note 211, at 272.
347. One could contend, of course, that the work experience would motivate the
welfare recipient to get off welfare and find a private sector job. However, one of the
rationales for workfare is that it is somehow less shameful and more respectable than
simply being "on the dole." To the extent this sense of respectability is internalized by
the workfare recipient, it would undercut the argument that such experience would
motivate one to leave the rolls as soon as possible.
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carrying a significant sector of society on its "payroll" in perpetuity.'
This is especially true if, as some commentators have asserted, capitalism
inevitably results in some segment of the population being unemployed at
any given time. In short, if workfare "works" to change preferences, we
would be fostering a more widespread and ingrained preference for
something that our society simply cannot supply enough of on its
own. 
3 9
One might reasonably ask whether, assuming some segment of the
population will need public assistance at any given time, it would be
better to have that segment working at public jobs rather than simply "on
the dole." As previous analysis indicates, such a move would decrease
"unfairness" costs to society and would theoretically increase the utility
of the recipients during their time on welfare (as well as increase the
utility to them and to others when and if they leave the welfare rolls).
Moreover, the recipients would, in theory, be doing productive work and
generating value through their efforts.
Balanced against these considerable benefits is the simple, empirically
demonstrated fact upon which proponents and opponents of work
requirements agree: any public work program will always cost far more
than would a simple transfer of funds.35 Of course, the fact that the
public provision of work costs money does not necessarily mean that it
should not be provided. As Michael Walzer has stated, "[w]ork itself is
one of the things men and women need, and that the community must
348. It is unlikely as a practical matter that the government would maintain such
a program for any amount of time approaching perpetuity. For example, Piven and
Cloward have observed that "work-enforcing. . ., reforms" have historically "presaged
the eventual expulsion of large numbers of people from the rolls, leaving them to fend for
themselves in a labor market where there was too little work and thus subjecting them
once again to severe economic exploitation." PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 65, at 343-
44.
349. See supra note 272 (quoting Block's assertion that we need fewer incentives
to work, not more).
350. See, e.g., BUTLER & KONDRATAS, supra note 281, at 145 (noting that
workfare would not result in short term budget cuts); KAUS, supra note 10, at 135 (citing
"best estimate" of "between $43 and $59 billion a year more than we're spending now");
MEAD, supra note 197, at 126 ("[Wlorkfare costs more per client than just paying
assistance, because of supervision and other expenses.") (footnote omitted).
That providing work is more expensive than providing money is true not only
presently, but historically as well. See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 1, at 30 ("Writing in
1894, Amos Warner pointed out how much more it usually cost to 'set the inmates of an
almshouse to work than their work is worth.' They could be supported 'more cheaply in
idleness,' he said."); PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 65, at 82 (Work relief "was far
more expensive than direct relief: the wages paid exceeded the levels of direct relief
grants, and substantial expenditures for administration and materials were required to put
people to work.").
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help provide whenever they are unable to provide it for themselves and
one another.""' However, those considerable costs must be balanced
against the utility gains society expects to receive from the work program.
The costs of a public works program do not stop with the dollars it
takes to generate and supervise jobs, provide childcare and transportation,
and train workers. Works programs can potentially create disutility for
private businesses by competing against them for workers352 or for the
provision of goods and services.353 The massive cost of a guaranteed job
program would greatly intensify any negative economic effects currently
associated with welfare. For example, some suggest that the cost burden
of such a program would fall on small and mid-sized firms who would
otherwise be able to employ people themselves."
Additionally, a public works program "requires centralized planning
and administration and invites the interventions of planners and
administrators."' 5 Increased government intervention increases liberty
costs associated with redistribution. Even Lester Thurow, a proponent of
guaranteed full employment, cautions that "[n]o one should attempt to
deny that a real, open-ended guaranteed job program would constitute a
major restructuring of our economy." 3"
Additional costs stem from the waste involved in "creating"
jobs.357 Such make-work jobs are by definition not demanded by the
market; moreover, to avoid displacing government contractors, the
projects would need to be ones that the government has heretofore been
351. WALZER, supra note 252, at 92. See also THUROW, supra note 276, at 204
("[W]e have a moral responsibility to guarantee full employment. Not to do so is like
locking the church doors and then saying that people are not virtuous if they do not go. to
church.").
352. Making public works jobs pay less than the minimum or prevailing wage is
a recognized way to avoid conflicts with the private sector. See PIVEN & CLOWARD,
supra note 65, at 95 (noting that WPA workers were paid at a rate below the prevailing
wage to avoid competing with private employers); KAus, supra note 10, at 125 (proposing
that guaranteed jobs pay "a wage slightly below the minimum wage for private sector
work") (footnote omitted). However, if, as commentators contend, public works jobs are
far less demanding than private sector work, workers might be willing to accept a
somewhat lower wage.
353. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 65, at 82 ("[Work relief raised the
specter of government activity in areas hitherto reserved for private enterprise.").
354. GILDER, supra note 222, at 193.
355. WALZER, supra note 252, at 92.
356. THUROW, supra note 276, at 204.
357. GILDER, supra note 222, at 192 ("As a general principle all public-sector
work that is created to 'develop jobs' rather than to accomplish a needed end may be
assumed to represent waste.").
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unwilling to pay for.35' Such jobs are (and always have been) difficult
to invent.' It is also questionable whether such jobs would produce
any value which would offset the cost of creating and administering
them.3'
The most devastating criticism of works programs is the inability of
society to enforce the work requirement without causing harm to
children. 61  Any welfare program that depends upon recipients
behaving in certain ways or making certain desired decisions raises the
question of what happens if the recipient refuses to cooperate. No matter
how well-designed any conditional transfer program is (including time-
restricted programs), it must be assumed that some proportion of
recipients will refuse to meet the condition for receiving the transfer.
What happens to those people? And what happens to their young
children?
To maximize the incentive to meet the requirement, a very strict
benefit cut-off rule must be applied. But this puts society to very hard
choices when a welfare recipient tests this cut-off rule by failing to meet
a particular requirement. Society might be willing to cut off benefits to
an adult recipient who failed to meet the requirement and let that person
live in whatever diminished manner he or she could, on the assumption
that the pain of hunger and homelessness would eventually alter the
person's attitudes toward the requirement in question. But where young
children are involved (and we can assume that any large-scale benefit
program will be premised upon the existence of children), letting this
scenario play itself out has very severe costs. While an adult might be
358. See Edelman, supra note 94, at 1752 ("[W]hen we talk about public job
'creation,' though, we generally mean jobs that we would not otherwise pay anyone to
do.").
359. See KATZ, supra note 1, at 30 (noting the difficulties with finding adequate
work for inmates of nineteenth-century poorhouses). However, the involvement of local
government in identifying needed work may be a promising method of alleviating some
of the "job invention" costs. See, e.g., Judith Burrell & Eugene T. Lowe, Althaus
Releases New Transportation and Community Development Projects 'Ready to Go'for
1993, U.S. MAYOR, Feb. 22, 1993, at 1, 3 (citing survey report identifying almost 4,400
"ready to go" city construction and urban transportation projects which would create an
estimated 200,000 jobs).
360. See GILDER, supra note 222, at 192-93 (citing CETA jobs which, according
to GAO figures, cost more than $20,000 each; if the job makes no net contribution to the
economy, the cost to maintain them "can be registered as a loss"). But see THUROW,
supra note 276, at 205 ("If care is shown in project selection, there is no reason why the
projects could not generate substantial net benefits.").
361. This is only one of many enforcement problems inherent in "workfare," see
generally MEAD, supra note 197, at 135-41, but it is perhaps the one least susceptible of
resolution through changes in program design or the manner in which workfare is
administered.
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able to survive for some time on an inadequate diet and with inadequate
shelter, children subjected to such conditions much more quickly succumb
to disease and death. The loss associated with the needless suffering of
a child is very costly in both human and economic terms.6' Moreover,
all of society incurs justice costs when a child (who, after all, was not the
one who failed to perform the required task) is needlessly and cruelly
punished through withdrawal of support.
The dilemma is straightforward. Children, who represent the
"deserving poor," mightbe in the charge of poor adults who do not
appear "deserving" of assistance.' Attempts to persuade or coerce
impoverished adults into prescribed behavioral patterns must ultimately
founder where children are involved, since any reduction in benefit levels
aimed at "punishing" an adult welfare recipient who is perceived as lazy
or undeserving will have the effect of punishing the child.'
The only way to avoid the "tie-in" of deserving children and
undeserving parents' is to separate children from parents who show
themselves to be "undeserving" (by, for example, failing to fulfill a work
requirement) and have the children raised by others.' For example,
Mickey Kaus has proposed that the state withdraw assistance from parents
who fail to fulfill a work requirement, and that it then remove children
from these "unfit" homes if "squalor and filth" results from this
withdrawal of support.6 7  Aside from the potential legal and
362. See supra part IIL.C (discussing impact of children on strategic dilemma); part
NV.E (noting that society's utility is inextricably linked with the utility of its children).
363. See supra notes 264-65 and accompanying text.
364. See Edelman, supra note 94, at 1751 n.253 ("The punishment of an AFDC
parent's recalcitrance ultimately falls on the children, the most vulnerable and blameless
AFDC recipients."); OKUN, supra note 115, at 111 ("Generous aid removes important
economic incentives that discourage women from getting into dependent positions, and that
discourage their men from putting them there. But stingy aid denies the right to survival
to the children of these broken families. The disincentive to the parents and the diet for
the children are a tie-in sale; and that creates a particularly nasty tradeoff.").
365. OKUN, supra note 115, at 111.
366. The disruption of impoverished families is not unprecedented. See generally
KATZ, supra note 1, at 103-09 (Although entire families were initially moved into
poorhouses together, reformers thought it better to remove children from the
poorhouses-and from their parents.). By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the
removal of children from their parents was desired by reformers who thought this measure
was necessary "so that pauper parents could not pass on their lax morality and distaste for
work to their children." Id. at 103.
367. See KAus, supra note 10, at 126-27. Kaus does not supply details concerning
the manner in which such monitoring for "squalor and filth" would transpire. Aside from
the liberty intrusions inherent in such monitoring of families (who, remember, are no
longer even receiving any government assistance), it seems quite likely that such extreme
conditions of grinding, unalleviated poverty would often destroy the health or take the
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constitutional difficulties with any such approach," it seems that it
would entirely miss the point. Does it really make sense to remove a
newborn baby from its mother simply because she refuses to leave the
baby at a government day-care facility all day to toil at a job that nobody
needs her to do? By separating children from their families, the children
are still being punished for their parents' perceived sins (albeit in a
psychologically rather than physically damaging manner).' Nor would
this plan operate to reduce the monetary costs of alleviating poverty; on
the contrary, it would be exceedingly expensive."
C. Universal Versus Means-Tested Transfers
A perennial controversy in welfare policy formulation is the extent
to which benefits should be narrowly targeted at the poor, rather than
spread across a larger segment of society.371  Gilbert Steiner contrasts
"crude" means-tested relief efforts which "limit[] benefits to those who
can establish need" with the more "subtle" universal efforts, which
"spreadi] benefits across a broad spectrum of the population, subsidizing
many without need as well as those in need." 3
Traditional redistributive measures are means-tested; benefits go only
to those who can establish a certain level of neediness. AFDC, food
stamps, Medicaid, and other "poverty" programs fall into this
category. 31 Social Security is a broad-based universal program;
everyone with a work history (or a spouse with a work history) is eligible
lives of innocent children before state officials arrived to declare their home "unfit."
368. The Supreme Court has given parental rights great deference, indicating that
they may be dissolved only where a "powerful countervailing interest" is present. See
Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) ("[A] parent's desire for
and right to 'the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children'
is an important interest that 'undeniably warrants deference, and absent a powerful
countervailing interest, protection.'") (citation omitted).
369. See, e.g., Elaine C. Kamarck & William A. Galston, A Progressive Family
Policy for the 1990s, in MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 9, at 153, 175 (citing "the
confusing and ultimately damaging world of foster care" in which a child removed from
the home "goes from one set of bad circumstances to another"). Although foster care
may be the best available alternative where conditions of violence and abuse compel the
removal of a child from the home, it makes little sense to subject children from loving
homes to this system simply so that an impoverished welfare mother can be punished for
failing to comply with behavioral requirements.
370. Aside from the cost of providing foster care to a child, one would expect high
administrative costs to be associated with the removal of a child from the home.
371. See, e.g., GLAZER, supra note 94, at 86-97.
372. STEINER, supra note 138, at,2.
373. Id. at 3; GLAZER, supra note 94, at 86.
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for benefits 74 Other programs which benefit the middle class as well
as the poor, such as federal college and housing loans, also fall in the
latter category.3
So-called "universal" programs are not really universally available;
they merely distribute benefits on the basis of some criterion or criteria
other than income and wealth. 76 In so doing, they avoid the
administrative cost of determining whose holdings and income are below
a certain level and the cost of seeking to enforce that eligibility
requirement (including costs of monitoring to ensure that welfare
recipients are neither working nor saving in violation of the eligibility
requirements). 3' New administrative costs are presented,
however-those associated with determining who is eligible based on the
new criteria (for example, whether a person is employed, or whether a
person is a parent).37
On the other hand, costs for universal programs are increased by the
fact that such programs necessarily assist some who are more well-off, as
well as those who are less well-off. If the goal is redistribution to the less
well-off, spreading benefits across both the well-off and the less well-off
would seem to be a quite inefficient way of achieving it. 3  As Kuttner
notes, "the welfare state is a kind of sand castle. As the benefits are piled
higher, it continuously erodes. As the welfare state becomes larger and
more universal, it also becomes less redistributive. "3" Or, as
Christopher Jencks has observed, "If we Want to redistribute income, the
most effective strategy is probably still to redistribute income. "381 But
the analysis in this Article suggests that mere redistribution is not
society's true goal. Society is interested in effecting a more complex
change not only in the utility of the less well-off, but also in their
374. See STEiNER, supra note 138, at 2-3.
375. See id.
376. An exception may have been the "demogrant" proposed by George McGovern
in his 1972 presidential campaign. Although details concerning the plan were sparse, the
basic idea was that "[e]ach person would get a minimal sum from the government for
maintenance. It would be returned by way of taxation if that person earned enough from
work not to need it." GLAZER, supra note 94, at 86.
377. Id.
378. Even a universal health care program would require a determination as to
whether one was sick and in need of health care products or services.
379. See KuTrNER, supra note 10, at 40-41 ("Clearly means tested programs
would target more income to the genuinely needy and therefore accomplish more
redistribution in the literal sense."); GLAZER, supra note 94, at 92 (noting low "target
efficiency" of universal "children's allowances").
380. KutrNER, supra note 10, at 231.
381. Id. at 40-41 (quoting Christopher Jencks).
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preferences."* Hence, a more detailed analysis is required to determine
whether this more complex goal is more efficiently met through a
universal program.
It has also been argued that, given limited -resources, "[rleliance
upon universality would have the effect of condemning many people to
much lower levels of well-being than would be the case under a selective
program that concentrated help on those most in need." 3" That
contention assumes that the amount of money available for poverty-
alleviation programs is fixed and static, regardless of program design.
This country's experience with Social Security vividly illustrates that this
is simply not the case. The amount of money available, while not exactly
unlimited, expands and contracts based upon the political attractiveness
of the particular package involved. Because a more universal program
provides benefits to more people in society, one of its chief advantages
has always been its political palatability.'" Put simply, a universal
program may cost more money, but it will also be capable of drawing in
more money. The net effect on the lot of the poor of universalizing
assistance is therefore indeterminate.
One advantage of a redistributive program which is not means-tested
is the avoidance of perverse incentives to get and stay below some
arbitrary level of income and holdings."' There will, however, be an
incentive to bring oneself within the category of persons eligible for
benefits. It has been suggested, for example, that all families (or, in
some variations, all working families) with children be eligible for some
type of family allowance. 3" While this would not discourage work (at
least as long as the grant amount was held constant across all income
levels), it would encourage the bearing of children. Moreover, if the
grant amount varied with family size, as is usually suggested,3" the
bearing of additional children would not be discouraged.
These "childbearing" effects would, in a universal program, be felt
across all of society rather than be limited to the poor. For example, a
middle class family which is reticent about having an additional child for
382. As Irving Kristol has aptly noted, if poverty is defined as having an income
of less than a certain amount, the government could "abolish poverty" by simply
transferring the shortfall to those who fit this definition; however, "this statistical
achievement is quite meaningless, in human terms." Kristol, supra note 185, at 36.
383. Moon, supra note 289, at 50.
384. See infra note 396 and accompanying text.
385. See GLAZER, supra note 94, at 86 ("They [means-tested programs] can have
perverse effects: people may restrict their income so as to become or remain eligible.").
386. See id. at 92; JENCKS, supra note 7, at 233-34; WILSON, supra note 223, at
152.
387. See, e.g., JENCKS, supra note 7, at 233-34.
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money reasons might find that the family assistance grant made just
enough of a difference to allow them to have that child. If these effects
were significant, costs of the program would obviously go even higher.
Society would, in effect, be encouraging all families to produce more
children than they can afford to care for, a policy which makes little sense
unless society, for independent reasons, wishes to stimulate population
growth.
Universal programs, by making married women with working
husbands eligible (as well as those women who are unmarried and those
who have unemployed husbands), would not create the disincentives to
marriage that allegedly currently exist."' Yet a series of studies
conducted in connection with the Nixon administration's proposed Family
Assistance Plan (PAP) revealed that guaranteed income programs
increased family breakups. 3 9 The apparent reason for this phenomenon
was simply the increase in money which gave women the financial
freedom to extricate themselves from unpleasant relationships; without the
money, they were dependent on their husbands' income and unable to
leave.3' This is, of course, the same phenomenon one would expect
if those same women were able to obtain jobs and earn their own
income.3 91
By using a universal program to redistribute wealth, costs associated
with demeaning means-testing procedures are avoided. Moreover,
because rich and poor alike are eligible, no stigma is attached to receipt
of benefits.' Thus, preference adjustments that may attach to "going
on welfare"-adjustments which in theory hinder one from leaving
welfare-are avoided. 3 By removing distinctions between those who
388. See supra part V.B.4 (discussing family structure costs).
389. See generally MOYNIHAN, supra note 199.
390. See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
391. Id.
392. See ELLWOOD, supra note 1, at 23-25 (discussing the "Targeting-Isolation
Conundrum"); GLAZER, supra note 94, at 86; KUtrNER, supra note 10, at 231
("Targeting aid to the 'truly needy' tends to isolate the poor in separate programs and
erodes the political constituency for equality. It creates a welfare-state culture that is not
just means-tested, but mean-spirited. But the more equitable solution-broad citizen-
entitlement programs-is expensive and in some respects inefficient."); Moon, supra note
289, at 32 ("What is demeaning about receiving welfare is in part the invidious distinction
that the receipt of welfare itself makes between those who receive it and those who do
not.").
393. See supra part VI.A. I1. See also Lee Rainwater, Stigma in Income-Tested
Programs, in INCOME-TEsTED TRANSFER PROGRAMS, supra note 287, at 19, 39-40 ("[Alt
least for some significant minority of 'charity cases' long-term effects can be quite
negative in shaping a self-definition that suggests they are in some way permanently
impaired and failed."); id. at 39 ("[Ilt should be obvious that the cost of warding off
stigmatization is lower with some kinds of programs, such as universal payments, than
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are on welfare and those who are not, universal social programs "can help
create a common society and a common nation."' But the absence of
stigma can also cut the other way by removing the deterrent effect of
shame. 395
Probably the most important advantage of universal programs is their
political attractiveness." The success of Social Security largely inheres
in the fact that it provides something for virtually everyone. Not only
does every taxpayer have the assurance of benefits in old age, but a great
many of them observe first-hand the significance of Social Security
payments in the lives of their own parents, including the lessening or
elimination of a financial burden which would otherwise fall on them.
Similarly, the fact that a universal family grant would, by definition, help
all families adds greatly to its political palatability.
The model of universality provided by Social Security is certainly
compelling,' yet the massive costs of implementing a universal family
assistance program are daunting. Moreover, an administrative loss would
be associated with such a program, since most of the disbursements made
with others.").
394. GLAZER, supra note 94, at 95. In fact, the ability of universal programs to
draw together different socio-economic groups may be somewhat limited. Even where
benefits are provided on a universal basis, the poor may still find themselves treated less
well by benefit administrators than their more well-off counterparts. See Moon, supra
note 289, at 50-51 (citing NEIL GILBERT, CAPITALISM AND THE WELFARE STATE:
DILEMMAS OF SOCIAL BENEVOLENCE 71 (1983)). James Coleman has also found that the
evidence is inconclusive as to whether universal programs really increase social cohesion,
rather than merely altering the nature of social division. Coleman, supra note 287, at 67,
88.
395. See Coleman, supra note 287, at 67, 72 ("In response to the argument that
income-tested programs .produce stigma, the argument for income-testing would assert
such stigma is valuable and necessary."); supra part V1.A.1 (discussing deterrence and
work-ethic effects of stigmatizing public assistance).
396. See KUTTNER, supra note 10, at 40 ("To win broad popular support, social
programs must be of high quality and must serve the middle class as well as the poor.").
According to Kuttner, the resulting "'leak' of benefits to the nonpoor" is not only
"socially desirable; it is politically indispensable." Id. See also Hugh Heclo, The
Political Foundations ofAntipoverty Policy, in FiGHTINo POVERTY 313, 330 (Sheldon H.
Danziger & Daniel H. Weinberg eds., 1986) (Studies have consistently shown that "the
truly popular programs" are "mass-based" programs such as "pensions, health care [and]
education," while "considerable unpopularity is attached to programs that are most
directly relevant to the poor: public assistance, food stamps, social services, and the
like.") (citations omitted). Indeed, William Julius Wilson has suggested that more
targeted programs be packaged with the universal ones so that the former will be
accepted. See WILSON, supra note 223, at 154-55.
397. See LOCKHART, supra note 77, at 4 (suggesting that the politically attractive
"design features of social security could be adapted for the development of social merging
programs directed at reducing poverty").
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under such a program would then inevitably be recaptured from the more
well-off through taxation, with money leaking out throughout the
process.?
VIII. TOWARD THE OPTIMAL WELFARE PROGRAM:
PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS
One way of capturing the benefits of universality without requiring
the government to engage in wholesale cutting of benefit checks for every
family in the country would be some sort of universal family loan
fund.' Loans are critical to the basic workings of economic life for
a majority of citizens, yet the poor, by virtue of their low beginning
position, are not given the same opportunity as other Americans to better
their overall position by borrowing against future earnings. °  Unlike
the Crusoe character described in Heyne's textbook example, the poor
must struggle for a meager subsistence income (or accept it from others),
since they cannot purchase the means for bettering their condition on
credit.4" As Arthur Okun has recognized, the blocked access of the
poor to capital results in significant inefficiency, even as it increasesinequality.'
While the details of such a loan program would have to be
painstakingly hammered out, a basic design is easy to imagine. Like
Social Security, "contributions" to the family loan fund could be withheld
from paychecks' (although a work history would not be a necessary
398. See GLAZER, supra note 94, at 88-89 ("[Universal subsidy payment] involves
mailing out checks to 200 million people in order to help 20 or 40 million, and then
having 160 or 180 million mail back checks.") (quoting Kesselman and Garfinkel, in turn
quoting Milton Friedman).
399. The idea of loaning government funds to the poor has been endorsed by
President Clinton. Clinton proposed that a $382 million government fund be established
to make credit available in impoverished areas which would be modeled after a successful
bank established in Bangladesh to make loan money available to poor village women.
Kenneth H. Bacon, Clinton Looks to a Bank in Bangladesh for Model to Help U.S. Poor
Get Loans, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1993, at A2. About 40 loan funds based on the
Bangladesh model have already been established in the United States, mostly by
foundations. Id. Default rates for these funds range between 0% and 3%, no higher than
the default rates for commercial banks. Id.
400. See, e.g., Okun, supra note 148, at 23 (Because of "the disadvantage low-
income citizens suffer in access to capital,... investments in human capital by the poor"
are discouraged.) (footnote omitted).
401. See supra text accompanying note 167.
402. See Okun, supra note 148, at 23.
403. Cf Simon, supra note 19, at 1485 (noting that in Social Security context
"special purpose fund financing" has been "traditionally considered essential to the private
law analogy").
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precondition to drawing on the reserve fund). The fund could be accessed
upon proof that one was responsible for the support of a dependent child
or children, and the amount available for withdrawal would be a monthly
disbursement based on family size, much as AFDC is now.
Unlike AFDC, however, disbursements would be styled as loans
from the fund rather than grants, and would not be means-tested. Full
account information would accompany each month's disbursement
(including a running total of the amount borrowed). The amount
borrowed, or some prorated amount of it in the case of low-income
borrowers, would be repaid with interest in future months or years based
on a repayment plan keyed to the recipient's income level. For example,
the repayment plan. could feature grace periods during which no interest
would accrue, and no repayment would be required for low income or
unemployed borrowers. An explicit work reward could also be built into
the system by, for example, providing loan forgiveness for those working
in low-paying jobs.' By adjusting repayment terms and interest rates
(perhaps by applying progressively higher interest rates to those in higher
income brackets), the more well-off could be discouraged from resorting
to the fund, except when absolutely necessary.
In order to control costs, caps would need to be put on how many
consecutive and total months of disbursements would be available in a
given time period.' When the allotted number of disbursements is
close to being exhausted, intensive job training and placement services
would become mandatory for unemployed borrowers." If this proved
unsuccessful, and the allotted disbursements were ultimately exhausted,
the individual would stop receiving checks out of the family loan fund and
would have to rely on other sources of funding. '  By working for
some period of time, however, an individual could regain eligibility for
access to the fund.
404. Care would have to be taken to avoid creating perverse incentives against
attaining higher income levels. Any benefits of a lower income job, such as loan
forgiveness or better interest rates, would have to be phased out gradually as income
increases to avoid creating sharp "notches" that would discourage work effort. See supra
note 199 and accompanying text (discussing this problem in the context of the Family
Assistance Plan).
405. This limitation would also create an incentive for those in short-term straits
to get back to work as quickly as possible, so as to "save" remaining months of
assistance. C). ELLWOOD, supra note 1, at 123 (positing that "transitional assistance"
would create 'a strong incentive to go back to work quickly so as to save as much of your
transitional assistance as possible for other periods of hardship").
406. Employed borrowers would simply go on "repayment status" at the
exhaustion of the allotted disbursements. No further checks would be sent out, and a
repayment plan would kick in (perhaps after a grace period had elapsed).
407. See infra text accompanying note 411 (discussing "second tier" of benefits).
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What impact would such a plan have upon those who now receive
AFDC payments? First, it would remove the stigma of means-tested
welfare, reducing the costs associated with the suppression of socially
valuable preferences. Second, loans are better than grants at avoiding
perverse incentives. Loans would remove the tremendous disincentives
to work which now exist. Granted, a person who remained unemployed
and in poverty would never have to repay his or her disbursements. But
since working would not disqualify one from continuing to receive
disbursements (although it might expose one to the withholding tax), one
could be made better off by working than by not working. And, while
making grants available to people with children may have the tendency to
increase the number of people giving birth to children they can't afford
to support," making loans available during the childbearing years
simply shifts the time of payment for child-related expenses without
changing the total cost a potential parent must consider.
The "unfairness" costs of the present welfare system would be
reduced greatly: low-income or unemployed parents would be drawing on
the same fund as their more well-off counterparts. Ability to draw on the
fund would be viewed as a short-term prerogative of parenthood. Indeed,
parenthood would simply be treated as a cash-flow crunch, much like
college. In this manner, the strategic dilemma between the poor and the
nonpoor could be sidestepped, since both poor and nonpoor persons
would benefit from the program.
The fact that the disbursements are loans which must be repaid has
several positive psychological effects. First, it does not have the
appearance of a handout, either to the recipient or to the rest of society.
Second, it implicitly communicates that the borrower is expected to
succeed in the future and have the wherewithal to pay society back what
he or she borrowed from it during a difficult time. Hence such a
program would be unlikely to trigger destructive preference shifts that
could lead to greater dependency; on the contrary, it would be likely to
foster a sense of autonomy and competence.' Nor is it merely a
408. See supra part VII.C (discussing the incentive impacts of a universal family
assistance program).
409. This would represent one way of extending to poor families some measure
of the same choices about family configuration and work that nonpoor families have. As
Handler and Hasenfeld have argued, extending such choices to poor families plays an
important role in welfare reform. See HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 5, at 232
(emphasizing the need for "a program of inclusion-poor mothers and their children
would be treated the same as the nonpoor. They would be given the same choices that
other mothers have-full- or part-time paid labor or homemaking and child rearing. Like
the nonpoor, they could choose independent life or marriage"). A loan program, it is
important to recognize, would not (at least in theory) be extending poor families a greater
measure of choice about such matters as reproduction and work than is available to other
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fiction to characterize the disbursements as loans rather than grants
because the government will be able to reduce program costs greatly by
getting funds back from those who are ultimately able to repay.
In sum, such a program would have the benefit of ameliorating
poverty costs without creating high levels of decision costs. To be sure,
some increases in "provision costs" would be expected-more money
would be moved, and into more hands than is presently the case. Yet the
loan paradigm of the program would temper these increases, since some
percentage of the money would ultimately be recaptured.
Although a family loan fund would be the centerpiece of welfare
reform directed at minimizing costs, it could not stand alone. The
weakest link in such a loan program is the necessity for limitations as to
how long one may draw funds. Once the idea of a cutoff is incorporated
into the program, however, the inevitable question arises as to what
happens to those who do not end up supporting themselves by the time
their "draw" runs out. 410  At that point, recipients would enter a
second tier of support which would, by definition, possess many of the
flaws which the loan program sought to avoid. It would, of course, be
targeted only at the very poor and premised upon there being no (or
insufficient) income, creating the same perverse incentives AFDC does
today. The more generous and flexible the "first tier" loan program is,
the fewer people will fall within the purview of this less desirable and
more socially costly second tier. Overall, the potential for some
improvement over the present situation exists, simply by reducing the size
of this second group. 1'
IX. CONCLUSION
The poverty problem cannot be easily solved, either in theory or in
practice. The foregoing ideas merely represent starting points for
discussion and analysis in the remarkably complex realm of redistributive
policy. Nevertheless, the construction of a framework which draws out
the complex and subtle interactions in poverty policy helps by asking the
right questions of proposed programs.
A principled understanding of the conflicts implicit in welfare policy,
as well as the opposing interests and competing visions of fairness and
families-like the more well-off, the poor would have to consider the cost of their choices.
410. This is, of course, the same problem that the Clinton administration must face
in attempting to institute time-limited welfare. See, e.g., Mickey Kaus, Wetfare Waffle,
NEw REPuBLIC, Oct. 12, 1992, at 11.
411. Cf Edelman, supra note 94, at 1733 ("The aim of any good antipoverty
strategy should be to maximize the number of people who are self-sufficient, and to
minimize the number of people for whom all policies other than income support fail.").
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justice which underlie them, is an important first step in understanding
and moving beyond the strategic dilemma which poverty policy presents.
By understanding more fully what costs are involved in alleviating
poverty-and what we as a society stand to gain from poverty
alleviation-dialogue concerning the appropriate policy measures may be
furthered.

